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1 Introduction
Thinking, or knowledge getting, is far from being the armchair thing it is often supposed to be. The reason it is not an  
armchair thing is that it is not an event going on exclusively within the cortex […] Hands and feet, apparatus and  
appliances of all kinds are as much a part of it as changes within the brain.1
Traditionally in the modern western thought the mind has been conceived as isolated and detached 
from the  body  and  the  rest  of  the  world.  Descartes2 for  instance  put  forward  a  metaphysical 
dichotomy  between  the  mind  and  the  body  to  the  conclusion  that  the  mind  is  something 
ontologically distinct from physical substance. Specifically, mind is concerned with  thinking and 
other  such  mental  phenomena,  but  is not  divisible  and  extendable  in  space.  Descartes  also 
advanced the view that the brain (the pineal gland to be specific) was the location where the mind 
causally interacted with the body so that mindful action would be possible.3 This interaction was 
conceived to be quite rudimentary, as Michael Wheeler puts it: '[there was a] bidirectional channel  
of causation that ran from body to mind in perception, and from mind to body in action.' 4 This 
metaphysical dichotomy has been dubbed Cartesian substance dualism. 
Now, even though there has been divergence from this sort of Cartesianism and everything 
is for instance argued to be of one physical substance, i.e. mental phenomena are reducible or  
identical to, realized or determined by, or supervene on some physical processes, for the most part  
the notion of an isolated mind has persisted both in philosophy and in the multidisciplinary field of  
cognitive  science.5 One clear  example  of  the  sort  of  isolationism present  in  the  early  work of 
cognitive science is a computer analogy of cognition, where the mind is seen as the software run by 
the  hardware of  the  brain.  In  this  picture  cognition  is  characterised  as  a  process  of  symbol-
manipulation that relies on the syntactic (rule-like) and semantic (meaningful) properties of the 
symbols. This symbol-manipulation is an input-output process, where the symbolic inputs received 
through the senses get translated in the mind/brain to other symbols that result as an output, e.g.  
overt physical behaviour. Hence, because the focus is purely on the internal manipulation of the 
symbolic inputs and outputs, cognition is essentially seen as an isolated process separated from the 
world.6 Susan  Hurley  aptly  characterises  this  sort  of  view  as  a  sandwich  model  of  cognition. 
Perception and action are separated from each other and the higher cognitive processes; they are  
the buns and cognition is the filling in between.7
1 John Dewey 1916: 13–14
2 Descartes 1641; There are modern philosophers that also adhere to the tradition of conceiving the mind as 
essentially isolated, e.g. Locke, Hume and Kant (see Gallagher 2009).
3 Descartes 1641: 51–64, 241
4 Wheeler 2005: 21
5 Wheeler 2005: 21–23; Rowlands 2010: 2; For philosophers who hold on to an isolated mind see e.g. Fodor (1983, 
2000) and Adams & Aizawa (2008). In this thesis I will examine more fully Adams & Aizawa's position.
6 Cowart 2005: sec.1; Shapiro 2007: 338–339; Varela et al. 1991: 8; Rowlands 2010: 2–6
7 Hurley 2001: 3-4, see also her 1998.
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This sort of traditional approach to cognition will henceforth be referred to as cognitivism.8 
Even  if  proponents  of  cognitivism  have  moved  away  from  the  early  simplistic  picture  of  the 
computer analogy, they still hold on to the notion whereby the brain with its neuronal processes  
houses and ultimately explains all cognitive processes and mental phenomena. Hence, the mind is 
still isolated to the brain and the boundary of cognition has been drawn at the skin and skull of the  
head. As Mark Rowlands succinctly summarises the cognitivist position: 'whatever else is true of 
mental  processes, whether they are abstract  formal processes or patterns of activity in a neural  
network (or both)–they are processes that occur inside the head of the thinking organism.'9 
Lately in the philosophy of mind and the general field of cognitive sciences, there has risen  
an interest in the possibility of departing from this cognitivist position. These views react against the 
sandwich model of cognition because it neglects the role our bodies, the surrounding world, tools  
and  artefacts,  and  our  active  participation  in  this  (cultural)  environment  have  in  structuring 
cognitive processing. Some of the authors have started to talk about 4E Cognition, originally due to 
Shaun Gallagher10 and alluding to the nature of cognition being  embodied,  embedded,  enacted, 
and extended. The move from traditional theories of cognition to 4E theories may be characterised 
as  moving  from  a  restricted,  or  isolated,  view  of  cognition  to  a  more  systemic  view  that  
encompasses the brain, body and the world as equal partners. 
The current debate surrounding these issues is vivid. This is exemplified for instance by 
journal  themes and issues  dedicated to exploring the  4E nature  of cognition.  See  for  instance  
Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences (2010) 9(4): Special issue: 4E Cognition: Embodied,  
Embedded, Enacted, Extended;  Topoi (2009) 28(1):  The enacted mind and the extended mind; 
Teorema (2011) 30(2): Special Section: The Extended Mind; and Cognitive Systems Research (2010)  
11(4): Special Issue on Extended Mind.
Yet,  the beginnings of 4E may be traced back to the early  1990's.  Early seminal  works 
include the following: in embodied and embedded cognition John Haugeland's 1998 paper 'Mind  
Embodied and Embedded' and Andy Clark's 1997 book Being There; in enactive cognition Varela, 
Thompson,  and  Rosch's  1991  book  The  Embodied  Mind (where  ideas  of  embodiment  and 
embeddedness were also present); in extended cognition Andy Clark and David Chalmers' 1998 
paper 'The Extended Mind' (although similar ideas were already present in Clark's 1997 book and 
Rob Wilson's 1994 paper 'Wide Computationalism').11 
In addition to the four Es there could be rightly added a D; that of  distributed cognition 
developed most notably by researchers in the University of San Diego (California), such as Edwin  
8 Varela et.al. 1991; Other terms for this type of approach to cognition include individualism (Wilson & Clark 2009; 
Wilson 2004; Menary 2010b), classicism (Cowart 2005), isolationism (Clark 1998a), and brainbound (Clark 2008a).
9 Rowlands 2010: 2–3
10 See Gallagher (2008a) and Rowlands (2009b: 3, 219n4).
11 There are many other early theorists that share a commitment to 4E type of approach to cognition. See for instance 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Hurley (1998), Van Gelder (1995), Rumelhart et al. (1986), Beer (1990), Ballard (1991) 
and Järvilehto (1998a, b; 1999; 2000; 2009)
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Hutchins, Jim Hollan and David Kirsh in the late 1980's and 1990's. Hutchins' 1995 book Cognition 
in the Wild, may be regarded as the seminal  work in this context. The relevance of distributed 
cognition comes from its similar and pertinent theoretical commitments and the growing interest in 
it in the current discussion about the nature of cognition. 
The most significant and fiercest critics of 4ED are Fred Adams and Kenneth Aizawa with 
their numerous individual and co-authored articles and their 2008 book The Bounds of Cognition, 
and Robert  Rupert  with  his  numerous  articles  and  his  2009  book  Cognitive  Systems  and  the  
Extended Mind. It is important to note that in addition to the 1990's works the idea of cognition 
not  being  restricted  to  the  head  is  already  present  in  the  phenomenological  and  pragmatic  
traditions. The ideas of philosopher's such as Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Peirce, and Dewey 
bear close resemblance to the contemporary accounts. In fact these ideas have re-emerged in the  
contemporary 4ED literature and are cited and referenced, if not explicitly made use of, by some of  
the 4ED theorists.12
The  aim  of  this  thesis  then  is  to  examine,  compare  and  contrast  the  different  4ED 
approaches to cognition in relation to each other and the criticisms that have been raised against  
them.13 There are four specific research questions that guide this thesis. I) What are the theoretical  
commitments the different accounts of cognition in 4ED hold on to and how do these relate to  
each other? I deem this question crucial because even if the views share similar commitments they 
are often unwarrantedly confounded by simply lumping them together without paying attention to 
their distinct theoretical features. II) (Why) should distributed cognition be added with the rest of  
the  4E  accounts? This  second  question  stems  from  the  increasing  interest  and  relevance  of 
distributed cognition in the current debate about the boundaries of cognition. This is most evident 
in the so-called “second-wave extended cognition” and questions pertaining to cognitive agency. Yet  
distributed cognition has not been accredited a detailed analysis in the context of 4ED. Hence, I  
deem it important to provide one, and in doing so to see how it might offer a unique point of view 
and insight to the nature and study of cognition. III)  What critique does 4ED face and how does  
providing a mark of the cognitive affect both the proponents as well as the opponents of 4ED? The 
relevance of a mark of the cognitive stems from the challenges that have been raised against 4ED.  
Yet importantly, it seems that it levels the ground between 4ED and the orthodox cognitivism. This 
again highlights the possible viability of the 4ED approach. There lies also the independent (meta-
level) issue of the need of providing this kind of mark in the first place in order to study cognitive 
phenomena and draw the boundaries of cognition. IV )  How does the notion of cognitive agency  
12 For accounts of the historical roots of 4ED type approach to cognition and mind see e.g. Clark (1997: ch.8 sec. 8), 
Thompson (2007: Part one), Gallagher (2009), Anderson (2003), and Clancey (2009).
13 In this thesis there will be a conceptual distinction between mind and cognition. Mind and mental states in general 
are distinguished from the broader notions of cognition and cognitive processes in that they essentially involve 
experiential states (e.g. sensation of pain) and propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, intentions, etc.) The focus 
in this thesis will be on cognition. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 12; Clark 2008a: xxviii, 233n4; Drayson 2010: 374–
375; Rupert 2004). Also cognition and cognitive processes need/should not be understood as conscious 
phenomena. (Clark & Chalmers 1998: 10; Adams & Aizawa 2001: 48)
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figure in the 4ED approach(es) to cognition?  If one is persuaded about the viability of 4ED, then 
interesting issues are brought to light with regards to how the different views conceive cognitive  
agency.  Each  of  the  4ED theories  have  a  somewhat  different  take  on  agency,  and  hence  it  is 
interesting to see what kind of similarities and differences between the approaches are highlighted.
The first research question concerning the theoretical commitments of the 4ED approaches 
runs through the whole thesis. Yet specifically, chapters 2–5 focus exclusively on looking into the  
specific theoretical commitments of each individual 4ED approach. The second research question to 
do with the status of distributed cognition as part of 4E is covered in chapter 5. After examining the 
various notions of 4ED I will inspect in chapter 6 the most notable criticisms and defences of 4ED,  
as well as the interesting issues this debate brings forth concerning the mark of the cognitive (the 
third research question). The exploration into the notion of cognitive agency follows in chapter 7 
(the fourth research question). There I will look into how the different 4ED approaches conceive 
cognitive agency, and how this highlights both the theoretical overlap and differences between the 
approaches. Finally chapter 8 concludes the thesis with a summary of the main aspects that are 
covered under the four research questions. I will ponder the significance of this sort of discussion 
in general, and in particular whether a comprehensive framework for cognition is seen to emerge. I  
will also look at some open questions and further possible directions for the applicability of 4ED.
The philosophical relevance of the issues examined in this thesis vary from the principal  
and long-lasting  question  concerning  the  nature  of  mind  and  cognition  to  the  importance  of  
providing  an  elucidatory  examination  of  the  unorthodox approaches  to  cognition.  Due to  the 
current vivid debate surrounding these 4ED approaches it  is  important to clarify,  compare and 
contrast the various positions since this sort of examination is lacking in the literature. Indeed as  
will become clear in the course of this thesis there is overlap between the approaches exemplified 
by  the  continuing  refinement,  development  and  evolution  of  the  conceptions.  Thus,  by  first  
establishing a solid grounding on the various conceptions one is then later able to take on other 
interesting philosophical questions. For instance there is a host of normative questions that arise  
from allowing  cognition  to  include  cultural  artefacts  and other  people.  Also  it  would  be very 
interesting to see how the role of representation varies across the 4ED approaches and what this  
would mean for the orthodox conception of  representation.  Since  the 4ED approaches have a  
multi- and interdisciplinary backgrounds, with the authors taking inspiration from various empirical  
fields such as cognitive science, artificial intelligence, neuroscience, biology and psychology, the 
current  investigation  also  pushes  the  boundaries  of  traditional  philosophical  inquiry.  Hence,  I  
ultimately  hope  this  thesis  helps  to  articulate  and  provide  nouvelle  points  of  view  to  the 
understanding  and  study  of  cognitive  phenomena  and  this  way  provide  a  basis  for  further 
philosophical investigation that might precipitate from the sort of approaches to cognition under 
discussion here.
4
2 Embodied-Embedded Cognition
If we are to understand mind as the locus of intelligence, we cannot follow Descartes in regarding it as separable in  
principle from the body and the world […] Broader approaches, freed of that prejudicial commitment, can look again  
at perception and action, at skillful involvement with public equipment and social organization, and see not principled  
separation but all sorts of close coupling and functional unity [...] Mind, therefore, is not incidentally but intimately 
embodied and intimately embedded in its world.14
This chapter explores the notion of embodied-embedded cognition, which comprises the first two 
Es of 4E cognition. I have grouped together the notions of embodiment and embeddedness for four 
reasons. 1) They have risen quite simultaneously and interdependently. 2) Embodiment has often  
been used in the sense of embeddedness, or interchangeably with It. I.e. emphasis has often in the  
literature been placed both on the role of the environment (which is the focus of embeddedness)  
and the body (which is the focus of embodiment) in structuring cognition.15 3) Conceptually they 
are quite close, since it is not a huge leap to allow the environment to have a significant influence  
on cognition once the boundary of the skull is broken and the body is allowed to have a more 
significant role in structuring cognition. 4) Yet, there is a conceptual difference between the two 
notions,16 hence I have not merely stuck with talking about either embodiment or embeddedness.  
So, the dual notion aims to capture the theoretical proximity of embodiment and embeddedness as 
well as their distinct character.
Embodied-embedded cognition has risen from various fields and the following is only a 
sampling of the early authors introducing the ideas of embodied-embedded cognition. Linguistics: 
Lakoff & Johnson (1980); dynamical systems theory: Van Gelder (1995); developmental psychology:  
Thelen & Smith (1994); systems psychology: Järvilehto (1998a, b, 1999, 2000); artificial intelligence:  
Brooks (1990, 1991a,  b, c),  Beer (1990); cognitive science: Varela et al.  (1991), Kirsh & Maglio 
(1995) philosophy: Wilson (1994), Clark (1997), Haugeland (1998), Hurley (1998). Furthermore, in 
addition to the phenomenologists and pragmatists mentioned in chapter 1 the inspiration and roots 
of embodied-embedded cognition may also be found from the work of Vygotsky (1979, 1986), Von 
Uexküll (1934) and Gibson (1979). In what follows I will examine further some of these authors. 17
The point of reaction embodied-embedded theorists take is most often with cognitivism. 
The cognitivist commitments that people react against are well described by Michael Wheeler, who 
distinguishes eight principles in cognitivism that advance a picture of an isolated mind: 
14 Haugeland 1998: 236–237 original emphasis
15 See e.g. Cowart (2005) and Shapiro (2007)
16 See.g. Haugeland (1998), Wilson (2004), Gallagher (2005), Kiverstein & Clark (2009) and Rupert (2009a)
17 For overviews on the subject see Anderson (2003), Wilson & Foglia (2011), Cowart (2005).
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1) In  cognitive  activity  there  persists  a  subject-object  dichotomy between  the  cognitive  organism  and  the  
environment.
2) Mind  and  cognition  are  to  be  explained  in  terms  of  representational states and  the  way  these  states  are  
structured, transformed and manipulated.
3) Intelligent  action  is  the  outcome  of  general  purpose  reasoning that  works  by  retrieving  the  relevant  
representations  for  the  behavioural  context  and  then  manipulating  and  transforming  those  representations  
appropriately so as to determine the corresponding correct behavioural output.
4) The nature of human perception is essentially inferential
5) The connection between perception and action takes the sequential form of sensing, representing, planning and 
finally acting (or moving).
6) The  cognitive  agent  is  essentially  disembedded from  the  environment  due  to  the  three-fold  nature  of  the  
environment: a) the environment merely holds problems for the agent to solve, b) it merely provides informational 
inputs through the senses, and c) it is merely the stage where reflected actions are acted out.
7) The cognitive agent is also disembodied in the sense that in cognitive scientific explanations no conceptual  or  
theoretical room is made for the physical embodiment of the agent.
8) Psychological explanations do not take into account the temporal process of mental phenomena.18
I take these eight aspects to be an illuminating description of the general cognitivist position. I do 
not maintain that all of these are necessary aspects of cognitivism. Rather they are here to shed light 
on some of the characteristics of isolated cognition the cognitivists hold on to as well as to provide 
a theoretical background from which embodied-embedded theorists depart. I will return to these at 
relevant places later in this chapter.19
 Embodied-embedded cognition refers to the way cognition is significantly structured by 
the type of body an organism has, as well as the type of environment it is situated in. It might seem  
unsurprising to claim that our actions, perceptions and thoughts are intertwined, or that our bodies 
and the  environment  affect  our  cognition.  One  often  hears  descriptions  such  as  “humans  are  
essentially  psycho-physico-social  beings”.  But  the  issue  at  stake  here  is  on  the  nature  of  this 
intertwinement and the principled separability of mind, body and world. The aim of this chapter is  
to critically examine the notions present in Wheeler's eight aspects. 20 This chapter takes inspiration 
from Andy Clark's  argumentation in his  1997 book  Being There because in it  Clark presents a 
concise  and  comprehensive  picture  of  what  it  means  to  say  that  cognition  is  embodied  and 
embedded. A picture that synthesises various research programmes in various fields that all put into 
question the orthodox conception of  cognition. Nevertheless,  I  will  largely rely  on the original  
expositions of embodied-embedded cognition that are cited by Clark.
18 Wheeler 2005: 23–53
19 I chose Wheeler's eight aspects as a characterisation of cognitivism due to its comprehensive nature. Other 
characterisations were also available and valid, but which in my opinion too readily identified cognitivism simply as 
emphasising internal representations and their manipulation see e.g. Rowlands (2010: 51–52) or Menary (2010c: 
605–606). Yet, to be fair contemporary cognitivists such as Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2010b) explicitly hold on 
to a view of cognition as essentially involving non-derived representations. If one is interested in Wheeler's full 
argumentation see his (2005: ch.2–4)
20 Clark 2008a: xxvi–xxviii.
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This chapter is structured around various concepts and ideas that put into question the 
isolated cognitivist approach. These concepts importantly shape the current debate concerning the 
4ED nature of cognition. The chapter has two main sections. I will start by showing how cognitive  
processing should be conceived as decentralised and dependent on the surrounding environment. I  
will then (re-)emphasise the way cognition is embodied. I conclude the chapter by raising the most  
pertinent notions of embodiment and embeddedness, as well as elucidate its departure from the 
cognitivist alternative.
2.1 Decentralisation, Ecology and Scaffolding
Clark argues for a systemic view of cognitive processing that is essentially decentralised in the sense 
that mind, body, and world all play an essential role in structuring cognition.21 There lies important 
theoretical commitments and insights within this decentralised approach. First, Clark is wary of the  
excessive need for centralised world-modelling and emphasises a more direct connection between  
the organism and the  environment,  as  well  as between perception and action. Here  he relies, 
among others,  on Rodney Brooks' research in artificial  intelligence (AI) and robotics. 22 Second, 
Clark is wary of the idea that the development of cognitive capacities follows a single-cause view of 
brain  maturation  and  the  unfolding  of  some genetically  imprinted  blue-print.  Here  he  follows 
developmental  psychologists  Esther  Thelen  and  Linda  Smith.23 In  general  decentralisation  of 
cognition emphasises a bottom-up view of operational and developmental  emergence of higher-
cognitive states from lower ones over a more centralised top-down view.
Brooks rejects the orthodox idea that  AI  systems should be modelled according to a  
conception  of  intelligence  that  essentially  consists  of  the  manipulation  of  information  bearing 
symbols by  a central control system. One of the reasons being that  the central  control  system, 
creates  a  representational  bottleneck that  hinders  and  obstructs  real-time  responses.24 This  is 
because the incoming sensory information needs to be converted to appropriate symbolic code for  
the control system to handle it and the output code needs also to be transformed into various  
motor responses. These transformations make the central control system approach computationally  
expensive and slow. Brooks dubs this cumbersome framework sense-model (represent)-plan-act, or  
SRPA for short.25
Brooks' alternative approach to avert the looming difficulties is to ground AI systems in the 
21 See for instance Clark 1997 and 2008a.
22 See Brooks 1990, 1991a, b, c; Brooks et al. 1988.
23 See Thelen & Smith 1994 and Thelen 1995.
24 Other reasons relate specifically to the way AI systems are designed; often resulting in a detachment from the real-
world dynamics and interactions due to a reliance on a “picture” of the world that is fed in by the system's 
designers. This also leads to a frame problem since the AI system may not assume anything besides the explicitly 
stated matters. (Brooks 1991a: 2–5 and 1990: 1–3; Shanahan 2009)
25 Brooks 1991a: 2–5; 1990: 1–3; 1991b; Clark 1997: 13–15, 21–22 Note also Wheeler's fifth aspect of cognitivism.
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physical world and to 'use the world as its own best model'.26 The driving idea behind this approach 
is the recognition that all the relevant information may be found in the world, one just needs to  
sense  it  often  enough  to  get  an  up-to-date  picture  of  it.  Brooks  and  his  colleagues  have  
implemented this idea by building real-life robots with a computational  subsumption architecture 
that avoids the need for a central control system. The architecture consists of multiple complete  
activity producing systems, or layers. These layers work in parallel, are in a direct interaction with 
the surrounding environment through sensors and actuators, and hence directly connect sensing to 
action. An aspect of control comes from the layers being in a simple interaction with each other;  
either turning off (subsuming) the activity of another or joining in on it. This aspect of control  
brings  the  layers  an  implicit goal  or  purpose  in  their  activity,  one  which  they  match  to  the 
conditions in the surrounding environment. But note that since the systems do not have a central 
control  structure,  the  apparent  central  control  is  ascribed  to  the  system  only  by  its  outside  
observers.  The  pattern  of  purposeful  behaviour  emerges  to  the  observer  from  the  competing  
behaviours of the layers.27 An example of a three-layered subsumption architecture is the following: 
The first layer makes the robot avoid hitting both static and moving objects in the environment, if  
no  avoidance  is  needed  it  stays  put.  The  second layer  makes  the  robot  wander  about  in  the  
environment by giving it random headings every 10 seconds, if it is not currently avoiding obstacles. 
The third layer may suppress the second layer and make the robot explore distant places. These 
three layers exhibit the three key basic intelligent operations that Brooks argues form the basis for  
higher-level intelligence: survival related tasks, vision and mobility.28 An example of a robot with a 
14-layer  subsumption  architecture  is  a  robot  called  “Herbert”  who  roams  the  floors  of  MIT's 
robotics lab collecting soda cans, all the time reacting to the ever-changing dynamic environment 
without a central control system or a plan of the premises. 29 The significance here lies not in the 
nature of this seemingly mundane and trivial task, but on the way the task is completed. Brooks'  
research undermines the traditional  sandwich model of  cognition, and even though his field is  
artificial intelligence the findings could be applied to mirror a picture of human cognition.
Similarly to Brooks, Thelen & Smith depart from the traditional views of development that 
approach it from a top-down single-cause view, according to which the development of locomotory 
abilities  for  instance are  explained in  terms of  brain maturation,  neural  growth,  or  converting 
reflexes into instrumental actions.30 Thelen & Smith take the development of walking as a sort of 
case study through which they argue for their dynamical systems approach of the development of  
behaviour and cognition.31 For instance, relying on empirical evidence Thelen & Smith manage to 
26 Brooks 1990: 3
27 Brooks 1991a: 5–8; 1990: 1–4
28 Brooks 1991a: 7–10
29 Brooks et al. 1988; Connell 1989
30 Examples of these maturationist and cognitivist approaches include Forssberg (1985), Konner (1991), Zelazo 
(1984). 
31 Thelen & Smith 1994: 3–9. For another good and often cited dynamical systems approach to cognition see van 
Gelder (1995).
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show how learning to walk consists of many subcomponents that do not develop linearly, and how 
this nonlinear development is structured both by bodily and environmental factors. There are two 
important notions here that I take to be most relevant and illuminating for the present discussion.
Self-organisation is the idea of how the sub-components of an open system (in this case the 
system generally composed of the brain, body and the world) may relate to each other in various  
unexpected ways that give rise to an emergent organisation.32 This emergent pattern is something 
different from the elements that constitute it. So, the insight from self-organisation is that high-level  
patterns emerge from the interaction of distributed simple components that follow local rules and  
principles without the need of a central controller, or a developmental blue-print.33 For instance 
Thelen  &  Smith  discovered  that  the  development  of  walking  and  reaching  behaviours  are  
dependent on multiple context-dependent local factors that do not arise linearly, such as bodily  
growth,  environmental  factors,  alertness,  brain maturation  and learning.  Development  of  these 
abilities could not be accounted for in terms of some high-order single-cause hypothesis.34 Soft-
assembly relates to the interaction of the different structures (neuronal, bodily and environmental) 
that  influence behaviour  and problem-solving  activity.  Soft-assembly  allows the problem-solving 
activity to be dynamic and responsive to changes in the system by selecting and adapting new 
solutions found in the relevant structures. For instance, when one finds oneself suddenly walking 
on an  icy  surface  one needs  to  readjust  to  these  changes  and recruit  new aspects  of  upright  
locomotion on the go.35 Similarly, consider how Herbert, in contrast to the centralised approach, is  
soft-assembled since it responds fluidly to the changing environment. The solutions arise and are  
solved within the context the problem is posed. Thelen aptly illustrates the decentralised approach 
to cognition the following way:
A fundamental assumption in a dynamical approach to development is that behavior 
and cognition, and their changes during ontogeny, are not represented anywhere in the 
system beforehand either as dedicated structures or symbols in the brain or as codes in 
the genes. Rather, thought and behaviour are “softly assembled” as dynamical patterns 
of  activity that  arise as a function of  the intended task at  hand and an individual's  
“intrinsic dynamics” or the preferred states of the system given its current architecture 
and previous history of activity.36
Related  notion  to  decentralisation  is,  what  Clark  dubs,  ecological  control.  A  system 
exhibiting ecological control achieves its goals by delegating the problem-solving responsibility to 
32 Thelen & Smith (1994: 45–54) focus on Belousov–Zhabotinsky reactions in chemistry, and Haken's discoveries of 
laser. Examples of self-organizing systems are ubiquitous also in biology, paradigm cases being how ants forage and 
birds flock by following few simple effector cues or rules (see e.g. Clark 1997: 40; Wheeler 2005: 94–95).
33 Thelen & Smith 1994: 54–56, 78–79, 82–83; Wheeler 2005: 94–96; Clark 1997: 40, 73
34 Thelen & Smith 1994. See also Thelen et al. 1982, Thelen et al. 1984 and Thelen & Ulrich 1991
35 Thelen & Smith 1994: 60, 84, 311, 321; Clark 1997: 42–45
36 Thelen 1995: 76
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reliable  sources  found  in  the  body,  brain  and/or  the  surrounding  environment,  not  by 
micromanaging  every  detail  of  the  desired  action  or  response.37 For  instance  the  information-
processing load required in problem-solving activity may be reduced by 'sensitizing the system to 
particular aspects of the world–aspects that have special significance because of the environmental  
niche the system inhabits.'38
This is what Clark dubs  niche-dependent sensing.39 He draws inspiration for this notion 
from the biologist Jacob Von Uexküll's emphasis on how each animal has its own specific way it 
perceives and effects the environment it is situated in. This perceptual world relative to a given  
animal is what Von Uexküll dubs an animal's  Umwelt. Each animal has its own umwelt, its own 
specific relation to the surrounding environment that is carved out of the general physical world. 
Von Uexküll insists that the relation between the animal and the objects in its umwelt should be  
conceived  as  complete  and  interdependent,  consisting  of  functional  cycles  that  constitute  a 
systematic whole. For instance the perceptual world of Herbert, its umwelt, due to the nature of its  
various sensors essentially consists of table surfaces, obstacles to avoid and coke cans that attract.40 
Now, Von Uexküll's insights seem to give a more substantial role for the relation between a given 
animal's  way of  life  and the specific features  that  it  picks  up,  attends to,  or  focuses  on in the  
environment.  Clark applies  this  to human perceptual  worlds  as well.  Instead of building a  full 
picture of the world, humans attend only to parts of the environment. Relying on Dana Ballard's 41 
animate vision  research Clark, paraphrasing Brooks, maintains that we humans can also  use the  
world  as  its  own best  model and visit  and re-visit  the  surrounding environment  as  and when 
needed without the need of building a complete three-dimensional representation, or model, of it.  
Perception here is deemed more as an exploration of the environment rather than passive reception 
of  stimuli  which  is  then  modelled  in  the  head.42 In  John  Haugeland's  words  emphasis  is  on 
'perceiving  instead  of  representing'43 because  the  former  is  cheap and the  latter  expensive,  as 
became clear in Herbert's case.
Both Haugeland and Clark maintain that James Gibson's theory of ecological perception44 
brings forth further insights into the relationship between the perceiver and the perceived, as well  
as  between perception  and action.45 Similarly  to  Von Uexküll,  Gibson  places  emphasis  on  the 
specific  nature  of  the  organism,  its  situation  in  the  environment,  and  the  interdependent 
relationship between these two structures. Gibson argues for a notion of affordances as intimately 
structuring the way we perceive the world. An affordance is a potentiality for interaction with an 
37 Clark 2006: 4–5; 2008a: 5–6
38 Clark 1997: 24 emphasis mine
39 Clark 1997: 23–25
40 Von Uexküll 1934: 6, 10–13; Clark 1997: 24
41 Ballard 1991
42 Clark 1997: 25–31; 1999: 345–346
43 Haugeland 1998: 219
44 Gibson 1979
45 Haugeland 1998: 221–223; Clark 1997: 50–51; 1999: 346–347
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object or a state of affairs in the environment, relative to a given animal. That is, a chair for instance 
offers sitting to a normal height adult, but not necessarily for a child. For a beaver a chair might  
afford something completely different; if made out of wood it affords nutrition.46 
I take there to be three pertinent aspects that may be drawn from Gibson's argumentation. 
First,  Gibson takes up the idea of a  niche but rather than seeing it as  where animals live, Gibson 
conceives  a  niche  as  how animals  live.47 He  defines  a  niche  as  a  set  of  affordances.  Niches 
understood this  way emphasise  the complementarity  of  animals  and the environment.  A  niche 
implies a certain type of animal as much as an animal implies a certain type of niche. Hence it seems 
that  Gibson's  (as  well  as  Von  Uexküll's)  conception  of  a  niche  cuts  across  the  dichotomy  of  
subjective and objective present in cognitivism. Second, Gibson maintains that the environment 
holds different affordances, or niches, for specific actions (e.g. caves for living or hiding, woods for  
hunting, water for swimming or drinking, etc.)  Moreover, the environment maybe transformed in 
order to change what it affords us. Affordances are therefore as much to do with the environment as 
they are to do with actions. Third, Gibson maintains that the value or meaning of objects and states 
of affairs may be perceived directly. Here he departs from orthodox psychology, in that objects are 
not to be understood as being composed of their properties or qualities, and perception of these 
objects being the discrimination of these qualities. Rather Gibson maintains that 'what we perceive 
when we look at objects are their affordances, not their qualities.' 48 So, direct perception means that 
one does not perceive value-free objects and then somehow add meaning and value to them, rather 
perceiving an affordance is perceiving a value-rich ecological object. Gibson calls the perceivable 
features that designate some affordance high-order invariants.49 
This third aspect is what Haugeland takes to be Gibson's most significant and controversial  
insight. What is pertinent here is not the idea or possibility of affordances, but that they could be  
perceived rather than inferred.50 Gibson himself notices this when he says that 'the central question 
for the theory of affordances is not whether they exist and are real but whether information is  
available in ambient light for perceiving them.'51 Haugeland points out that if it indeed is the case 
that affordances can be a feature of the ambient light itself and we may pick these up through our  
perceptual system, then our perceptual capacities are more complex than previously thought and it  
is  this complexity in the perceptual  system that ties us  intimately with the complexities  of  the 
world.52 Clark  makes  a  similar  point  and  emphasises  how  the  possibility  of  action-relevant 
information  being  available  for  our  perceptual  capacities  lends  credence  to  a  more  intimate 
46 Gibson 1979 (especially chapter 8)
47 The notion of a niche is present in ecology in general. Yet, note how Gibson's conception of niche closely 
resembles Von Uexküll's notion of Umwelt since they both place emphasis on the specific lifestyle of the animal 
and not merely its location in the environment.
48 Gibson 1979: 134
49 Gibson 1979:  127–130, 133–141
50 Note the departure again from cognitivism exemplified by Wheeler's fourth aspect.
51 Gibson 1979: 140
52 Haugeland 1998: 221–223
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connection between perception and action. This again undermines the need for the cumbersome 
SRPA routine and emphasis the close coupling of the cogniser and the world. Clark illustrates this  
by a finding53 that shows how in order to catch a fly ball no complex calculations of trajectories,  
accelerations and distances are required. Instead one merely needs to run so that one does not  
allow the ball to look like it's  curving towards the ground, rather one keeps the ball so that it  
appears  to  move  in  a  straight  line  in  the  visual  field.  So,  instead  of  perceiving,  representing, 
planning  and  acting,  one  picks  up  a  relevant  higher-order  invariant  through  perception  and 
coordinates/adapts one's actions in real time with the environment so as to fulfil the goal.54
The  final  aspect  of  this  section  relates  to  the  reliance  on environmental  structures  as 
external scaffolding that ease cognitive processing. The notion of scaffolding originates from the 
developmental psychologist Lev Vygotsky, who argued for the way external structures such as public  
language influences the development of cognitive capacities. Vygotsky's related notion is the zone 
of proximal development, which pinpoints an optimal point of learning where a task is not too easy  
to be accomplished alone, nor is it too hard that one simply cannot do, but is one that may be  
accomplished with the help of others. It  refers to the way development is  diachronic in nature. 
Primarily the development of different capabilities such as language happens in the  intermental 
level where it is effected and facilitated by relying on the help of parents for instance, before the  
development continues internally, in the intramental level. I will return to this in chapter 5 where 
Richard Menary makes use of these Vygotskian ideas in his account of extended cognition.55
In  the  context  of  embodied-embedded cognition external  scaffolding  refers  to  external 
resources that may include cultural ones such as language as well as specific inanimate artefacts  
such  as  pen  and  paper.  For  example,  the  use  of  pen  and  paper  facilitates  and  expands  our  
mathematical skills. It is far easier to calculate long multiplications with the help of pen and paper  
rather than solely in the head.56 In a way one can off-load some of the cognitive burden on to the 
external tools, whereby one can directly perceive the numbers and operations needed to be done. 
The recognition that environment may be changed and external scaffolding built is not new, but the 
notion  pertinent  for  present  discussion  is  a  process  called  cognitive  niche  construction.57 
Specifically it is a 
process by which animals build physical structures that transform problem spaces in 
ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain  
or domains.58 
53 McBeath et al. 1995
54 Clark 1999: 346–347
55 Vygotsky 1934; Clark 1997: 45, see also ch. 10
56 This pen-and-paper example has become one of the standard examples in the 4ED literature, originally the analysis 
is due to Rumelhart et al. (1986).
57 Clark 1997: 45–47; 2008a: 61–63; 2005a: 255–257;  Wilson 2004: 218–219; Wilson & Clark 2009: 58–61
58 Clark 2008a: 62
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This transformation of the relevant physical problem-solving space is illuminated by a distinction 
between pragmatic  and epistemic actions introduced by Kirsh & Maglio.59 Pragmatic action is one 
taken so as to alter the world so that one's goal is achieved. For example, taking a glass from the 
cupboard in order to have a glass of milk. Epistemic action in contrast is one taken so as to alter the 
world so that one's cognitive, or problem-solving, load is eased. For instance, the grouping of jigsaw 
puzzle pieces according to shape and colour, or the physical manipulation of scrabble tiles, aid the  
problem-solving tasks involved by facilitating searching, and pattern and word recognition.60 
Generally  the  reliance  on  the  surrounding  environment  in  problem-solving  and 
information-processing tasks is captured by two of Clark's principles:
007-Principle: In general, evolved creatures will neither store nor process information 
in costly ways when they can use the structure of the environment and their operations 
upon it as a convenient stand-in for the information-processing operations concerned. 
That is, know only as much as you need to know to get the job done.61
Principle of Ecological Assembly: […] the canny cognizer tends to recruit, on the spot, 
whatever  mix  of  problem-solving  resources  will  yield  an  acceptable  result  with  a 
minimum of effort.62
The essence of these principles is that the cognitive cost may be shared amongst all the components  
and structures of the hybrid cognitive system, and that the cognitive agent is not biased towards any  
of the available resources, whether internal or external. I will return to Clark's conception of agency 
in chapter 7.
2.2 Taking Embodiment Seriously
In the sections above I have talked about some of the main concepts and notions that I take to be 
crucial for an understanding of cognition as embodied and embedded. Yet, it might seem that the 
emphasis has been more on the embedded nature of cognition, how it is intimately tied to the  
surrounding  environment.  Hence,  I  will  now  briefly  raise  some  of  the  embodied  aspects  of 
cognition that might have been neglected or obscured in the preceding discussion.
Firstly, from their infant studies Thelen & Smith found that the structural properties of the 
infants' legs greatly affect infant stepping. For instance it stops due to gain in the body mass of legs,  
59 See Kirsh & Maglio 1994 and Kirsh 1995
60 Clark 1997: 62–64; Kirsh & Maglio 1994: 513–515; Kirsh 1995
61 Clark 1989: 64 emphasis mine
62 Clark 2008a: 13 italics removed.
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yet reappears when the mass is reduced (e.g. due to  buoyancy by placing the legs submerged in 
water).63 Similarly the springlike properties  of tendons and muscles in legs allow coping with the 
changes in the dynamical environment so that normal walking and gait is possible.64
Yet, more importantly in his 2005 book How the body shapes the mind Shaun Gallagher 
takes  up the  issue of  our  embodiment and its  relevance for  our cognition.  Specifically,  he  re-
analyses  the distinction between a  body image and a  body schema,  that  according to  him has 
historically been confusing.
A body image consists of a system of perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs pertaining to  
one's own body. In contrast, a body schema is a system of sensory-motor capacities that  
function  without  awareness  or  the  necessity  of  perceptual  monitoring  […]  So  the 
difference  between  body  image  and  body  schema is  like  the  difference  between  a 
perception (or conscious monitoring) of movement and the actual accomplishment of 
movement, respectively.65
Gallagher supports this distinction with empirical evidence of two types of pathologies where either  
the body image is intact and the body schema dysfunctional or vice versa. In cases of  unilateral 
neglect, due often to brain damage from a stroke, the patient's body image is impaired while the 
body schema remains unaffected. The patient for instance might not be able to perceive her left side  
of the body, it remains unattended in the sense that it might not be dressed or the left side of the  
head is not combed. Yet, there is no effect on the motor functions; the subject is capable of normal  
gait (yet she would not notice if her left shoe were to drop while walking) and the performance of  
movements  that  require  both  hands  such as  buttoning  her  shirt.  In  contrast,  in  rare  cases  of  
deafferentation patients who have lost all tactile and proprioceptive input from below the neck the 
body image remains intact while the body schema is impaired. These patients do not have a sense  
of body posture or limb position, and yet they may still control their limbs and movements (only)  
through visually guiding them.66 
In what follows I will mainly focus on the body schema since I deem it more crucial for 
helping to understand the relevance of the body in the embodied-embedded approach to cognition. 
Yet, it is crucial to recognise the importance of drawing this distinction in the first place, since it 
undermines the (cognitivist) idea of the body's trivial embodiment; as merely a lump of matter that  
simply houses the brain and is directed by the brain. Hence, Gallagher's exposition aims to show 
that the role of the body is more intricate and offers more to our cognitive performances than  
traditionally thought.
63 Thelen & Smith 1994: 12–13, 94–121; See also Thelen & Ulrich 1991
64 Thelen & Smith 1994: 60; Clark 1997: 42–43
65 Gallagher 2005: 24 original emphasis.
66 Gallagher 2005: 24–25 and ch.2 for a more detailed discussion of the pathologies and the neuroscientific aspect of 
the body image–body schema distinction.
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A body schema is a system of sensory-motor functions and processes that are subpersonal.  
They involve close to automatic tacit performances that dynamically govern posture and movement. 
A collection, or repertoire, of motor schemas Gallagher calls  motor programs. These are, on the 
behavioural  level,  flexible  and corrigible  patterns,  that  are  either  entirely  learned,  or  if  innate 
nevertheless  enhanced through practice and habituation. Examples of  these sorts of  behaviours 
include, swallowing, reaching, grasping, walking and so forth. Similarly, when we are learning to 
ride a bicycle or catch a fly ball we first closely attend to every (motor) detail within the task, but  
once the  ability  is  mastered none of  these  facts  are  longer  attended to;  the attention is  more 
directed at the more general task in hand. Hence, Gallagher, is strict about saying that these body  
schematic operations are not reflex-like or completely automatic. Rather, they are close to automatic  
in the sense that they are often part of voluntary, goal-directed, intentional acts. One final aspect I  
want to raise about body schemas is the way they allow a close integration or immersion with the  
environment.  For instance body schemas may incorporate objects into it such as a blind man's  
cane67 or a carpenter's hammer. The basis for this often lies in their use in some goal-directed or 
intentional action.68 Moreover, this integration has a neuronal basis.
This extension of the body schema into its surrounding environment is reflected in its  
neural  representations.  Not  only  do  bimodal  premotor,  parietal,  and  putaminal 
neuronal  areas  that  represent  a  given  limb  or  body  area  also  respond  to  visual 
stimulation in the environmental space nearby, for some of these neurons the visual 
receptive field remains “anchored” to the body part when it moves (Fogassi et al. 1996; 
Graziano and Gross 1998; Graziano et al. 1994).69
Yet, Gallagher is adamant that the neuronal representations do not explain everything, since the 
past history, practice and habituation of the agent, as well as the environmental situation and the 
intentionality inherent in the action all influence the body schematic performance.
The body schema, however, is not reducible to a purely neurophysiological explanation 
of  motor  control,  since  the  way  my  body  moves  is  in  support  of  my  pragmatic 
intentions and in response to environmental features that either afford or prevent my 
action, or make it difficult.70
67 Gregory Bateson (1972: especially 6.4: 325) questioned where the boundaries of the unit of cognitive analysis 
should be drawn. He used the example of a blind man exploring the world with his cane to argue that one should 
not delimit or define the boundaries a priori. Rather one necessarily needs to incorporate the given situation and 
environment where the cognitive processes develop and operate in within the unit of analysis. Bateson's 
argumentation could be seen as a predecessor to extended and distributed theories of cognition (see e.g. Hutchins 
2010).
68 Gallagher 2005: 26, 32–34, 36–39, 47–48
69 Gallagher 2005: 37. Also Maravita & Iriki's (2004) empirical studies with Macaques' tool use strengthen the case for 
body schematic integration of tools through their intentional use.
70 Gallagher 2005: 246, see also 138–146 for empirical support of this.
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This echoes Gallagher's notion of a prenoetic performance of the body, which is a performance 'that 
helps  to  structure  consciousness  but  does  not  explicitly  show  itself  in  the  contents  of 
consciousness. In just such performances the body acquires a certain organization in its relations  
with its environment.'71 I take this to be a crucial aspect for the way our bodies may be said to 
implicitly structure our actions, movements and conscious processes.
 
2.3 Summary
In this  chapter  I  examined embodied-embedded cognition  through various  concepts  stemming 
from various fields of study. In summing up three themes may be raised, that speak for the impact  
of embodied-embedded cognition. Namely, when conceiving cognitive processing from a systemic  
point  of  view that  allows a  more substantial  role  for  the world outside the brain to influence  
cognition, the body and the environment may be said to  coordinate,72 constrain, and/or  facilitate 
organism's cognitive capabilities. This becomes evident when the above discussion is situated with 
regards to Wheeler's eight aspects of cognitivism. 
Coordination  arises  when  cognition  is  decentralised  and  perception  and  action  are 
connected more dynamically and directly with the surrounding environment. There is no longer 
need for a general purpose reasoning engine (aspect 3) that executes a cumbersome, cognitively 
slow and expensive sense-represent-plan-act -cycle (aspect 5). Moreover, perception is no longer 
thought to be inferential, but more directly in tune with the dynamic environment (aspects 4 and 
8).  Here  are  already  present  some  facilitating  aspects,  namely  the  reducing  of  the  cognitive  
processing  load  by  getting  rid  of  the  sense-represent-plan-act  -cycle.  Yet,  the  facilitating  and 
constraining  aspects  are  more  evident  when  the  relationship  between  the  organism  and  the  
environment is no longer conceived to be dichotomous (aspect 1) but to exist synchronously. This  
is exemplified by  environmental niches  and Umwelten. Moreover this allows the organism's body 
and the environment to actively structure cognitive processing (aspects 6 and 7): both constraining 
the possible processes (due to for instance our perceptual capabilities) and facilitating them (for  
instance by off-loading some of the work to external scaffolding structures).
71 Gallagher 2005: 32. See also p.2–3.
72 The term coordinate could be replaced  with e.g. regulate or guide. The point being not to fall back onto a 
cognitivist reading that postulates some kind of central control system. See e.g. Wilson & Foglia (2011) and Port 
and van Gelder (1995).
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3 Enactive Cognition
Upon analysis, we find that we begin not with a sensory stimulus, but with a sensori-motor coordination, the optical-
ocular, and that in a certain sense it is the movement which is primary, and the sensation which is secondary, the  
movement of body, head and eye muscles determining the quality of what is experienced. In other words, the real  
beginning is with the act of seeing; it is looking, and not a sensation of light. The sensory quale gives the value of the  
act,  just  as the movement furnishes  its  mechanism and control,  but both sensation and movement  lie  inside, not  
outside the act.73
In this chapter I will examine a related view to the embodied-embedded approach, that of enactive  
cognition, or  enactivism. I will distinguish two projects or strands within the enactive approach,  
one more concerned with the nature of cognition and the other partly building upon this and 
putting forward a (sensorimotor) theory of perception. My aim is to provide a general account of  
enactive cognition prevalent in contemporary discussion. There are other varieties of enactivism 
that might not completely fit this picture, such as Daniel Hutto's Radical Enactivism, which, for the 
sake  of  brevity  will  not  be  examined  in  detail  here.  I  have  also  excluded  any  discussion  on 
enactivism's take on consciousness and the explanatory gap even though they feature prominently 
in it. This is because, if included, it would take us to far afield from the purview of this thesis. 74 
3.1 Enactivism
Originally the terms enactivism, enaction and enactive cognition are due to Varela, Thompson and 
Rosch in their 1991 book the  Embodied Mind. There they set out an approach to cognition that 
departs from, and puts into question, classical cognitivism with its emphasis on the centrality of  
representation in cognition. Hence they make the following claim: 
We propose as a name enactive to emphasise the growing conviction that cognition is  
not  the  representation  of  a  pregiven  world  by  a  pregiven  mind  but  is  rather  the 
enactment of a world and a mind on the basis of a history of the variety of actions that a  
being in the world performs.75
Broadly stated then, enactive cognition emphasises the way cognition depends on the activity of the  
cognitive  agent.  This  is  in  contrast  to  the  cognitivists'  sense-represent-plan-act  -cycles,  which  
73 Dewey 1896: 358–359
74 If one is interested in Hutto's work see e.g. a collection of papers edited by Richard Menary (2006b); on issues to 
do with consciousness see e.g. Thompson (2007), Hurley & Noë (2003), and O'Regan & Noë (2001b).
75 Varela et al. 1991: 9
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according  to  enactivism  neglect  the  dynamic  nature  of  the  environment  and  the  mutual 
dependence  of  the  cognitive  agent  and  the  environment.76 More  specifically,  there  may  be 
distinguished  five  essential,  mutually  interdependent,  ideas  within  the  enactive  approach  to  
cognition.77 
1)  Autonomy:  living  organisms  should  be  understood  organisationally  in  terms  of 
autonomous systems that generate and sustain their own activity so as to bring forth, or enact, their 
own cognition. Hence, systems capable of cognition need to be autonomous in the sense of being  
capable of self-government. Di Paolo et al. illustrate this the following way: 'if a system “has no say” 
in defining its own organization, then it is condemned to follow an externally given design like a  
laid down rail track.'78 Another aspect of autonomous systems is that they are operationally closed. 
That is, the processes constituting a given system constitute it as a unity, so that if one of these  
processes is examined then necessarily other processes relevant for the system's constitution will  
also be examined at some point. This is not to say that autonomous systems are materially closed, 
i.e.  closed  from  outside  influences.  On  the  contrary,  autonomous  systems  need  to  be 
thermodynamically open so that the environment and the system may interact with each other. It is  
a necessary condition for an autonomous system that it is influenced by processes not belonging to 
it.  In  other  words  cognitive  systems  must  be  coupled  to  the  environment.  In  contrast  to  
cognitivism's sandwich model Di Paolo et al. characterise enactivism's commitment to autonomy the 
following way: 
Viewing cognitive systems as autonomous is to reject the traditional poles of  seeing 
cognition  as  responding  to  an  environmental  stimulus  on  the  one  hand,  and  as  
satisfying internal demands on the other – both of which subordinate the agent to a  
role of obedience. It is also to recognize the “ongoingness” of sensorimotor couplings 
that lead to patterns of perception and action twinned to the point that the distinction 
is often dissolved.79
2) Sense-making: the interactive and relational aspect of autonomy is brought to light by the notion  
of sense-making. Organisms regulate their interactions with the world in order to transform it into a  
salient and meaningful  environment.  Into one that  is  suited for the organism's  needs,  into an 
76 Ward & Stapleton to appear: 3–4
77 I take this division into five key concepts from Di Paolo et al. (2007) and Thompson (2005, 2007). Yet, in giving an 
account of the five concepts I will be relying on Thompson (2005: 407–409; 2007: parts one and two), Thompson 
& Varela (2001), Di Paolo et al (2007: 6–14), Thompson & Stapleton (2009: 23–25) and Ward & Stapleton (to 
appear: 3–12) since their treatment of enactivism is uniform enough and flows from the original treatment present 
in Varela et al. (1991). I will only make more detailed references either as clarifications or when directly quoting 
passages.
78 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 8. Note also the resemblance with Brooks' design requirements for AI systems in section 2.2 
especially footnote 26.
79 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 8–9. Here they cite, among others, evidence from the evolutionary roboticist Randal Beer's 
findings of how in simple agents the decision making process (between two actions) is extended in time and does 
not happen in an instant (Di Paolo et al. 2007: 56n2).
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umwelt that possesses value and meaning. Organisms are structurally coupled to the world through  
their  sensorimotor  capacities.  By  autonomously  constructing,  regulating,  organizing  and 
maintaining these exchanges with the environment the organism picks up relevant features for itself  
and hence creates meaning. The normative status of the interactions arises from the recognition 
that some of the interactions constrain the autonomy of the organism and some facilitate it. Hence,  
this autonomous sense-making activity may be characterised as a kind of autonomous adaptivity.  
Now, enactivism's emphasis on an organism's activity may be highlighted by contrasting this notion 
of autonomous sense-making activity with cognitivism on the one hand, and Gibsonian ecological 
psychology on the other.80 First, it is not the case that organisms passively receive information from 
the environment that they then convert in to an internal representational format. Rather, in their  
actions they are already directly part of generating meaning; 'they enact [i.e. bring forth] a world.'81 
Second, high-order invariances should not be conceived as something that are out there in the 
environment, that are then retrieved through our perceptual capacities in direct or indirect means.  
Information and meaning is not first present in the environment and then extracted from it. Rather,  
invariances and meaning are the outcome of the formative interrelational activity of the organism 
and the environment.82
3)  Emergence: implicitly in 1) and 2) there is a notion of emergence present. Autonomy 
arises from the operational closure and is therefore not a property of the components; in sense-
making meaning and value are not properties found either in the organism or in the environment 
but  are  the properties  found in the relational  sphere between the  two.  Di  Paolo et  al.  qualify  
emergence the following way: 
[…] in order to distinguish an emergent process from simply an aggregate of dynamical 
elements, two things must hold: 1) the emergent process must have its own identity  
and 2) the sustaining of this identity and the interaction between the emergent process 
and  its  context  must  lead  to  constraints  and  modulation  to  the  operation  of  the 
underlying levels.83
As I understand it, the first requirement aims at guaranteeing the identifiability of the emergent  
property that is enabled (but not completely determined) by the component processes. The second 
requirement alludes to the mutual interdependence between the emerging and enabling processes. 
Di Paolo et al. cite life itself as evidence for emergence, specifically how for instance cells contain 
80 This contrast is largely due to Di Paolo et al. 2007: 9
81 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 9 original emphasis
82 I have left out discussion concerning the notion of autopoiesis (developed by Maturana & Varela 1980; and later 
Weber & Varela 2002) that is often referred to in this context since its relevance as a necessary condition for 
autonomy, sense-making, and cognition in general is contested (see e.g. Thompson & Stapleton 2009). If one is 
interested in the notion of autopoiesis I direct you to Thompson (2004 and 2007: ch.5), Di Paolo (2005 and 2009) 
and the aforementioned literature.
83 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 10
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properties that no constitutive part at a lower molecular level contain. Yet, they do recognise that  
the  notion  of  emergence  is  problematic  and is  in  need  of  further  analysis  along  the  lines  of  
dynamical systems theory, due mainly to the need of explaining the interactions of different levels.84
4)  Embodiment: enactivism emphasises the way cognition emerges from temporally and 
spatially embedded embodied actions. Specifically enactivism takes embodiment to mean that:
mind is inherent in the active, worldful body, that the body is not a puppet controlled  
by  the  brain  but  a  whole  animate  system  with  many  autonomous  layers  of  self-
coordination and self-organization and various degrees of  openness to the world that 
create its sense-making activity.85
Hence it seems that enactivism does not depart much from the theoretical commitments of the  
embodied-embedded approach to cognition. Where it does depart, I take it, is in the emphasis on  
the active participation and bodily activity of the agent in generating cognition.
5) Experience: according to enactivism (conscious) experiences should be brought into the 
focus of scientific investigation and not simply left as a side issue. This is accomplished by bringing  
in phenomenological analysis to the study. This fifth aspect is mainly a thematic and methodological 
one, and hence will not be investigated further here. 
 Taking these five aspects together one may say that for enactivism cognition is essentially  
relational. It is not fully internal, in terms of being located solely within the head and explained in 
terms of neural processes alone, since as Thompson & Stapleton make clear: 'Cognition is not an  
event happening inside the system; it is  the relational  process of sense-making that takes place  
between the system and its environment.'86 Yet, the internal processes are crucial in terms of taking 
part in enabling the sense-making activity. Di Paolo goes so far as to claim that since cognition is  
best understood as a process in a relational domain it has no location.
It  simply  makes  no  sense  to  point  to  chunks  of  matter  and  space  and  speak  of  
containment within a cognitive system. Inspect a baby all you want and you'll never find 
out whether she's a twin.87
Hence enactivism departs from the isolated cognitivist view of cognition towards a more systemic  
one, in the sense that it accredits the body, brain and the world all an essential and necessary role  
in constituting cognition.
84 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 10–11
85 Di Paolo et al. 2007: 12
86 Thompson & Stapleton 2009: 26
87 Di Paolo 2009: 19
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3.2 Enactive Perception
The other  strand or project  within enaction is  a  more focused one and relates  to a  theory  of 
perception. Specifically I will focus on Alva Noë's  enactive theory of perception presented in his 
2004 book Action in perception. My focus on Noë's account is due to three reasons: 1) it offers a  
good example of implementing an enactive account to the issue of perception, even though it is not 
a full-fledged derivation of enactivism presented above.88 2) It offers a nice illustration of another 
type of account of perception (this is in addition to Gibson's ecological account presented in the 
previous chapter) that keeps with the theme of 4ED.89 3) It is the account of enactivism that is 
(most) often contested by the critics. Usually on similar grounds as 4ED in general is challenged. 90
Noë starts his account by the following description: 
Perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What  
we perceive is determined by  what we do (or what ever we know how to do); it is 
determined by what we are ready to do [...] we enact our perceptual experience; we act 
it out.91
So for Noë perception should be thought of as action, a type of skilful bodily activity. He motivates 
this with an image of a blind man perceiving the world through touch;  skilfully exploring and 
probing the environment with a cane. Noë takes this sort of perception as paradigmatic; we do not 
perceive the world all at once but gradually in time build a picture of it through interactions with it.  
This account is opposed to the  cognitivist approach which sees perceptual systems as essentially 
located  in  the  brain  that  build  internal  representations  of  the  world.  Yet,  Noë  is  not  as  anti-
representationalist as for instance Gibson is, and allows representations to have a limited role in 
cognition and perception. Hence he claims the following: 
No doubt perception depends on what takes place in the brain, and very likely there  
are internal  representations in the brain (e.g.  content-bearing internal  states).  What  
perception is, however, is not a process in the brain, but a kind of skillful activity on the 
part of the animal as a whole.92
88 Noë 2004: 233n1
89 I do not take issue here whether Noë's account is the most plausible one in the field. For similar approaches and 
discussion on (sensorimotor) theories of perception see: O'Regan & Noë (2001a, 2001b); Hurley (1998, 2001); 
Hurley & Noë (2003); Gangopadhyay & Kiverstein (2009); Ward, Roberts & Clark (2011). See also the collection of 
papers in Gangopadhyay et al. (2010)
90 See Adams & Aizawa (2008), Adams (2007), Prinz (2006), Block (2005), and to an extent Rupert (2009). The 
argument usually is that Noë's account confounds external causal coupling relations as constitutive ones of 
cognition. I will return to this sort of challenges in chapter 6.
91 Noë 2004: 1
92 Noë 2004: 2
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There  are  two aspects  in  Noë's  approach:  in  addition  to  the  claim that  perception  should  be 
understood as skilful activity, the content of perceptual experience is also due to the possession of 
bodily skills. Specifically Noë's central claim is that the ability to perceive is both dependent on, and 
constitutive (in part) of, a possession of, what he calls, sensorimotor knowledge, which is built up 
of sensorimotor dependencies.93 Sensorimotor knowledge is an implicit understanding of how our 
experiences  and  perceptions  are  effected  by  movement.  Within  this  idea  lies  a,  now  familiar,  
(enactive) commitment to the sensorimotor relationship between the perceiver and the perceived.  
Noë  maintains  that  there  are  two  dimensions  of  how perception  is  effected  by  movement:  1) 
movement-dependence:  our  bodily  movements  adjust  the  sensory  stimuli  and  2)  object-
dependence: when perceiving an object, it is its movements that also change the sensory stimuli.94 
In  addition  to  these  two  dimensions  there  are  specific  perspectival  properties,  or  p-
properties  for short, that  effect  perception. P-properties are objective environmental properties. 
Specifically they instantiate how things look to a perceiver and they are relational in the sense that 
'they are not relations between objects and the interior, sensational effects in us. Rather, they are  
relations  among  objects,  the  location  of  the  perceiver's  body,  and  illumination.'95 The  two 
dimensions that effect perception mentioned above effect specifically the perception of p-properties  
and thus allow the perception of how things actually are in the world. For instance we visually 
perceive tomatoes as spherical, we experience them as round, three-dimensional objects. This is so 
even  though  we  are  only  able  to  see  their  facing  sides  and  hence  are  unable  to  see  them 
completely.96 Noë explains this phenomena the following way:
Our perceptual sense of the tomato's wholeness–of its volume and backside, and so 
forth–consists in our implicit understanding (our expectation) that movements of our 
body to the left or right, say, will bring further bits of the tomato into view. Our relation  
to the unseen bits of the tomato is mediated by patterns of sensorimotor contingency.97
So, a tomato is perceived as a whole due to our capability of understanding how our potential  
movements,  and the object's  movement,  would reveal further aspects of it.  Here Noë distances 
himself from cognitivist inferential perception (recall Wheeler's aspect 4) by maintaining a similar  
commitment to direct perception as Gibson does.
93 Noë 2004: 1–2, 12
94 Noë 2004: 64
95 Noë 2004: 85
96 Noë 2004: 75–79
97 Noë 2004: 63
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We  don't  conjecture  or  infer  how  things  are  from  how  they  look.  In  actively 
encountering the way in which how things look varies with movement,  we  directly 
encounter how things are.98 
Finally Noë99 illustrates the plausibility of his approach to perception by giving an account of a form 
of blindness that is not due to damage to visual sensory system (such as cataracts, retinal disease, 
damage to eyes etc.) and hence not due to the lack of sensation or sensitivity. Noë dubs this sort of  
blindness experiential blindness and characterises it as the 'inability to integrate sensory stimulation 
with patterns of movement and thought.'100 In order to convince of the existence of experiential 
blindness  and hence the tenability  of  an enactive approach to perception he cites studies 101 of 
congenitally blind patients who have had their cataracts (which block incoming light to the retina)  
removed in order to restore sight. What these cases show is that even though the surgeons restore 
visual sensations, by removing the cataracts, sight is not restored. The following is a description of 
Oliver Sacks' patient Virgil's experience after the surgery. 
Virgil told me later that in this first moment he had no idea what he was seeing. There  
was light, there was movement, there was color, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur.  
Then out of the blur came a voice that said, “Well?” Then, and only then, he said, did he 
finally realize that this chaos of light and shadow was a face—and, indeed, the face of his 
surgeon.102
Noë maintains that since it is the case that patients such as Virgil clearly only have visual sensations  
of light, colour, movement and so forth, they still lack the ability to see.
The  visual  impressions  [the  patients]  now  [after  their  operations]  receive  remain 
confusing and uninformative to them, like utterances in a foreign language. They have 
sensations,  but  the  sensations  don't  add  up  to  experiences  with  representational 
content.103
 
Moreover, perceptual difficulties seem to persists even some time has passed after the operation. 
Noë cites here Gregory & Wallace's patient S.B. who seems not to be able to make use of, respond  
to, and understand visual impressions that he receives. He does not pay any attention to things in 
his visual field unless prompted. Noë argues that S.B. lacks the ability to grasp the sensorimotor 
significance of the impressions, how the impressions change as he moves, and hence are without  
98 Noë 2004: 85 original emphasis
99 Noë 2004: 3–11
100 Noë 2004: 4
101 Gregory & Wallace 1963, Sacks 1995 and Valvo 1971
102 Sacks 1995: 114, cited in Noë 2004: 5
103 Noë 2004: 5
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content. S.B. continues to be experientially blind. Noë maintains that the evidence for experiential 
blindness  is substantial and something that  may not be captured by a simple  inferential input-
output  picture.104 Noë's  point,  paraphrasing  Kant,  is  that:  'intuitions–patterns  of  stimulation–
without knowledge of the sensorimotor significance of those intuitions, are blind.'105
3.3 Summary
In this  chapter  I  examined the  enactive  approach to cognition,  both in general  as  a  theory of 
cognition and in particular as a sensorimotor theory of perception. Common to these approaches is 
the emphasis on bodily activity and the relational aspect of cognitive processes. Enactivism departs  
from cognitivism's heavy reliance on internal representations and its sandwich model of cognition.  
It resembles the embodied-embedded approach in that it accredits a more significant role for the  
environment and the body to structure cognition. So much so that the brain, body and the world  
are all mutually interdependent in giving rise to cognition. Here it departs from the embodied-
embedded  approach  since  the  body  and  the  environment  are  not  thought  of  merely  as  
coordinating, facilitating or constraining the inner processes. For enactivism cognition has no strict 
location. It is a process in the relational domain between the enabling neuronal processes and the 
sensorimotor couplings of the organism and the environment.
104 Noë 2004: 5–6
105 Noë 2004: 11. Cf. Kant (1881: 51 [62]): 'Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are 
blind.' 
24
4 Extended Cognition
If, as we confront some task, a part of the world functions as a process which, were it done in the head, we would have 
no hesitation in recognizing as part of the cognitive process, then that part of the world is (for that time) part of the 
cognitive process. Cognitive processes ain't (all) in the head!106
The examination of the extended cognition hypothesis107 in this chapter is divided in to two general 
parts. I will  start  by examining what has recently been dubbed  first-wave extended cognition,108 
understood essentially as parity-based extended functionalism. Here I will rely on Andy Clark's and 
David Chalmers'  1998 paper 'The Extended Mind',  which is  regarded as the seminal  and most  
contested  paper  of  extended  cognition. I  will  also  show  how  Clark,  and  Michael  Wheeler  in 
particular, conceive extended cognition essentially in coarse-grained functionalist terms. After this I 
will  move  on  to  the  next  part,  where  I  will  examine  second-wave  extended  cognition,  which 
emphasises  complementarity  and  cognitive  integration  arguments  over  the  reliance  on 
functionalism and parity considerations of the first-wave extended cognition. The main authors here 
will be Richard Menary, John Sutton and Mark Rowlands.  The chapter is thus divided because I 
deem the current debate around extended cognition to revolve around making this distinction. 
4.1 First-Wave Extended Cognition
Andy  Clark  and  David  Chalmers109 (C&C  hereafter)  are motivated  to  challenge  the  cognitivist 
prejudice of isolated headbound cognition and put forward an argument for the literal extension of 
cognition and mind beyond the organism. They take a step further from the embodied-embedded  
nature of cognition, and demand that the epistemic credit involved in epistemic actions should be 
spread so that the external parts also count as proper parts of the cognitive process.  In order to 
convince us about the plausibility of this C&C put forward a kind of veil of metabolic ignorance for 
identifying cognitive systems. That is, they question what it would take for us to identify an element  
or a process as (part of the) cognitive. This is the essence of their  parity principle, quoted in the 
beginning of this chapter.110 The parity principle urges one to ignore the apparent importance of 
106 This is the so-called Parity principle found originally in Clark & Chalmers (1998: 8). Here it is in an amended form 
with the qualification 'for that time' found in Clark (2005b: 2) with original emphasis.
107 Similar approaches to cognitive extension under discussion here go by various different names such as vehicle 
externalism (Hurley 1998; Rowlands 2006), locational externalism (Wilson 2004), wide computationalism (Wilson 
1994), active externalism (Clark & Chalmers 1998), environmentalism (Rowlands 1999), cognitive integration 
Menary 2007, 2010a), and the amalgamated mind (Rowlands 2010). In what follows I will examine further some of 
these approaches.
108 The distinction between first- and second-wave extended cognition is originally due to John Sutton (2010).
109 Clark & Chalmers 1998
110 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8; Clark 2007: 166-167
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the head and to focus rather on the functional role played by the different parts of a cognitive  
system. Hence contrary to some critics111 it does not claim that the external part of the cognitive 
system works (or needs to work) exactly like the inner part, nor does it say anything about the 
necessary  or sufficient conditions for an external  vehicle of  cognition.112 In  what follows I  will 
return to the points about functional role and vehicles of cognition.
C&C argue for active externalism, which they distinguish from Putnam and Burge113 type 
passive externalism of content where the relevant external features  do not drive cognition in the 
present situation, in the hear-and-now. In contrast active externalism grants the external features an  
ineliminable  role  in  affecting  cognitive  processing.  This  is  exemplified  by  combining  active 
externalism with the notion of  a  coupled system,  to which has  already been alluded to in the 
previous chapters.  C&C maintain that  human's  may link with  external scaffolding in a  two-way 
interaction that  allows the creation of a  closely coupled cognitive system in its  own right.  The 
essence of parity, active externalism and closely coupled systems is captured by the following quote:
All the components of the system play an active causal role, and they jointly govern 
behaviour in the same sort of way that cognition usually does. If we remove the external 
component  the  system's  behavioural  competence  will  drop,  just  as  it  would  if  we 
removed part of its brain. Our thesis is that this sort of coupled process counts equally  
well as a cognitive process, whether or not it is wholly in the head.114
So for instance the formation of words by rearranging scrabble tiles, the completion of a jig saw 
puzzle by grouping the pieces, or calculating with pen and paper may be seen as extended cognitive 
processes in themselves, and not just  as epistemic actions easing the cognitive processing load.  
According to C&C they are best characterised as part of thought, not as individual actions. 115
One  could  raise  the  question  here116 whether  there  is  a  possible  way  of  conceiving 
epistemic  actions  as  not extended within  the  extended cognition framework?  I  think  a  simple 
answer would be: no, they should always be thought of as extended cognitive processes. Yet this 
implies another more interesting question for extended cognition: why should we prefer extended 
cognition over the embodied-embedded way of conceiving epistemic actions? One possible answer 
here  would  be  that  it  is  simply  wrong  to  stick  with  embodied-embedded  approach  and  that  
extended  cognition  conceives  the  nature  of  cognition  correctly,  i.e.  it  is  explanatorily  more 
plausible. Perhaps it brings forth new and exciting ways of conceiving the use of artefacts and tools 
in cognitive  activity  that  the  embodied-embedded  way  neglects.  Another  related  answer  is  that 
111 See e.g. Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2009, 2010a) to be discussed more fully in chapter 6.
112 Clark 2007: 166-167; 2005b: 2
113 Putnam 1975; Burge 1979
114 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8–9
115 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8–12.
116 I would like to thank Ilmari Hirvonen for pointing this out to me.
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extended  cognition  has  more  explanatory  power  for  cognitive  science  in  general. 117 Now, 
interestingly  Robert  Rupert118 takes  up  this  sort  of  argumentation but  uses  it  in  favour  of  the 
embodied-embedded approach. I will return to Rupert's argument in section 7.2, since it brings to  
light further interesting and important differences in 4ED with regards to cognitive  agency.  But, 
note  that  Mark  Sprevak119 argues  against  this  sort  of  general  argumentative  tact  for  or  against 
extended cognition that is based on “inference to the best explanation” considerations. Relatedly,  
Samuli  Pöyhönen  validly  recognises  that  none  of  the  authors  that  rely  on  explanatory  power  
argumentation has provided a systematic account of the notion of explanatory power they utilise.  
Interestingly  Pöyhönen  aims  to  provide  one  and  in  doing  so  offer  an  independent  way  of  
demarcating cognitive systems.120
Now, let's  get  back to a few more important theoretical features of first-wave extended 
cognition. First, Clark maintains that the possession of a contentful cognitive state is best thought of 
as a  property  of  the whole  active system. Hence,  he insists  that what is  specifically  at  issue in  
extended cognition is that the cognitive vehicles, that are capable of bearing cognitive content and 
thus enable the systemic-level contentful states, can be distributed across the brain, body and the  
environment.121 Second, for an external element to be considered a cognitive vehicle it needs to be  
poised to fulfil three criteria: reliability, accessibility and automatic endorsement. A cognitive vehicle 
is reliable if it is portable and available for use as and when required. It is also easily accessible  
when it is always at hand and routinely appealed to. Finally, any information retrieved from the  
vehicle needs to be deemed trustworthy and not routinely put into question, i.e.  more or less  
automatically endorsed. By fulfilling these three criteria an external cognitive vehicle may be said to  
become transparent for the system's cognitive processing. This transparency is purported to be akin 
to the functioning of working biological cognitive vehicles.122
One could raise the question here whether these conditions are too individualistic and 
presupposes  a  model  of  an  already  formed  cognitive  agent  that  might  pose  problems  for  the  
tenability  of  extended cognition.123 For instance,  one could argue that  the point of  view about 
cognition inherent in extended cognition is wrong-headed; it is not that cognition is first in the 
head and then possibly gets extended, but that cognition should from the start be conceived as a  
distributed cultural phenomenon for instance. Rupert recognises a similar point and asks whether 
these conditions presuppose some kind of persisting systemic integrity, which might bring forth 
117 See e.g. Clark & Chalmers (1998), Clark (2007, 2008a) and Wilson (2004) for this sort of argument.
118 Rupert 2004; 2009a, b; 2010a, b
119 Sprevak 2010
120 Pöyhönen 2012
121 Clark 2005b: 1 (footnote 1). Clark takes vehicles of cognition to carry for instance representations and 
propositional attitudes. Menary's and Rowlands' take on cognitive vehicles is somewhat different as they 
understand them as information-bearing structures (Menary 2010a; Rowlands 1999, 2003) I will not adjudicate the 
possible differences here and will simply take cognitive vehicles to be information-bearing structures and/or to 
carry representations, propositional attitudes etc.
122 Clark 2008a: 79–80; 2010a: 46–47; 2005b: 2–3
123  I would like to thank Sami Paavola for pointing this out to me.
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problems for the notion agency in extended cognition.124 I will not delve into this now, but will take 
up  these  sort  of  worries  in  chapter  7  where  a  more  thorough  analysis  of  the  different  4ED 
approaches is made through the notion of agency.
4.1.1 First-Wave Extended Cognition as Extended Functionalism
There may be drawn a close connection between the parity based first-wave extended cognition and 
functionalism.125 Now, functionalism takes the architecture of the mind to be a complex cognitive 
system, which is  characterised by a network of causal input-output relations. These input-output 
relations  spread  out  across  the  brain,  body  and  the  world.  Individual  mental  states/cognitive 
processes, are characterised by their function, or the role, they play within this system of inputs and  
outputs. So, what matters is not the internal constitution of the mental state or cognitive process,  
but  its  causal  functional  role  within the  whole  cognitive system.  Specifically,  the  role  between 
systemic  inputs,  systemic  outputs,  and  other  systemic  states.  So,  for  instance  pain  can  be 
characterised as being caused by tissue damage and causing wincing and groaning behaviour. One 
important implication of this view is that cognitive states are multiply realisable. That is, functional 
analysis  of  the  mind  does  not  restrict  the  type  of  system that  is  capable  of  implementing,  or 
realising, cognitive states. Cognitive states can be realised in physically different systems by various 
different mechanisms.126 
When  the  idea  of  multiple  realisability  is  compared  with  the  parity  principle,  the 
connection between functionalism and first-wave extended cognition becomes clear.  Remember 
that the parity principle urges one to ignore the arbitrary boundary of skin and skull and rather 
focus on the nature of the processes within the whole system. In purported cases of extension what 
is important is the functional role the external element contributes to the overall cognitive system 
or a  given process  and not  the physical  structure  of  the element  or  the implementing system. 
Moreover,  first-wave  extended  cognition  theorists  argue  that  there  is  functional  isomorphism 
between the inner and outer states  and processes  and that  this functional  similarity should be  
conceived essentially as coarse-grained. That is, it is the similarity of the broader common-sense role 
of  the states  and processes  in  driving and explaining behaviour  that  matters.  In contrast,  fine-
grained functionalism requires the realizing processes (of the coarse-grained roles) to be similar in 
all the resources (inner and outer).127 So, extended functionalism does not purport to claim that the 
124 Rupert 2010a: 330n6
125 For clear arguments for the connection between extended cognition and functionalism see Wheeler (2010) and 
Clark (2008a, b)
126  Kim 2006: 117–119, 151, 159; Levin 2010: 1, 3.1, 3.2, 4.5; Wheeler 2010: 247–249
127  Clark 2008a: 88–89, 99, 114–115; 1998: 98–100; Wheeler 2011: 419; to appear: 4, 9. Wheeler (2010: 258–261) 
gestures at the possibility of fine-grained microfunctionalism present in extended cognition, and that fine-grained 
functional roles could also be extended and not solely realised internally. Since for time being this remains merely 
a gesture, and not a fully developed argument, I will not examine it further.
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external resources function exactly like the inner ones.  Hence, the possible counter-argument128 
that requires the functional similarity to be fine-grained and essentially modelled according to brain 
processes might not apply. As Wheeler puts it: the wrong way to understand parity is to 
first  […]  fix  the benchmarks for  what it  is  to  count as  a  proper part  of  a 
cognitive system by identifying all the details of the causal contribution made 
by (say) the brain.  Then we look to see if any external elements meet those 
benchmarks.129 
This  is  just  the  sort  of  bio-chauvinistic  prejudice the  parity  principle  was  made to 
undermine in the first place.130 So, for the first-wave extended cognition it is the coarse-grained 
functional  similarity  between  the  internal  and  external  resources  in  driving  behaviour  that 
ultimately matters in the formation of a hybrid (extended) cognitive system.
To be fair there remains tension between extended functionalism and for instance Rupert's  
argument that the internal and the external cannot be functionally equivalent since for instance the 
(fine-grained) processes and properties of biological memory are so vastly different and ones that  
are not captured by some extended memory systems.131 Yet, it has been recognised that a stalemate 
is bound to arise between the proponents and opponents of extended functionalism. 132 Rowlands 
for  instance notes  that  the stalemate  arises  because  Wheeler  claims that  Rupert's  criticisms are 
question-begging because they require a chauvinistic form of functionalism (that excludes extended 
cognition), yet it could be argued alike that the reliance on coarse-grained functionalist arguments 
is also question begging against the requirement for a fine-grained analysis. 133 This problem could 
then be located at a more general problem with functionalism, raised e.g. by Block,134 in defining 
the nature of the inputs and outputs.
4.1.2 Extended   Mind 
As a final aspect concerning first-wave extended cognition I would like to go through C&C's now 
infamous thought-experiment and argument for the extension of  mind and mental  states.  C&C 
move on from extended cognitive processes, such as may be present when calculating with pen and 
paper,  to  the  possibility  of  extending  mind  and  mental  states.  They  argue  that  even  our  
128 Made for example by Rupert (2004, 2009a, b, 2010a).
129 Wheeler to appear: 3–4. See also Wheeler (2010: 249–255) and Clark (2008a: 114–116) for this sort of 
argumentation.
130 Clark 2005b: 2;  2007: 167
131 Rupert 2004: 405–415; 2009a
132 See e.g. Kiverstein & Farina 2011; Wheeler 2010; Rowlands 2009b; Sprevak 2009; Walter & Kästner 2012
133 Rowlands 2009b: 633–634; Wheeler 2010
134 Block 1978
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propositional  attitudes;  beliefs,  intentions,  etc.,  may  be  extended.  They  illustrate  this  with  a 
thought-experiment and ask us to imagine two individuals Inga and Otto, who both are eager to go 
to the Museum of Modern Art (MoMA). Inga thinks for a moment and recalls the correct address of  
the museum and then goes to MoMA. In doing this it seems clear that she had a (dispositional) 
belief of the location of MoMA and that she had that belief even before attending to her memory  
(before the belief became occurrent). Now consider Otto who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease and 
whose biological memory is degrading. In order to facilitate the structuring of his life Otto relies on  
a notebook. He carries it with him all the time, writes down new information when encountered 
and looks up old information when needed. So, when Otto decides to go to MoMA he consults his  
notebook and looks up the correct address and arrives at the museum. C&C maintain that it seems  
that Otto arrived at MoMA because he had the desire to go there and the correct belief of  the  
location of MoMA. Importantly, it also seems plausible to say that Otto had his belief even before  
consulting his notebook, much in the same way as when Inga had her belief before consulting her  
memory.  So, the  role the notebook plays to Otto is akin to Inga’s working biological  memory. 
Hence,  the  thought-experiment  urges  us  to  consider  Inga  (with  her  appropriately  functioning 
biological memory) and Otto (with his notebook) on a par and therefore the plausibility of Otto's  
mental states extending to the notebook he is using.135
Moreover, Otto's notebook may be said to be a legitimate physical vehicle of mental content  
since it fulfils the three criteria C&C set up for the candidates of external  cognitive vehicles.  The 
notebook is reliable since Otto carries it with him all the time and uses it as and when required. 
Hence the information in the notebook is also easily  accessible,  since it  is always  at hand and 
routinely appealed to. Finally, the retrieved information is more or less automatically endorsed. 
That  is,  Otto  does  not  routinely  put  into  question  the  information  but  deems  it  trustworthy.  
Moreover, by fulfilling the criteria of external vehicle the notebook becomes in a way transparent to 
Otto’s cognitive processing. This transparency is again purported to be akin to the functioning of a  
working  biological  memory.  For  instance,  consider  how Inga’s  incorrect  information  about  or  
misremembering  of  the  location  of  the  museum  is  similar  to  the  notebook  having  incorrect 
information.136
So,  it  is  the  close  coupling  between  Otto  and  the  notebook  and  the  active  role  the 
notebook plays  in  the system that  makes  it  the  case that  Otto  and the notebook count  as  an  
extended cognitive system, with all the parts of the system enjoying full cognitive status. That is, the  
notebook contributes to the behaviour of the entire system, in that were it be lost Otto’s cognitive 
capabilities  would diminish  significantly.  Similarly,  the  notebook plays  an  active  role  in  belief-
formation, for if the information about the location of MoMA were incorrect then Otto would not 
be able to get there. Therefore,  in the belief-formation process the information in the notebook 
135 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 12–13
136  Clark 2008a: 79–80; Clark 2010a: 46–47; Clark 2005b: 2–3
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functions equivalently to the information in biological memory, i.e. they have similar  functional  
poise.137  Hence,  what ultimately  matters for making the case for extended mind is the similar  
functional poise of the information in the two cognitive systems (Inga and Otto + notebook) and 
the transparency of the notebook in Otto’s cognitive processing.
4.2 Second-Wave Extended Cognition
Relating to the importance and the role of the parity principle there is divergence among the first-
wave theorists. Whereas Wheeler maintains that 'the parity principle provides the only viable basis 
for  [extended cognition]',138 Clark deems it merely a sufficient condition for cognitive extension.  
For Clark the parity principle by itself is not meant as an argument for extended cognition but  
merely as a device to question the bio-chauvinistic prejudice. According to Clark there are two 
components  in  extended  cognition  argumentation:  one  placing  emphasis  on  functional 
isomorphism and parity, the other on the distinct yet  complementary nature of the internal and 
external resources. As early as 1998 Clark maintained the primacy of the second component when 
he argued the following way:
Given this second line of argument (the one stressing complementarity), it is best to see 
functional isomorphism as at most part of a sufficient condition for cognitive extension 
[…] The more interesting and plausible argument, I feel, is the one which describes  
the seepage of mind into the world by stressing that “the brain's brief is to provide  
complementary facilities that will support the repeated exploitation of operations upon 
the  world  [and]  to  provide  computational  processes  (such  as  powerful  pattern  
completion) that the world, even as, manipulated by us, does not usually afford” [Clark  
1997: 58].139
Now, the second-wave extended cognition theorists such as Richard Menary, John Sutton, and Mark 
Rowlands have recognised this disparity in first-wave extended cognition. They have also recognised 
the critics' neglect of Clark's point about the two distinct components of the extended cognition  
argumentation.140 Sutton  for  instance  validly  recognises  that  most  of  the  criticisms  towards 
extended cognition have  been directed  at,  or  are stemming from, the  parity  principle  and the  
commitment to coarse-grained functionalism. Recall for instance the aforementioned stalemate.141 
Yet, the second-wave theorists have mixed feelings with regards to the first-wave: on the one hand  
they contend that their  approach is not necessarily incompatible with the first-wave,  but rather 
137 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 13–16; Clark 2005b: 2; 2008a: 79
138 Wheeler manuscript: ch.5 p.2; See also Wheeler 2011.
139 Clark 1998: 99
140 Sutton 2010: 204–205; Sutton et al. 2010: 524–525; See also Kirchhoff 2011 and Walter 2010.
141 For the most adamant critics see Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2008, 2009) and Rupert (2004, 2009a, b, 2010a).
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“flows from it”, as Sutton puts it. Sutton and Menary for instance do clearly recognise that the 
payoff from first-wave extended cognition is that it establishes the hybridity of cognitive processing;  
that cognition involves both internal and external aspects, which are to be integrated into a systemic 
whole.142 But on the other hand, the second-wave theorists deem there to be a tension between 
parity based argumentation and their own. They go so far as to claim that the parity principle is  
either wrong or incomplete as a motivation for extended cognition since it at least  neglects the 
value in external resources possibly having different character than the internal ones. 143 Therefore, 
the second-wave theorists emphasise an approach to cognitive extension that is more akin to the 
second aspect of extension that Clark distinguished (i.e. complementarity).
There are roughly four key notions in play within second-wave extended cognition. 144 The 
complementarity, integration  and  manipulation of  internal  and  external  resources,  and  the 
transformation these bring about. Let's start with Sutton's Complementarity principle:
in  extended  cognitive  systems,  external  states  and  processes  need  not  mimic  or 
replicate  the formats,  dynamics,  or  functions  of  inner  states  and processes.  Rather, 
different components of  the overall  (enduring or  temporary) system  can play  quite 
different  roles  and  have  different  properties  while  coupling  in  collective  and 
complementary contributions to flexible thinking and acting.145
Sutton makes two further qualifications. a) In the idea of complementarity one should resist the 
tendency of conceiving the internal and external as distinct realms with fixed properties. The point 
being that  one should not from the outset, for instance,  exclude the possibility of the external  
resource being as dynamic and fluid as the internal one. The characteristics of internal and external  
might well turn out to be interchangeable for cognitive practice. At this stage Sutton merely warns 
about not making this mistake and leaves it to further discovery whether the fixed properties view 
should  be  abandoned.146 b)  The  other  aspect  relates  to  the  way  the  integration to  external 
complementary contributions may alter, or transform, the inner parts of the cognitive system. I will 
now turn to this second aspect and examine it through Menary's extensive analysis.147
Menary adhere's  to  Sutton's  complementarity  argumentation,148 but  conceives  extended 
cognition essentially in terms of cognitive integration, which may be broadly construed as involving 
142 Sutton 2010: 189–190, 193–196, 204–206; Menary 2010a: 227–229
143 Sutton 2010: 198–200; Menary 2006a: 333
144 These notions stem from all three second-wave theorists under examination here; Sutton (2010), Sutton et al. 
(2010), Rowlands (1999, 2006, 2010), Menary (2006a, 2007, 2009, 2010a, b, c). Each theorist places varying 
emphasis on these notions, yet I deem the general approach to be similar enough to warrant a comprehensive 
picture of second-wave extended cognition to be presented.
145 Sutton 2010: 194
146 Sutton 2010: 189, 206–207, 213, 216n.2. Specifically Sutton gestures here at the possibility of developing a new 
and distinct third-wave extended mind. Interestingly, Kirchhoff (2011) has taken up this type of project along the 
lines of a dynamical properties view.
147 Sutton 2010: 206–208
148 Menary 2010b: 571
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some cognitive processes as coordinated processes. Whereby,
cognition is the coordination of bodily processes of the organism with salient features 
of  the  environment,  often  created  or  maintained  by  the  organism.  A  coordinated 
process allows the organism to  perform cognitive  tasks  that  it  otherwise  would be 
unable to; or allows it to perform tasks in a way that is distinctively different and is an 
improvement upon the way that the organism performs those tasks via neural processes 
alone.149
In  cognitive  integration,  and  specifically  in  those  coordinated  processes,  are  two  important  
regulatory aspects. 1) the  manipulation of external structures as a constitutive part of cognition, 
and 2) the cognitive transformation this manipulation brings about.150 I will next treat each of these 
aspects accordingly.
4.2.1 Cognitive Integration: the Manipulation of External Structures
Menary holds a manipulation thesis, which he credits originally to Rowlands:
cognitive  processes  are  not  located  exclusively  in  the  skin  of  cognising  organisms 
because such processes are, in part, made up of physical or bodily  manipulation of 
structures in the environments of such organisms.151
Menary  takes  the  aim of  cognitive  manipulation  to  be  the  restructuring  of  informational  and 
physical structure of  the environment. It is important to note that this thesis seems to be very  
similar to the theoretical commitments of embodied-embedded cognition. Specifically inherent in 
the  idea  of  manipulation  are  the,  now  familiar,  ideas  of  ecological  control,  (cognitive)  niche 
construction, and the self-built or natural external scaffolding constructions that are relied upon  
when  completing  cognitive  tasks.  What  distinguishes  Menary  from  the  embodied-embedded 
approach is that for him the manipulation thesis is insufficient on its own, due mainly to the purely 
causal nature of the manipulations. Hence he argues that the manipulations need to be normative  
as well.  These normative manipulations should be understood as embodied practices stemming 
from learning,  training,  and  enculturation.152 Menary  distinguishes  four  broad  classes  of  these 
normative manipulations. 
The first two classes of normative manipulations are nothing new  by now. Menary takes  
149 Menary 2010b: 563
150 Menary 2010b
151 Rowlands 1999: 23 original emphasis; in Menary 2010a: 228
152 Menary 2007: 84; 2010a: 233; 2010b: 563–564.
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epistemic  actions,  that  were  already  introduced  in  section  2.2,  as  instances  on  normative 
manipulations. Thus Menary emphasises the fact that not all the relevant states and processes (for  
the completion of a cognitive task) need to be in the head, and that much of the explanatory power 
of cognitive abilities is also due to the manipulations of the environment (recall the examples of  
grouping puzzle pieces  and scrabble tiles).153 Also,  what  Menary dubs,  biological  couplings are 
familiar  from  the  embodied-embedded  view  and  enactivism  in  that  they  emphasise  the  close 
relationship between organism and environment. Menary does not investigate this in detail but  
merely gives Webb's analysis of phonotaxis in crickets, Ballard's animate vision, Dawkins' extended 
phenotypes,  and  O'Regan  and  Noë's  sensory-motor  contingencies  as  examples  of  biological 
couplings.154 One could speculate here whether enactive cognition in general (and not just the 
perceptual  aspect  of  it  exemplified  by  O'Regan  and  Noë)  would  also  fit  into  this  picture  of  
biological  couplings,  since  it  places  a  large  emphasis  on  the  relational  aspect  of  cognition,  
approaches it from a biological perspective, and emphasises the structural coupling of the organism 
and the environment.155 As a side note, this might also be one of the reasons why Menary and 
Rowlands  say  that  the  second-wave arguments  take  a  more enactive  approach to  cognition  by 
emphasising  the  bodily  activities  in  the  world  (or  actions  on  external  information-bearing 
structures) as a part (in addition to neural processes and vehicles) of the constituting aspects of  
cognition.156 Be as it  may,  with these first  two normative manipulations Menary  clearly aims to 
reduce the cognizer's reliance on internal representations of the environment as well as form a  
more intimate relationship between the organism and the world.
Now, the following two normative manipulations are unique to Menary's exposition. Self-
correcting actions are similar to epistemic actions in that they direct and structure practical actions  
when completing tasks. Yet, they are distinct because self-correcting actions do not involve a direct  
physical manipulation of the environment. Examples of self-correcting actions include the use of  
props,  language  and  gestures.  When  describing  this  Menary  focuses  on  the  role  of  linguistic 
structures in influencing cognition and future actions. He relies here largely on Lev Vygotsky's ideas 
and studies  of  the  role  of  language in  infant  development  and completion  of  tasks. 157 Menary 
adhere's  to  Vygotsky's  diachronic  account  of  development.  Higher  cognitive capacities,  such as  
reasoning, are primarily (developmentally) a social phenomenon that happen in the  intermental 
153 Menary 2010b: 564–568
154 Webb 1994; Ballard 1991; Dawkins 1982; O'Regan & Noë 2001a, b.
155 Menary 2010a: 237 and Menary 2010b: 564.
156 Menary 2010a: 227; Rowlands 2010: 71. See Menary (2009) for a more detailed account of the relationship 
between extended cognition and enactivism. Note that there is an ongoing debate concerning the possible 
incompatibility of extended cognition and enactivism. Rowlands (2009b, 2010) argues for the incompatibility of 
Noë's form of enactivism and his extended cognition, still holding on to the possibility of adhering to some other 
form of enactivism. Wheeler (to appear) also argues for the incompatibility of extended functionalism and what 
here has been presented as the general approach of enactive cognition. But see Di Paolo (2009) for a response to 
Wheeler and the rejection of functionalism but the acceptance of some form of extended cognition closer to that of 
second-wave extended cognition. See also Thompson & Stapleton (2009) for similar type of argumentation.
157 See section 2.2 for Vygotsky's impact on the notion of scaffolding and his notion of the zone of proximal 
development. Menary relies here on Vygotsky (1978).
34
plane. A child is guided in her intermental development and problem-solving activity by her own 
(activity specific) egocentric speech and the linguistic utterances of her parents (this linguistic help 
of  the  parents  is  captured  by  the  notion  of  the  zone  of  proximal  development).  Slowly  by  
accomplishing cognitive tasks this way the need for parental scaffolding reduces and the egocentric 
speech is internalised into an inner monologue. Hence, the intramental cognition then arises only 
through/after the development of intermental capacities. Yet, Menary agues that the child's speech is  
not merely accompaniment of her (problem-solving) activity. Rather it gives a cognitive structure 
for the activity; sequencing the required actions to be taken, searching for solutions, recognising 
failures etc.158 Hence, Menary argues that '[s]elf-corrective speech, whether private or public, is used 
to structure, direct and correct actions that lead to the completion of cognitive tasks.' 159
The second unique aspect of Menary's normative manipulation is cognitive practice, which 
refers to the way external representational systems are manipulated according to cognitive norms in 
order to complete cognitive tasks. According to Menary a norm is cognitive, as opposed to social or  
moral, when it is tied directly to the completion of a cognitive task, such as solving a problem,  
planning or making inferences.  The manipulation of external vehicles is normative because the  
correct way to manipulate them is learned and because they have a goal of fulfilling some cognitive  
task.160 Menary investigates writing as an example of cognitive practice. Another one would be the 
classic  example  of  the  use  of  pen  and  paper  when  doing  maths.  Menary  argues  that  writing 
paraphernalia:  pens,  papers,  typewriters,  keyboards  etc.  enable  the  creation  of  external 
representations,  or  vehicles,161 such  as  words,  sentences,  paragraphs  and  essays,  that  are  not 
cognitive in themselves. Rather it is the coordination of the internal and external vehicles and the  
creation and manipulation of these external vehicles that is cognitive.162 Menary maintains this as 
one  of  the  crucial  features  of  second-wave  extended  cognition.  So,  the  external  process  (the  
physical manipulation of words and sentences on a paper) is different from, but complementary to,  
the internal processes and nevertheless should be accredited cognitive status in the overall system. 
Contrary to purely internal processing, these bodily manipulations of external vehicles allow for a 
more efficient way of completing complex cognitive tasks, such as writing an essay, since the pieces  
of text are enduring and stable and hence more easily edited. Keeping and editing an essay solely in  
the head would be very difficult. It is far more easy to manipulate the world directly.163
158 Menary 2010b: 564–565, 568–570; 2010a:238–241
159 Menary 2010b: 570
160 Note that Menary does not give a straightforward account of what he means by normativity but in this context his 
way of conceiving normativity seems to be in terms of instrumental normativity, with means–end type oughts, 
along the lines of von Wright (1963). See also Glüer & Wikforss (2010).
161 Recall (from note 134) that Menary takes cognitive vehicles to be information-bearing structures.
162 Hence contrary to some of the critics (most notably Adams & Aizawa: 2001, 2008) it is not the case that the 
external artefact, vehicle or representation is cognitive by itself. Rather it becomes a part of an extended cognitive 
system when appropriately incorporated. I will return to this point in chapter 6, when the challenges to 4ED are 
examined.
163 Menary 2010b: 564–565, 570–571
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4.2.2 Cognitive Integration: Transformation
This cognitive practice aspect of manipulation leads Menary to the second more general regulatory  
aspect  of  cognitive  integration,  that  of  cognitive  transformation.  Here  he  investigates  the 
developmental underpinnings of cognition, and gives an account of how the manipulative norms 
just discussed for instance are acquired. Broadly speaking, cognitive transformations are due to the 
cognitive and social niche the individual inhabits.  For instance, the guidance of parents set out  
certain social and cognitive norms for the child that she then slowly acquires through learning. 
Menary specifically looks 'how the normative and social structure of the environment, mediated by  
learning  and training  histories,  has  a  direct  transformatory  effect  on the body.' 164 Menary puts 
forward a dual component process of transformation165 whereby one may either manipulate public 
symbol systems or internal ones, or a mix of the both, when completing cognitive tasks. He arrives 
at this through examining Gallagher's discussion of the development of body schemas as a way of  
integrating to the environment, and the internalisation of number systems that transforms internal  
mathematical capacities.166
Menary's discussion of body schemas is in line with that presented in section 2.3 and hence 
will not be rehearsed here. Just recall that body schemas subpersonally structure our interactions 
with the environment, are mastered through learning, practice and habituation, and that they may 
incorporate  tools  within  it.  Specifically,  Menary  argues  that  our  bodies  have  eventually  been 
transformed to be capable of writing and drawing, i.e. creating representational structures. This is 
accomplished for two reasons. First, the tools for manipulating representations are incorporated 
into the body schema the way Gallagher put forward. Second, the manipulations of representations  
are governed by the manipulative norms set out by Menary that were discussed above. 167
In  addition  to  the  development  of  these  public  skills  Menary  argues  that  our  “innate” 
internal  representational  capacities  are  also  transformed  through  learning.  Menary  relies  on 
Stanislav Dehaene's  and his colleagues'168 studies and subsequent model of the development of 
mathematical capacities, that suggest we possess an intuitive understanding of numbers, quantities  
and addition, upon which the system of cultural symbols of words and numbers are then added.  
Yet, Menary takes the ontogenetic development of mathematical skills, e.g. the internalisation of the  
public numeral system, to allow the manipulation of new operations and representational formats  
and hence the transformation of our cognitive capacities.169 Rowlands maintains a similar view when 
he argues that when we manipulate external information-bearing structures, the information may 
164 Menary 2010b: 572
165 Menary 2010b: 576. I will follow here Kirchhoff (2011: 7) who recognises three key elements within Menary's 
account of transformation: 1) extension of the cognitive architecture by integration, 2) enhancement of cognitive 
capabilities, and 3) the reformation of brain's representational capacities.
166 Menary 2010b: 572–577
167 Menary 2010b: 575
168 Dehaene et al. 1999; Dehaene 2007 and Nieder & Dehaene 2009
169 Menary 2010b: 575–577
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be transformed from the merely present to the available, which then may be used in subsequent  
cognitive processing.170 Nevertheless, Menary specifically maintains that,
[t]he deeply transformative power of our learning histories in the cognitive niche is one 
that  reformats the representational capacities of the brain in terms of public symbol  
systems. We internalise public symbol systems in the way Dehaene suggests, but we also  
learn techniques for manipulating those symbol systems in public space.171
So  the  essence  of  second-wave  extended  cognition  lies  in  the  recognition  of  the  distinct  but 
complementary contributions environmental structures may have on our cognitive processing and 
how  the  successful  integration  of  these  environmental  resources  through  their  appropriate  
manipulation constitutes an extended, or more aptly hybrid, cognitive systems that spans the brain, 
body and the world. Otto + notebook is an extended system and instantiates an extended process  
of  remembering  just  because  Otto  is  capable  of  manipulating  the  external  vehicle  and  the  
information in it according to some cognitive norms that enable him to fulfil the task of getting to  
MoMA. Hence, what matters is not the notebook and its functional poise as in first-wave extended 
cognition but Otto's ability to write down sentences and then retrieve the information contained in  
them and use this information appropriately in order to get to MoMA.172
4.3 Summary
In this chapter I looked into the notion of extended cognition. Specifically I examined two waves of  
it.  Both  of  these  waves  have  a  somewhat  distinct  take  on  how  best  to  understand  cognitive 
extension. Yet, they both depart from the general embodied-embedded approach in that they move 
from a view of environmental resources as external props and aids for fulfilling cognitive tasks to a  
constitutive  claim  of  their  incorporation  to  the  overall  cognitive  system.173 They  also  hold 
unintelligible to conceive the external elements as cognitive in themselves. Rather, the arguments  
revolve around incorporating them to the overall (extended) cognitive system as equal partners 
with the rest of the elements. They also endorse a view where the hybridity of the cognitive system  
enhances cognitive capacities. First-wave extended cognition relies on parity considerations and the 
functional  isomorphism  of  the  internal  and  external  resources  in  driving  cognition.  Whereas  
second-wave extended cognition is weary of the reliance on parity and functionalism and instead 
emphasises the complementarity, manipulation and the subsequent integration of the structures. 
170 Rowlands 2010: 84
171 Menary 2010b: 576 emphasis added.
172 Menary 2006a: 333; 2010c: 609
173 Note that this applies only to the general embodied-embedded approach, since e.g. Gallagher seems to be making 
the constitutive claim with his notion of body schemas.
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5 Distributed Cognition
The emphasis on finding and describing “knowledge structures” that are somewhere “inside” the individual encourages  
us to  overlook the fact  that  human cognition is  always situated in  a  complex sociocultural  world and cannot  be  
unaffected by it [...] I hope to show that human cognition is not just influenced by culture and society, but that it is in a  
very fundamental sense a cultural and social process. To do this I will move the  boundaries of the cognitive unit of  
analysis out beyond the skin of the individual person [...]174
In this chapter I will turn my attention to the final aspect of 4ED, that of distributed cognition. This 
chapter  is  guided by  the first  research  question  (I)  What  are  the  theoretical  commitments  the 
different accounts of cognition in 4ED hold on to and how do these relate to each other? Yet, the 
chapter will specifically be targeted by the second one: II) (Why) should distributed cognition be 
added with the rest of the 4E accounts? In giving an account of distributed cognition I will mostly 
draw from the expositions of Edwin Hutchins, Jim Hollan and David Kirsh, since they have been 
developing and utilising the framework of distributed cognition from the start and still continue to 
do so.  Hutchins  traces  the  roots  of  distributed  cognition  to  the  mid  1980's  having  theoretical 
influences in anthropology, sociology and the cognitive sciences. Yet, most notably it is Hutchins'  
own 1995  book  Cognition in the  Wild that  is  cited as  one of  the key texts  in  setting out  the 
theoretical  foundations  of  distributed  cognition.  My  focus  here  is  on  these  particular  authors 
because it is their, especially Hutchins', exposition that participates in the current debate and is 
most discussed by the opponents and proponents of 4E.175
This chapter has three main sections. I will start by giving a general account of distributed 
cognition in 5.2. I will examine the methodology, principles and types of distributed cognition that  
its theorists take to be most significant. Then in section 5.3. I will compare and contrast distributed 
cognition to the other 4E approaches and argue for why distributed cognition should be included  
with the rest of the 4E. My aim is to draw out both similarities as well as differences between the  
approaches, and in doing so further clarify the theoretical commitments of distributed cognition.
5.1   “Cognition in the wild” 
One of the distinguishing features of distributed cognition with reference to the other 4Es is its  
relationship  to  anthropology;  specifically  its  methodological  approach of  cognitive ethnography 
with its emphasis on the study of cognition in the wild. The term “cognition in the wild” was coined 
174 Hutchins 1995: xiii–xiv emphasis added.
175 Hutchins 2001: 2068. Note that for instance Norman (1993) and Saloman (1993) are cited as other seminal early 
texts in distributed cognition. See e.g. Hollan et al. (2000) and Hutchins (2001).
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by Hutchins in his 1995 similarly titled book. With  the term he refers to the idea of how human 
cognition should be primarily studied in its natural everyday environment and activity, contrary to 
the “captivity” of normal laboratory settings. In the book Hutchins' subject of ethnographic study is  
navigation  onboard  a  US  Navy  ship.176 The  attention  in  cognitive  ethnography  is  not  only  in 
individual cognition but also on the role material, social and environmental factors have in creating 
meaning and action.177 Furthermore, the methodological focus is on events as Hollan et al. describe 
the event-centredness of cognitive ethnography: 'We are interested not only in what people know, 
but in how they go about using what they know, to do what they do.'178
In addition to the methodology of cognitive ethnography distributed cognition maintains 
two  interrelated  principles  that  according  to  them  distinguishes  it  from  other  approaches  to 
cognition. The first principle concerns the boundaries of the unit of analysis for cognition.179 I find 
the following two quotes to illuminate this first principle.
The central  claim of  the distributed cognition framework is  that the proper unit  of 
analysis for cognition should not be set a priori, but should be responsive to the nature  
of the phenomena under study.180 
Distributed cognition looks for cognitive processes, wherever they may occur, on the 
basis of the functional relationships of elements that participate together in the process 
[…]  A  cognitive  process  is  delimited  by  the  functional  relationships  among  the 
elements that participate in it, rather than by the spatial colocation of the elements.181 
So,  the  boundary  of  the  cognitive  unit/phenomenon/process  under  study  is  relative  to  the 
explanatory needs; sometimes the correct boundary is drawn at the skin and skull of a person,  
sometimes this is too large a boundary and a more detailed analysis is required, yet most often the 
skin and skull are too restrictive and a larger boundary is needed. 182 Hence, the important point 
here is that cognition is not restricted from the outset to the brain leaving anything outside it non-
cognitive.  It  should  be  conceived  more holistically.  Also  contrary  to  the  (first  wave)  extended 
cognition for instance it is not the case that cognition is primarily in the individual's head and then 
perhaps extends from it to the surrounding world thus forming a hybrid cognitive system. Rather, 
the initial point of view is a systemic one that does not start from a predetermined location, instead  
176 Hutchins 1995: xiii–xiv, 370–371
177 Hollan et al. 2000: 179; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 243
178 Hollan et al. 2000: 179
179 Hollan et al. 2000: 175–176; Hutchins 2001: 2068; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 240–241. Subsequent exposition is 
based on these three articles due to their similar treatment of the subject and will not be referenced further, other 
than when directly quoting passages.
180 Hutchins 2011a: 426. Recall also Bateson's (1972) similar point about not setting up boundaries a priori noted in 
footnote 74.
181 Hollan et al. 2000: 175
182 Hollan et al. 2000: 175–176; Hutchins 2001: 2068; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 240–241
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one  seeks  to  'find  a  system  that  can  dynamically  configure  itself  to  bring  subsystems  into 
coordination to accomplish various functions.'183 
So,  distributed  cognition is  specifically  interested  in  conceiving  cognition  as  a  holistic 
phenomenon.  Something  that  is  larger  than  the  individual.  Another  reason  behind this  is  the 
second principle, which concerns the range of mechanisms that participate in cognitive processes. 
Here distributed cognition departs from the traditional cognitivist explanations that exclusively rely 
on internal symbol manipulations or neuronal events, and looks for a broader class of cognitive  
events  that  may  not  be  encompassed  by  the  boundary  of  the  skin  and  skull. 184 For  instance, 
Hutchins' study of navigation onboard a US Naval ship speaks for the way the bridge of the ship  
could be seen as a unit of cognitive analysis. Hutchins maintains for instance that  in the task of 
marking  the  ships  location  a  great  deal  of  coordinated  behaviour  and problem solving among 
different individuals in the navigational team, parts of the ship and specific navigational instruments  
is required. But, even though this task involves numerous representational subsystems no single  
subsystem  is  solely  responsible  for  the  representation  of  the  ship’s  location.  Rather,  this 
representation comes as a whole, and is best explained as being realised by the relevant individuals,  
navigational instruments and their coordinated actions.185 Chapter 7.5 discusses in more detail a 
challenge to this type of distributed conception that has been raised by Rupert. There the issue is  
discussed in terms of cognitive agency and problems with “group cognitive states”. The gist of the  
debate revolves around the possible redundancy of positing group cognitive states over and above  
the individual states of the particular individuals taking part in the group. But for now I deter the  
discussion to chapter 7.5.
In applying these  two aforementioned principles  to cases  of  cognition in the wild,  i.e. 
actual  cases  of  cognitive  activity  such as navigation,  jury  decision making,  problem-solving etc. 
Hollan, Hutchins and Kirsh distinguish three kinds of cognitive distribution: 1) socially distributed 
cognition, 2) coordination of internal and external structures, and 3) distribution in time.186 I will 
next treat each of these accordingly.
1)  The main idea in  socially  distributed  cognition  is  that  social  organisation  is  itself  a 
cognitive architecture. Hollan et al. argue that this is so because cognitive processes involve the 
transmission and transformation of information, the patterns of  which indicate some underlying 
cognitive architecture;  and since social organisation determines the way information flows in a  
group of people it itself may be seen as a cognitive architecture. Moreover, distributed cognition  
includes emergent phenomena that arise not only from the interactions between people, but also  
from  interactions  between  individuals  and  the  structure  of  the  environment  (recall  Hutchins' 
183 Hollan et al. 2000: 175
184 Hollan et al. 2000: 175–176; Hutchins 2001: 2068; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 240–241
185 Hutchins 1995: especially ch.3 and 4
186 Hollan et al. 2000: 176–180; Hutchins 2001: 2068–2071; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 241–244
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navigation study above).187  This leads nicely to the second kind of cognitive distribution.
2) Hollan et al. take the coordination of internal and external structures along the lines of  
embodied-embedded cognition discussed above in chapter 2.188 They emphasise causal coupling, 
the fact that minds are not merely representational engines that create internal models of external  
world,  and  how  minds  are  emergent  both  developmentally  and  operationally.  Hence,  for  
distributed cognition tools and instruments are not merely stimuli but are integrated elements in 
the  larger  cognitive  system.189 In  favour  of  this  idea  Hutchins  notes  how  '[i]t  is  essential  to 
distinguish  the  cognitive  properties  required  to  manipulate  the  artifact  from  the  [cognitive 
property] that is achieved via the manipulation of the artifact.'190
3) Once the boundary of the unit of cognitive analysis is moved beyond the skin and skull 
the close connection between culture and cognition and with it the aspect of cognitive distribution  
in time are brought forward.191 The relationship between cognition and culture has an intertwined 
dual nature: culture is a cognitive process as much as cognition is a cultural process. Hollan et al.  
describe this relationship the following way:
This means, on the one hand, that culture emerges out of the activity of human agents 
in their historical contexts, as mental, material and social structures interact, and on the 
other hand, that culture in the form of a history of material artifacts and social practices, 
shapes cognitive processes,  particularly cognitive processes that are distributed over 
agents, artifacts, and environments.192 
So,  the  cognitive  distribution  in  time  arises  from  the  way  culture  safeguards  accumulated 
knowledge and acts as a resource for learning, problem-solving and reasoning. This way culture 
both enables (by allowing the reliance on previous solutions) and constrains (by blinding to other 
possible  nouvelle  solutions)  the  accomplishment  of  tasks  that  otherwise  would not  have  been 
achieved.193 
Finally, Hutchins has recently started to emphasise and analyse more thoroughly the notion 
of  cultural  practice and its  relevance in shaping cognition.194 Cultural  practices incorporate,  or 
function within, the three types of distribution (social, coordination of internal and external, and 
distribution in time) and are practices that are constrained and/or coordinated by the practices of 
187 Hollan et al. 2000: 176–177; Hutchins 2001: 2069–2070;  Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 241–242
188 Specifically they take it as “embodied cognition”, but their discussion and references are more in line with 
embodied-embedded cognition discussed in chapter 2. (Hollan et al. 2000: 177–178) This aspect was present 
already in Hutchins (1995) even though it was not dubbed embodied cognition.
189 Hollan et al. 2000: 177–178; Hutchins 2001: 2070; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 241
190 Hutchins 2001: 2070.
191 Hutchins 1995: 354; Hollan et al. 2000: 178; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 241–242
192 Hollan et al. 2000: 178
193 Hollan et al. 2000: 178; Hutchins 2001: 2070–2071; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 241–242
194 Hutchins 2008; 2011b
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other people. Cultural practices have a dual function of organising human interactions in and with 
the world: 
[…] first by furnishing the world with the cultural artefacts that comprise most of the 
structure with which we interact. Second, cultural practices orchestrate our interactions 
with the natural phenomena and cultural artefacts that produce cognitive outcomes.195
Hutchins  maintains  that  effectively  all  external  representations,  such  as  language,  reading  and 
writing, are products of cultural practices. But cultural practices are not to be understood as static  
disembodied mental representations of knowledge. Instead they are  embodied skills that include 
particular ways of perceiving the world.196 An illuminating example would be the way of seeing and 
picking  out  constellations.  Stars  may  bee  seen  regardless  of  ones  cultural  background,  but 
constellations 'exist only by virtue of someone enacting it via a cultural practice that allocates visual 
attention in a particular way.'197 Yet, Hutchins goes so far as to argue that we make material patterns 
into  representations  by  enacting  their  meanings  through  cultural  practices.  These  enacted  
representations form the basis for understanding how higher-level cognitive processes emerge from 
lower-level  sensorimotor  ones.  For instance a  member of  a  navigation team may represent  the  
speed of the ship on a chart by appropriately manipulating a pair of dividers on successively marked  
positions of the ship on a map and the scale features embedded in the sides of the chart. The crew  
member is able to perceive/read from the span of the dividers placed on the scale the speed of the 
ship  rather  that  the  equally  visible  distance  covered  just  because  he  is  trained  to  make  the 
distinction (i.e. his accumulated cultural practices coordinate the process). 198 I take the point here 
to lie in Hutchins' recognition that perception is never passive reception of input but is always  
enacted  with  meaning  by  the  organism's  cultural  practices,  and  that  sensorimotor  activity  is 
necessarily part of the reasoning processes; '[…] cultural practices orchestrate the coordination of  
low-level perceptual and motor processes with cultural materials to produce particular higher-level 
cognitive processes.'199 
Importantly with regards to cognitive agency to be discussed in chapter 7 Hutchins argues 
that  one must  be  careful  with  attributing cognitive properties/processes  to  individuals  that  are  
involved in cultural practices since '[t]here is a danger of attributing to the individual cognitive 
properties that belong to the larger distributed system.'200 These ideas about cultural practices and 
larger distributed systems as agents also raise an interesting connection to the philosophy of social 
195 Hutchins 2008: 2018
196 Hutchins 2008: 2012; 2011b: 441
197 Hutchins 2011b: 441 emphasis added. 
198 Hutchins 2011a: 427–435
199 Hutchins 2011a: 434
200 Hutchins 2008: 2011
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sciences,  and philosophy  of  action  in  particular.  The work  done  by  Margaret  Gilbert,  Michael  
Bratman,  Raimo Tuomela  and David  Velleman  for  instance  could  be  highly  interesting  here.201 
Moreover the work of Deborah Tollefsen that approaches these sort of issues from the perspective  
of philosophy of action along similar lines as the authors just mentioned but with a connection to 
first-wave  extended  cognition  would  also  be  very  interesting.  Yet,  unfortunately  due  to  length 
constraints these sort of points of view will not be considered in this thesis. As has already been  
mentioned,  chapter  7  touches upon the issues of  cognitive (and collective) agency but from a  
different perspective to the philosophy of action theorists.
5.2 Why Distributed Cognition is Included With the 4Es202
At this point I think it is crucial to say something about why I have included distributed cognition 
with the rest of the 4Es. This is because no one in the 4E(D) literature has explicitly made this sort  
of grouping before, even when distributed cognition and namely Hutchins' theorising is alluded to 
and made use of. As was noted in chapter 1 the focus has largely been only in the 4Es with varying  
emphasises. In what follows I will draw four reasons for the inclusion of distributed cognition to 
the wider 4ED approach to cognition. The relevance of this issue stems from the consequences of  
bringing distributed cognition into the debate. For instance it opens up new ways of conceiving 
matters  to do  with  agency  and dynamic  nature  of  cognitive  phenomena that  might  have  been 
neglected by the other 4E approaches.
First, like the Es discussed above distributed cognition is often equated or mixed with the 
other views on cognition without drawing much attention to its distinct theoretical features. In  
particular distributed cognition is often lumped together with extended cognition in its general  
form.203 This has the unwarranted consequences of possibly dismissing distributed cognition for 
reasons that might not be directly applicable to it; as well as overlooking its unique theoretical  
features that could benefit and contribute to the overall debate concerning the nature of cognition.  
Thus the debate could inadvertently be impoverished. 
Second, distributed cognition does have a lot of similarities with the other E's. This might 
be  the  root  cause  for  lumping  distributed  cognition  with  them.  To  start  with,  the  embodied-
embedded perspective is evident in the second kind of distribution of cognition discussed in the  
previous  section.  Also  the  enactive  perspective  is  present  in  the  way  distributed  cognition  
emphasises the relevance of culture for cognition and its dynamic nature. 204 Interestingly, Hutchins 
201 Gilbert 1990, 2000, 2004, 2009; Bratman 1993, 1999; Tuomela 1977, 2003; Velleman 1997
202 I would like to thank my supervisor Sami Paavola for the initial nudge towards looking into the possible relevance 
of distributed cognition in the context of the other 4Es.
203 See e.g. Adams & Aizawa 2008; Chemero & Silberstein 2008; Menary 2009, 2010a, 2010c; Sutton 2006; Giere 2007.
204 Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 242 referencing Thompson (2007).
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has recently analysed and applied both the embodied-embedded and enactive perspectives to his  
distributed cognition view. The general theme here is seeing cognition essentially as a biological  
phenomenon rather than as a uniquely logical process. That is, to get rid of the cognitivist sandwich 
model of cognition that divorces cognition, perception and action in favour of a more unificatory  
framework. On the one hand Hutchins emphasises the interaction of body and world, the role of  
motor activity in reasoning processes, and the connection between perception and action. On the 
other  hand  Hutchins  relies  on  the  enactivist  ideas  about  how  experiences,  sensations  and 
perceptions  are  not  merely  received  but  are  dependent  on  the  particular  actions  of  a  given  
organism.205 This aspect is most evident in the discussion about cultural practices presented at the 
end of the previous section. Finally I would like to raise few issues that speak for the similarities 
between distributed and extended cognition. One clear similarity is the general tendency to brake 
the boundaries of cognition and credit more role for the external world in influencing cognition, 
e.g. by giving a more full-fledged cognitive status for the external scaffolding structures, physical 
tools and instruments in particular,  in the overall cognitive system. Also the emphasis on learning  
history, cultural acclimatisation and complementariness of the different resources in the second-
wave theorising bears close resemblance to the theoretical features of distributed cognition.
Third, it is important to note that distributed cognition is indeed a distinct approach to 
cognition,  with  its  own  tradition  and  theoretical  features.  Firstly,  there  is  a  quite  established  
research methodology that is based on the framework of distributed cognition. This is most evident 
in for example “human computer interaction” studies.206 Yet, a key distinctive feature is the reliance 
on anthropological considerations and the method of cognitive ethnography. This brings about the 
methodological focus on events, which could be contrasted for instance to Clark's static view of the 
environment and culture.207 Moreover, I take one of the crucial and unique features of distributed 
cognition to  be its  point of  view to the  study of  cognition.  With  this  I  mean the  tendency in  
distributed cognition not to “out the mind” like e.g. first-wave extended cognition purports to do, 
rather the point of view is from the start a more wider and systemic one. When assessing a given 
cognitive  task  distributed  cognition  seeks  to  encompass  the  whole  relevant  cognitive  ecology 
(cultural, artifactual, historical etc.) in the explanation. One simply cannot look at individuals or  
cognition  in  the  absence  of  the  wider  social,  environmental,  cultural  context.  So,  in  a  way 
distributed cognition does not privilege the brain but rather allocates a proper place for it in the 
overall cognitive ecology. The last distinctive feature of distributed cognition is its take on agency. I 
will not examine this further here but will return to it in chapter 7 since the question of agency  
draws interesting differences within the 4ED in general.
The fourth reason for why I deem it necessary to included distributed cognition with the 
205 Hutchins 2011a: 427–435
206 Hollan et al. 2000; Hollan & Hutchins 2010. But note that enactive cognition has similar ambitions and there is 
emerging a research methodology for cognitive science based on enactivism, see e.g. Stewart et al. (eds.) (2011).
207 Hollan et al. 2000: 179–180; Hollan & Hutchins 2010: 242–244; Hutchins 2011b; Clark 2008a.
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other 4Es is  its  growing relevance in  the  debate about  cognition.  For  instance Hutchins 208 has 
recently participated in the discussion through the aforementioned issue about agency and the 
apparent static nature of culture and environment. It  is worth noting that Hutchins'  account of 
agency is  due to his  reaction against  Clark's  account of  agency that  he saw as inadequate and  
mistaken. Others have also recognised the appeal to distributed cognition in these issues.209 Yet, in 
my opinion the relevance of distributed cognition has risen mainly due to a growing interest in it by  
the second-wave extended cognition theorists.210 Sutton with his colleagues for instance maintain 
that distributed cognition offers a viable methodological take on the study of cognition; one that is  
compatible with extended cognition and should be played more attention to. Sutton even says that  
his second-wave approach moves closer to distributed cognition.211
5.3 Summary
In this  chapter  I  examined distributed cognition.  I  started by offering a  general  account  of  its  
theoretical commitments. Distributed cognition emphasises the need to study cognitive phenomena 
in the natural everyday environment (cognitive ethnography). It holds that the boundaries of the 
unit of cognitive analysis should not be set a priori but should be responsive to the phenomena  
under study and their relevant social, cultural, environmental, and historical context. It stresses that 
the mechanisms involved in cognition should also be sensitive to the wider socio-cultural world.  
And finally distributed cognition urges one to recognise that  there are three kinds of cognitive  
distribution: social, coordination of internal and external, and distribution in time. The last point  
emphasises  the  fact  that  it  is  specifically  in  cultural  practices  that  we  organise  our  cognitive  
interactions with the world. I then gave four reasons for why distributed cognition should rightly be  
added to the rest of the 4E approaches to cognition. Firstly, to avoid its unwarranted identification 
and mix-up with the other views. Secondly,  it  shares a similar take on cognition as the others.  
Thirdly,  it  is  nevertheless  a  distinct  approach  to  cognition  with  its  own  important  theoretical  
commitments. That is, fourthly, it is relevant in current debate due to a growing interest in it and its 
fruitful theoretical features. 
208 Hutchins 2011b.
209 E.g. Kiverstein 2011; Kirchhoff 2011.
210 Sutton et al. 2010; Sutton 2006, 2010; Menary 2009, 2010a, b, c. Note that in and between the expositions of these 
second-wave extended cognition authors there is no clearly analysed and unified take on distributed cognition and 
its relationship to the other 4Es.
211 Sutton et al. 2010: 523n.1, 531n16; Sutton 2010: 215–216n1.
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6 Challenges to the 4ED Approach
So,  the  way  we  see  it,  there  are  two  principal  features  of  intracranial  processes  –  their  use  of  non-derived  
representations governed by idiosyncratic kinds of processes – that serve to distinguish cognitive from non-cognitive 
processes. These features constitute a “mark of the cognitive” and they provide some non-question-begging reason to  
think that cognition is intracranial.212
The past five chapters have been exclusively focused on the two first research question: I) What are 
the theoretical commitments the different accounts of cognition in 4ED hold on to and how do 
these relate to each other? and II) (Why) should distributed cognition be added with the rest of the  
4E  accounts?  This  chapter  expands  the  discussion  about  the  theoretical  commitments  of  4ED 
accounts by adding also a third research question to the investigation: III)  What critique does 4ED 
face and how does providing a mark of the cognitive affect  both the proponents as well as the  
opponents of 4ED? 
I will raise two key interdependent objections and challenges against 4ED:  the coupling-
constitution fallacy and an argument from  mark of the cognitive  considerations. I consider these 
particular challenges important because they are the most widely discussed and they affect all of the 
4ED approaches. More importantly still, the objections and 4ED authors' responses to them raise 
further  questions about the nature  of a  proper mark of the cognitive and the general  need of 
providing one in the first place. Interestingly these questions impact cognitivism as well, and in a 
way level the playing field between cognitivism and 4ED. I will largely follow Fred Adams & Ken 
Aizawa's (A&A hereafter) argumentation when presenting these criticisms even though there are 
other authors that have raised similar objections.213 A&A have been most actively criticising the 4ED 
type approach,  and the debate  has significantly  revolved  around their  objections.  Even though 
many of these criticisms are most often directed at extended cognition they apply to 4ED in general  
(in A&A's texts the 4ED positions are all more or less discussed, even if their focus has been on  
extended cognition).214 
6.1 The Coupling-Constitution Fallacy and Replies to It
A&A are contingent intracranialists and maintain that although logically and nomologically possible, 
it is a contingent empirical fact that cognition does not actually extend in the way 4ED approaches  
212 Adams & Aizawa 2008: 10
213 See for instance: Rupert 2004, 2009a, b, 2010; Shapiro 2010; Block 2005; Prinz 2006 
214 See e.g. Adams & Aizawa (2001 and 2008).
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claim, not at this time any way.215 A&A argue that the 4ED theorists confuse causal influences of  
external resources on cognition, such as coupling, manipulation or integration type dependencies,  
as constitutive parts of cognitive processes.216 A&A argue the following way
The fallacious pattern is to draw attention to cases, real or imagined, in which  some 
object or process is coupled in some fashion to some cognitive agent. From this, one  
slides  to  the  conclusion  that  the  object  or  process  constitutes  part  of  the  agent's 
cognitive apparatus or cognitive processing.217
For instance, it would be wrong to say that a pen and paper constitute a part of one's cognitive 
system since the relation one has with the pen and paper is that of causal coupling and not of  
constitution,  which  is  a  different  type  of  relation.  The pen and paper  are  nothing  more than  
external aids that an agent may rely on in her intracranial problem-solving tasks. More generally  
Adams & Aizawa's argument is that 
the fact that object or process X is coupled to object or process Y does not entail that X 
is part of Y […] So, if the fact that an object or process X is coupled to a cognitive agent 
does not entail that X is a part of the cognitive agent's cognitive apparatus what does? 
The nature of X, of course.218
Hence  it  seems  that  A&A's  main  argumentation  has  two  aspects:  first  teasing  out  a  coupling-
constitution fallacy, and then arguing from the specific nature of X, i.e. argue for a specific type of 
mark  of  the  cognitive.  This  argumentative  tact  is  also  one  of  the  reasons  I  focus  on  A&A's 
argumentation since they do not commit, what Susan Hurley calls, the “causal-constitutive error”  
error. That is, '[…] the error of objecting that externalist explanations give a constitutive role to  
external factors that are “merely causal” while assuming without independent argument or criteria 
that the causal-constitutive distinction coincides with some external-constitutive boundary.'219 I will 
return to the mark of the cognitive aspect in section 6.3. below, since it may be seen as a challenge  
in its own right.
Now, 4ED theorists have responded to the proposed coupling-constitution fallacy. Clark 
notes  that  there  are  some things  that  A&A  have  misunderstood  about  the  extended  cognition 
argumentation for instance.220 First, it is not the case that extended cognition aims to make some 
object  cognitive  through  appropriate  coupling,  by  for  instance  fulfilling  the  three  criteria  of 
215 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 53
216 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 46–57; 2008: 88–91
217 Adams & Aizawa 2010a: 68
218 Adams & Aizawa 2010a: 68 
219 Hurley 2010: 106
220 For the sake of simplicity and brevity I will only rehearse the responses offered by extended cognition theorists, but 
note that other 4ED theorists could also adopt similar lines of responses.
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reliability, accessibility and automatic endorsement. Clark argues that A&A have misunderstood the 
point about cognitive extension: it is not that some external object is cognitive in itself, rather the 
appeal to coupling
is intended to make some object, which in and of itself is not usefully (perhaps not 
even intelligibly) thought of as either cognitive or non-cognitive, into a proper part of  
some cognitive system, such as a human agent […] It is intended [...] to ensure that the 
putative part is poised to play the kind of role that itself ensures its status as part of the 
agent's cognitive routines.221
So, the original point in C&C's hypothesis was to see what it would take for an external resource to  
be incorporated (as a proper part) into a cognitive system and not what would make an external  
resource cognitive in and of itself. 
Secondly, Clark does recognise that A&A do also understand the incorporative claim. But 
he  argues  that  this  leads  to  a  more  complex  misunderstanding  that  feeds  directly  into  their 
argumentation about the mark of the cognitive. Specifically, A&A's last point about the nature of X, 
quoted above, leads Clark to argue that what in fact A&A are saying is that it is in virtue of the  
intrinsic nature of some objects and processes that they may be considered 'candidate parts (for 
inclusion in a cognitive process), whereas other objects or processes, still in virtue of their own 
nature, are not.'222 Hence, it seems that the issue of the mark of the cognitive is the more pressing 
one here in demarcating the (possibly) cognitive from the (possibly) noncognitive than the alleged 
coupling-constitution fallacy.223 I will return shortly to this.
Now,  Menary  argues quite  similarly  to Clark and maintains  that  it  is  not  the  case  that  
extended cognition purports to make some external artefact cognitive in itself. Menary argues that 
A&A's picture is flawed and rests on a misunderstanding of extended cognition:
If  we  accept  the  picture  of  a  cognitive  agent  as  implementing  a  discrete cognitive  
system, before they ever encounter an external vehicle, then we will have accepted the 
very picture of cognition we set out to reject.224
Instead, for Menary  X is the agent's manipulation of the external vehicle coupled to the agent's 
internal brain processes Y that together constitute a cognitive process Z. Moreover, because Z is a 
hybrid process it  may not be fully described by either  X or  Y alone.225 In relation to extended 
cognition Menary argues that: 
221 Clark 2010b: 83 original emphasis.
222 Clark 2010b: 84–85
223 Clark 2010b: 82–85; Clark 2008a: 86–89
224 Menary 2006a: 333 emphasis added
225 Menary 2006a: 333–334
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The aim is not to show that artifacts get to be part of cognition just because  they are 
causally coupled to a pre-existing cognitive agent, but to explain why X and  Y are so 
coordinated that they together function as Z, which causes further behaviour.226
Hence, what matters is not the artefact or the coupling  per se, but the appropriate coordinated 
manipulation and integration of the external element.
6.2 Mark of The Cognitive – Motley Crew and Nonderived Content
It seems clear from the responses to the coupling-constitution fallacy that the most stressing issue 
in A&A's argumentation is in providing an account of the nature of X (i.e. the purported cognitive 
state/process). This aspect of the argument is quoted at the beginning of this chapter and is based  
on distinguishing a mark of the cognitive, i.e. some necessary conditions for a state or process to be 
considered cognitive.227 I take there to be especially two reasons for why the mark of the cognitive 
argument  is  important  and interesting.  a)  As  Rowlands argues  the  coupling-constitution  fallacy 
(among few other objections) is derivative of distinguishing a mark of the cognitive and hence the  
fallacy ultimately collapses to the need of providing one.228 b) Sven Walter and Lena Kästner argue 
that cognitive agnosticism, that is the absence of an account of what cognition is, is unsustainable 
and needs to be addressed before one can question where cognition is.229 In itself the mark of the 
cognitive for A&A has a dual aspect since for them 'cognition involves particular kinds of processes 
involving  non-derived  representations.'230 In  what  follows  I  will  treat  each  of  these  elements 
accordingly:  1)  starting  with  the  requirement  for  “particular  kinds  of  processes”  and  2)  then 
following up with the notion of nonderived content. 
1) In section 4.2 I alluded to a stalemate that arises between first-wave extended cognition  
and  its  opponents  that  was  due  to  describing  the  particular  kinds  of  processes  underlying 
cognition. Now, there is another related problem for 4ED in general that pertains to the nature of  
the processes involved in cognition. A&A insists that 'the cognitive [like other natural domains] 
226 Menary 2006a: 334
227 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 48
228 Rowlands 2009a, c, 2010.
229 Walter & Kästner 2012; Walter 2010
230 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 52–53 emphasis added. Other names for non-derived representations include: original 
intentionality (Kiverstein & Clark 2009), intrinsic content (Clark 2005b; Menary 2006a),   intrinsic representation 
(Adams & Aizawa 2010a) and non-derived content (Clark 2010b). I will not take issue here whether there might be 
some radical conceptual differences between these terms, I will simply take them all to refer to the same thing: 
henceforth nonderived content.
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must be discriminated on the basis of underlying causal processes.' 231 A&A argue that the underlying 
causal processes involved in 4ED approaches to cognition are vastly heterogeneous and feature 
such a motley that fails to pick out any scientific  natural kind.  And since 4ED approaches fail to 
exhibit natural kinds they are no science at all and therefore should be abandoned as implausible  
approaches to the cognitive.232 
There are no laws covering humans and their tool  use over and above the laws of  
intracranial human cognition and the laws of  the physical  tools [...]  There just  isn't 
going  to  be  a  science  covering  the  motley  collection  of  [for  example]  “memory”  
processes found in human tool use.233 [A] would-be brain-tool science would have to 
cover too broad a collection of processes.234
A&A maintain that as it happens only an intracranial science of cognitive processes will be plausible 
since it has for example already discovered and explained important law-like regularities of primacy,  
recency, and chunking -effects of human memory.235
2) A&A take  nonderived content to be another essential feature that a cognitive state or 
process must involve. Specifically A&A are adamant that the claim is not that cognitive processes  
must entirely consists of nonderived content, but that there just needs to be some: 'if you have a 
process  that  involves  no  intrinsic  content,  then  the  condition  rules  that  the  process  is 
noncognitive.'236 A&A maintain that something has nonderived content when it means what it does 
independently of any other representations or contents.  That is, its meaning is not derived from or 
dependent  upon  other  ‘content-bearing,  representational  or  intentional  states.’ 237 For  instance, 
numbers and words bear derived content because their  meaning is fixed by intentional agents,  
social practices and/or conventions. A&A take thoughts, experiences and perceptions as paradigm 
cases that bear nonderived content just because their meaning is not fixed by other things.238 
Specifically  A&A  argue  that  processes  get  their  nonderived  content  by  fulfilling  some 
naturalised conditions. Here they appeal to philosophers such as Dretske, Fodor, Cummins, Searle  
and Millikan who aim to give a naturalised account of meaning. That is, how thoughts come to have  
meaning from the non-contentful states and objects in the world. Yet A&A are not committed to any 
231 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 52
232 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 51–52, 61–62. Rupert (2004) makes a similar argument. This is why this argument has been 
dubbed “The Motley Crew Argument”. See Shapiro (2010) and Walter & Kästner (2012) originally stemming from 
the argumentation of Adams & Aizawa (2001, 2010a) and Rupert (2004, 2009a).
233 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 61
234 Adams & Aizawa 2010a: 76
235 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 61–62
236 Adams & Aizawa 2010a: 70. A&A are adamant about making this clarification due to the debate between them and 
Clark (2005b, 2010a), where they take Clark to misunderstand them as making the stronger claim that all cognitive 
states and processes must involve nonderived content. I will return to Clark's exposition shortly. Note that Fodor 
(2009) does make the stronger claim.
237  Adams & Aizawa 2001: 50; 2009: 87
238  Adams & Aizawa 2008: 32, 35; Adams & Aizawa 2001: 48
50
particular  view of  natural  content  determination,  just  that  it  needs  to  be  natural  so  as  to  get  
nonderived content.239
A&A's argument from nonderived content is that since external elements carry only derived 
content they lack the mark of the cognitive and hence are excluded from being part of cognition. 
One might worry here that A&A's argument is too loose and that there is still room for external  
elements in cognition since A&A maintain that not all cognitive processes must bear nonderived  
content.  But  this  worry  should  fade  away  with  Aizawa's  further  clarification:  'The  idea  is  
[specifically] that  cognitive vehicles of content must bear non-derived content.'240 So, the external 
elements remain only as aids and tools for internal cognitive processing and cognition does not 
extend beyond the organism.241
6.2.1 Reply to the Motley Crew Argument
The reply to A&A's Motley Crew Argument has two stages. First, the aim is to try and retain the  
notion  of  natural  kindhood,  albeit  it  is  conceived  differently,  and  yet  show  how  it  does  not  
necessarily  affect  the  scientific  status  of  4ED.  Second,  the  aim  is  to  put  into  question  the 
requirement  for  natural kindhood,  and show that  kindhood  simpliciter is  enough for  scientific 
enterprises (4ED included).
The first reply to the motley crew is to hold on to the notion of natural kindhood and yet 
maintain that it does not affect the scientific status of 4ED. This reply 242 is founded on the idea that 
natural kindhood need not (or should not) be conceived in  essentialist terms, whereby natural 
kinds are defined by some intrinsic, necessary and sufficient conditions, that correspond to laws of 
nature. This is just the sort of conception of natural kindhood A&A champion.243 One of the reasons 
for  the  wariness  of  this  sort  of  essentialist  conception of  natural  kinds  is  that  it  has  run into  
difficulties  in  describing  phenomena  in  the  life  sciences;  e.g.  in  contemporary  biology  and 
evolutionary theory.244 Marc Ereshefsky for instance notes how a tenet of essentialism that requires 
all  and  only  the  members  of  a  kind  to  have  a  common  essence  faces  difficulties  in  biology;  
especially with regards to the notion of species. For it is very difficult to find biological traits that are  
found in all and only the members of a given species since biological traits are rarely unique to a 
species and they may disappear from a species in the course of evolution.245 Thus Samuli Pöyhönen 
notes how nowadays 'in the special sciences, scientifically interesting kinds of phenomena are often 
239 Adams & Aizawa 2008: 35–39; Aizawa & Adams 2005: 662–664; Adams & Aizawa 2010b: 588
240 Aizawa 2010: 337n10 emphasis added.
241 Adams & Aizawa 2001: 53–57
242 This issue was brought to my attention by the work of Samuli Pöyhönen (2012).
243 Bird & Tobin 2010: 1; Walter & Kästner 2012: 18–19; Pöyhönen 2012: 7
244 Pöyhönen 2012: 7–8; Ereshefsky 2010: 2.1
245 Ereshefsky 2010: 2.1. See also Bird & Tobin 2010: 2.1.2.
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characterized by relational properties, and do not correspond to laws of nature'.246
Pöyhönen presents Richard Boyd's  homeostatic property cluster theory as an alternative 
approach of natural kinds, and then applies it to explaining cognitive phenomena and the motley  
crew argument.247 Now, Boyd argues that instead of aiming to pinpoint a subset of some necessary 
and sufficient conditions, natural kinds should be thought of as denoting a larger set of correlated  
properties. Moreover, the unity of the cluster of these properties is causal rather than conceptual in  
nature.248 Specifically  these  natural  homeostatic  property  cluster  kinds are  determined  by  'the 
members  of  a  cluster  of  often  co-occurring  properties  and  by  the  (“homeostatic”  [causal])  
mechanisms that bring about their  co-occurrence.'249 Hence, Pöyhönen applies this definition of 
homeostatic property cluster kinds to cognitive phenomena whereby cognitive natural kinds could 
be described as 
consisting  of  [...] the  cluster  of  observable  properties  characteristic  of  the 
phenomenon and a corresponding [...] cognitive mechanism that guarantees 
the reliable co-occurrence of properties.250 
He then goes on to note how more and more psychological phenomena, such as social emotions  
and  psychiatric  disorders,  are  explained  in  terms  of  hybrid  mechanisms  that  are  not  solely 
intracranial and for instance include social causal factors. Therefore, homeostatic property cluster  
theory's take on natural kinds seems to be in line with the explanations of cognitive phenomena the 
4ED upholds. Moreover, from the point of view of the homeostatic property cluster theory the force 
of the motley crew seems to fall through. Recall for instance how second-wave extended cognition  
and distributed cognition do not require cognitive mechanisms (whether internal or external) to be 
causally similar. Thus, as a cursory analysis of natural kindhood it seems that the scientific status of  
4ED may  be retained by conceiving  natural  kindhood along the  lines  of  homeostatic  property 
cluster theory.251
Yet, this recourse to the homeostatic property cluster theory might not be necessary as the  
second reply to the motley crew challenges A&A's reliance on natural kindhood argumentation. As a 
preliminary analysis of the motley crew Sven Walter and Lena Kästner raise a few important issues.  
First,  the motley crew conceives proponents of 4ED to hold “cognition” as a kind of 'umbrella  
concept, i.e. a concept subsuming a diversity of processes that share only the fact that they fall  
246 Pöyhönen 2012: 7–8. See also Bird & Tobin 2010: 2.1.2 for similar point,
247 Pöyhönen 2012: 7–8
248 Boyd 1991: 141–142; 1999:141–144; Pöyhönen 2012: 8
249 Boyd 1991: 141
250 Pöyhönen 2012: 8
251 Pöyhönen 2012: 8; Boyd 1991: 141–142; 1999:141–144
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under  this  concept'252 comparable  to  concepts  like  “things  in this  library”  or  “things  that  play 
music”. Second, one should distinguish the claim within the motley crew argument that “cognition” 
is not a  natural kind concept from the claim that “cognition” is an umbrella concept, since one 
could  hold  that  cognitive  processes  are  non-natural  kinds  and  yet  deny  that  cognition  is  an  
umbrella concept.253
Walter & Kästner then object to A&A's insistence that science is only interested in natural 
kindhood, for it could be argued that what is important is kindhood simpliciter. They cite, among 
others,  the  study  of  superconductors  and  oscillators  in  physics  and  the  study  of  money  in 
economics as examples of scientific enterprises where the objects of study are not  natural kinds. 
Hence, Walter & Kästner argue the following way:
The mere fact  that  extended processes  involve  artefacts  and so  fail  to  constitute  a 
natural kind does therefore not entail that there could be no science of the cognitive if 
cognitive processes were extended.254
Moreover  cognition  may  involve  heterogenous  lower-level  processes  that  nevertheless  exhibit 
enough homogeneity at a higher-level so that they could fall under a meaningful scientific study.  
Hence “cognition” would be more like “money” or “superconductors” than natural kind concepts 
such as “helium” or umbrella concepts like “things in this library”.255 
Walter & Kästner sketch three available accounts for a concept of cognition, whereby it is  
not a full-fledged natural kind concept, nor an umbrella concept, but nevertheless picks up a class  
of things with higher-level unity. These are “cognition” as a  cluster concept, nominal kind and/or 
family concept. Walter & Kästner take Boyd's homeostatic property cluster theory to fit the cluster  
concept they are advancing and hence I will not rehearse it here. 256 Now, nominal kinds do not 
provide a scientifically discoverable essence, but a 'definition that specifies form, function, or origin 
of the concept's referents',257 i.e. a nominal essence. Cognitive processes form a nominal kind when 
their 'form, function, or origin that is used to characterize their nominal essence supplies them with  
enough higher-level  unification.'258 Walter & Kästner  take Rowlands'  account  of  cognition as an 
example  of  a  nominal  kind  view  where  extended  processes  count  as  cognitive.  Rowlands  for 
252 Walter & Kästner 2012: 19
253 Walter & Kästner 2012: 19
254 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20
255 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20
256 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20–21n.26. Note that Boyd does argue for his view to be a form of natural kindhood, even 
if not being of the essentialist type. Hence I take Walter & Kästner's qualification of “not full-fledged natural 
kindhood” and insistence on “kindhood simpliciter” to allude to other than essentialist forms of natural kindhood, 
or lack of naturalness thereof. Be as it may, Boyd's account nevertheless does offer, as has been argued above, an 
alternative conception to natural kindhood that fits 4ED and responds to the motley crew.
257 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20
258 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20 emphasis added.
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instance  maintains  that  cognition  involves  information  processing,  as  the  manipulation  and 
transformation of information-bearing structures, and that this information processing 
has the  proper function of  making available either to the  subject or to  subsequent  
processing operations information that was (or would have been) prior to (or without) 
this processing, unavailable.259
Finally, the notion of a family concept originates from Wittgenstein260 who argued that for example 
the conditions for something to count as a “game” include  'a complicated network of similarities 
overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall  similarities,  sometimes similarities of detail.'261 
Yet, there are no common aspects exclusively in all games. Walter & Kästner then apply this analysis  
to  cognitive  processes  so  as  to  argue  that  cognitive  processes may  resemble  one  another  in 
important ways even though there is no common feature to all and only cognitive processes.262
I take the importance of Walter & Kästner's exposition to lie not in any of the particular  
alternatives,  but  in  the general  tact  of  providing  alternatives  to  natural  kind conceptualisation.  
Moreover, if Walter & Kästner's argumentation holds and cognition is not necessarily a full-fledged 
natural kind concept that A&A require it to be, then 
[…]  a  mark  of  the  cognitive  would  not  be  spelled  out  in  terms  of  lower  level 
communalities among all and only cognitive processes but by appeal to higher level  
causal characteristic […] The Motley Crew Argument would thus not only have to claim 
that  extended processes  are  not  natural  kinds,  but  that  they  lack  even the  sort  of  
'higher-level  unification despite mechanistic  dissimilarities'  (Clark 2008a:  96)  we are 
familiar with from [superconductors, oscillators and money].263
I take this implication from Walter & Kästner's exposition to be important and lend credence to  
Clark's argumentation.
Clark's reply to the motley crew has two facets. First Clark somewhat diverts the discussion  
from  the  requirement  of  defining  cognition  in  terms  of  the  nature  of  its  underlying  causal  
processes.  Instead,  he  paraphrases  Daniel  Dennett  and  insists  that  'cognition  is  as  cognition  
does'.264 Focus here is on individuating cognition according to its characteristic effects rather than 
259 Rowlands 2009a: 8 original emphasis. Note that this is only a part of the conditions of Rowland's mark of the 
cognitive.
260 Wittgenstein 1953
261 Wittgenstein 1953: §66, partly cited in Walter & Kästner 2012: 21
262 Walter & Kästner 2012: 21
263 Walter & Kästner 2012: 20
264 Clark 2010b: 93
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its causes. Hence, what matters is the way cognitive processes are individuated according to the way 
they support certain kinds of higher-level  behaviours.265 I take this view to fit  well with 4ED in 
general,  where  the  emphasis  is  often  on  the  interplay  of  different  resources  relevant  for  the  
fulfilment of a given cognitive task. Clark does not develop this approach much further, but offers it  
merely as a possibly viable alternative way of conceiving the matter.
The second aspect in Clark's reply also emphasises the focus on larger systemic wholes over  
the nature of individual processes and parts. He argues that it seems quite possible that even the  
inner processes that A&A rely on will turn out to involve heterogenous underlying causal processes 
as well.266 Moreover, Clark maintains that what ultimately matters is 
(1) the degree of complementarity (between the different contributions) and (2) the 
degree of  integration achieved.  Given sufficient  complementarity  and integration,  it 
becomes plausible (many of  us believe)  to treat  the resultant system as a cognitive 
whole,  with  cognitive  properties  that  supervene  on  more  than  the  biological  
components alone.267
Unfortunately Clark does not develop these ideas much further either, but instead maintains that 
for a proper systems-level cognitive science one needs to understand both the details of lower-level  
parts and processes as well as the higher-level coupling of the biological and the artifactual. 268 He 
looks to the future and says that 
it is the substantive empirical bet of the extended systems theorist that the larger hybrid  
wholes, comprising biological and nonbiological elements, will  also […] prove to be 
the proper objects of sustained scientific study in their own right.269
In support of this Clark notes how even in neuroscience one does not simply study the neural  
substructures  but  also look at  dynamics  of  whole  processing  cycles with soft-assembled neural 
populations. Clark then asks why we should simply suppose that all the cognitively relevant soft  
assemblies are intracranial; perhaps we should therefore include our rich environment into the 
complex  cognitive  architecture.270 Moreover,  Clark  cites  a  debate  between Wayne  Gray and his 
265 Clark 2010b: 93
266 Clark 2008a: 94–96
267 Clark 2010b: 93
268 Clark 2010b: 92–95. Even if Clark does not develop this further here one could apply the second-wave theorists' 
analysis of cognitive integration and complementarity in order to support his reply.
269 Clark 2008a: 115 original emphasis.
270 Clark 2008a: 116
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colleagues'271 “time-cost-based” model and Ballard et al.'s272 “Minimal Memory Model” of cognitive 
task  performance  as  evidence  of  standard  forms  of  cognitive  scientific  investigation  that  are  
targeting genuinely (extended) hybrid wholes.273 I will return to this discussion in section 7.2 where 
Clark's view on cognitive agency is presented. Recall also that the methodology and framework of 
distributed cognition are already been used in human-computer interaction research for instance,  
and that there is being developed cognitive science based on the framework of enactivism. 274 So one 
might not need to look too far a future to see scientific investigations that target hybrid wholes.
6.2.2 Deflating the Notion of Nonderived Content
Originally Clark argued that nonderived content cannot be a mark of the cognitive since cognition 
(even if purely intracranial as A&A insist) necessarily involves derived content as well. Clark argued  
that Venn diagrams for instance, i.e. two overlapping circles that have conventionally determined 
set-theoretic meaning (i.e. derived content) concerning the overlapped area, may figure into ones 
“internal”  problem-solving  activity.  And  if  one  can  have  cognitive  processes  that  bear  derived  
content, then not all cognitive processes bear nonderived content and therefore A&A's condition for  
the  mark  of  the  cognitive  fails.275 But  as  was  noted  in  6.3  A&A  purported  to  clarify  their 
argumentation to counter this objection. They maintained that this reading was too strict and that 
their argument insisted that only some processes with nonderived content are necessary and that 
their nonderived content condition applied only to cognitive vehicles of content and that other 
processes may well bear derived content.276
It is unclear how successful this A&A's proposed “clarification” is since it still seems to be 
compatible with the view that an extended (or hybrid) process may include nonderived content in  
its inner aspects and derived content in its external aspects.277 Clark gets at this point nicely. He first 
notes that on A&A's revised condition it is acceptable to have an intracranial process that has a part  
that bears derived content so long as some other part of that process bears nonderived content for  
that process to be genuinely cognitive. Moreover an extended (or hybrid) process must fail this  
weakened condition by involving no nonderived content at all.278
Clark then asks in what sense this holds for the external elements of extended cognitive 
271 Gray & Fu 2004; Gray & Veksler 2005; Gray et al. 2006
272 Ballard et al. 1995; Hayhoe 2000
273 Clark 2008a: 118–122
274 See e.g. Stewart et al. (eds.) (2011)
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processes.  He argues that  the external element seems most  clearly to be part  of some genuine 
cognitive process when it is retrieved and used. And at that time there also seems to be plenty of  
other states and process in play that bear nonderived content. 'At run time, the process is not one 
that trades solely in representations whose contents are derived or conventional determined.' 279 At 
other  times,  it  is  the functional  poise  of  the  external  element  to  be,  for  instance,  part  of  the  
supervenience base for some of the cognitive states and processes of the larger system that allows it  
to be called upon at relevant run-time moments. Hence the external element could be seen as a  
resource to inform and affect the agent's behaviour at appropriate run-time moments. Clark insists 
again that the external part is not to be thought of as “intrinsically cognitive” all by itself. 280 He is 
also ready to accept, this could be just for the sake of the argument, that perhaps it is crucial that 
cognitive agents in their cognitive activity rely on some states with nonderived content. 
Be as this may Clark nevertheless continues by arguing that:
we have been given no reason at all to accept the further (and crucial) claim that no 
proper part of such properly cognitive system, considered now in splendid isolation 
from those crucial run-time wholes in which it participates, can afford to contain only 
representations lacking intrinsic content.281
Here it seems that Clark aims at fleshing out the idea that even when the external element is not 
appealed to, the cognitive system (i.e. the agent + the external resource) cannot be required to  
bear only states with nonderived content and hence be considered as noncognitive. It also seems to  
imply that  an agent's  processes become noncognitive as soon as an external resource is utilised. 
Even if it is the case that the external part bears only derived content why should this affect the  
cognitive status of the whole system? Relatedly, Clark argues that A&A fall again into making the 
mistake of requiring the external part to be cognitive in itself when the crucial point of (first-wave) 
extended cognition lies in the appropriate coupling and functional poise of the different elements.  
Similarly, in 4ED in general the focus is on the nature of the relation, interaction, manipulation,  
integration etc. between the elements and not in the specific intrinsic nature of the elements.282 
Interestingly this is even something A&A themselves recognise as a mistake relating to the proposed 
coupling-constitution fallacy: 'It does not follow from the fact that one has an X system that every  
component of the system does X.'283 Thus, Clark finishes:
279 Clark 2010b: 88
280 Clark 2010b: 88–89
281 Clark 2010b: 89 original emphasis.
282 Clark 2010b: 89–90. 
283 Adams & Aizawa 2009: 84, cited in Clark 2010b: 90
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Agreed,  the  mere  fact  that  the [external  element]  and [the  agent] “form a system”  
establishes nothing […] But the way to then proceed is surely  not by  asking, of the 
candidate part, whether it somehow “possesses” the characteristic that we now want to 
ascribe to the resultant overall system.284
Now, Menary's  response to the nonderived content  condition is  somewhat different to Clark's. 
Menary's presents a three-fold argument in order to deflate the notion of nonderived content A&A 
are  utilising:  1)  he  collapses  the  distinction  between  derived  and  nonderived  content;  2)  he 
undermines the strong reliance on naturalistic accounts of content determination; 3) he argues that 
cognitive scientists do not make (or need to make) use of the notion of nonderived content.285 A&A 
maintain the following view on content in their recent reply to Clark's and Menary's 286 objections to 
their nonderived content condition:
A thought might bear the content that the cat is hungry in virtue of satisfying some 
conditions on non-derived content, whereas a particular inscription on a piece of paper  
might bear that same content by satisfying some other conditions on derived content. 
To  put  the  matter  another  way,  there  are  two  questions  one  might  ask  of  a 
representation. The first is what content that representation bears; the second is what  
conditions make it the case that it bears that content.287
Even though this passage is not directly quoted in Menary's exposition I take it to be underlying his  
argumentation. Menary notes that since it seems that for A&A there must be a difference between  
derived and nonderived content for their argument to work, and that since it seems that there is not  
a difference in the content itself  (see the quoted passage above) the difference must lie in the 
method of content determination.288 
But let's start with 1). Menary notes that there looms a contradiction in A&A's original take 
on content and this more recent one. Recall the point made in section 6.3 that A&A maintain that  
words whether spoken or written have derived content and that thoughts are paradigm cases of  
nonderived  content.  Yet,  in  this  light  the  more  recent  claim  that  derived  and  nonderived 
representations may have same contents seems puzzling. On the one hand concerning the more 
recent claim Menary asks what makes it the case that for instance the thought “the cat is hungry” is  
cognitive whereas the inscription with the same content “the cat is hungry” is not, barring the mere  
question begging stipulation that what is inside the head is cognitive and what is outside of it is not?  
284 Clark 2010b: 90 original emphasis.
285 Menary 2010c
286 Clark (2005b, 2007, 2008a, 2010b) and Menary (2006a).
287 Adams & Aizawa 2010b: 582 emphasis added.
288 Menary 2010c: 612
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On the other hand concerning the original claim there is an even more puzzling implication that  
our conscious linguistic thoughts are not cognitive at all since they necessarily involve only derived  
content  in the  form of  natural  language.  Hence,  Menary  maintains  that  the claim that  derived  
content cannot be cognitive content is untenable and should be abandoned.289
2)  Recall  that  A&A are  not  committed  to  any  particular  naturalistic  theory  of  content 
determination, but merely the importance lies in the requirement on a natural determination, so as 
to get  at  the nonderived content.  Now, Menary argues that one should be wary  of relying on 
naturalistic accounts of content determination since none of them succeeds in giving an account 'of  
how richly conceptual cognitive representations can have the richly conceptual contents they do.' 290 
Moreover  he continues  that  if  'cognitive  semantics  is  to be  explained,  in  part,  in terms  of the  
semantics of public representations then Adams and Aizawa's stipulation fails.'291 Menary's next step 
is to gesture at a this sort of explanation. He argues that the propositional contents of thoughts may 
partly stem from the propositional contents of the natural language sentences they express. For 
instance, the meaning of π could come from its publicly/conventionally determined meaning: 'π is 
the ratio of circle's circumference to its diameter (and which is the same as the ratio of a circle's  
area to the square of its  radius).'292 Hence,  if  this holds  then A&A's  strong reliance on natural 
accounts of content determination is undermined.
3)  Finally  Menary  argues  that  cognitive  scientists  do  no  make  use  of  the  notion  of 
nonderived content. Here Menary relies on the work done by Dehaene et al. presented in section 
4.3.2.  He  argues  that  since  Dehaene  et  al.  (who  are  cognitive  (neuro)scientists)  are  studying  
phenomena that  would not be counted as cognitive if  A&A's condition was true,  the condition 
should be abandoned since it does not fit the phenomena Dehaene et al. are discovering.293
6.3 Summary
In this chapter I  examined the challenges that  have been raised against  4ED. I  focused on the 
coupling-constitution fallacy and the argument from mark of the cognitive. I argued that the more 
significant  challenge  was  the  mark  of  the  cognitive  objection.  I  also  examined  the  responses 
different authors had offered to these challenges. 
The abundance of varied and yet valid responses speak for the failure of A&A's arguments. 
Yet even if it seems that the challenges that A&A have raised fail on multiple accounts  this overall 
289 Menary 2010c: 612–613; Menary 2009: 40
290 Menary 2010c: 615
291 Menary 2010c: 615
292 Menary 2010c: 615
293 Menary 2010c: 616
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debate  nevertheless  brings  forth  interesting  questions  with  regards to  the  nature  of  cognition.  
Especially in relation to the third research question concerning the mark of the cognitive. It seems  
that no universally agreed upon or viable mark of the cognitive exists between the opponents and 
proponents of 4ED. Since this seems to be a matter that cuts both ways, it in itself speaks for the 
viability of questioning the more orthodox cognitivist position. It at least levels the ground for the  
more unorthodox 4ED approach. The debate also raises the more fundamental question pertaining 
to the relevance of providing a mark of the cognitive. Is it necessary to provide such a mark in the 
first  place? As was noted in section 6.3.1 Walter & Kästner argue that providing one should be 
crucial since one cannot ask where cognition is before knowing what it is. Yet, an alternative view 
would be to continue as it were and draw the boundaries of the cognitive unit of analysis according  
to the phenomena under study. The point being not to restrict the boundaries  a priori, but let 
scientific  practice and the phenomena under study dictate them.294 Alternatively one could also 
draw the boundaries according to epistemic and explanatory power considerations, as Pöyhönen 
has recently argued.295
294 See e.g. Hurley 2010: 106–107. Note also that this is a view that distributed cognition theorists hold.
295 Pöyhönen 2012.
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7 Agency in 4ED
 
In this part of the thesis I will draw upon the previous chapters and aim to provide an analysis of  
4ED in the context  of  cognitive agency.296 I  deem the question of  cognitive agency to be very 
relevant  and  illuminating  both  because  it  highlights  the  overlap  and  differences  in  4ED,  and 
because the playing field between the orthodox cognitivism and the more unorthodox 4ED seems 
to be levelled (due to issues to do with the mark of the cognitive) thus opening up the analysis of  
cognitive agency. So, this chapter continues the analysis of 4ED under the guidance of the first 
research question: I) What are the theoretical commitments the different accounts of cognition in  
4ED hold on to and how do these relate to each other? Yet, more specifically this chapter will be  
directed by the fourth research question: IV ) How does the notion of cognitive agency figure in the 
4ED approach(es) to cognition?  The driving issue behind this relates to whom, or what kind of 
elements, are cognitive properties attributed and what/who is the author or of these properties and 
processes?297 In what follows I will go through each theory's take on agency in the order mirroring  
the structure of this thesis.
7.1 Embodied-Embedded Agency
According to the embodied-embedded approach the cognitive agent is the biological organism. The 
human being that may utilise and lean on environmental resources in problem-solving tasks for  
instance. Now, rest of the exposition of the embodied-embedded approach's take on agency will be  
phrased in terms of a challenge, put forward by Rupert, to views such as enactivism, extended  
cognition and distributed cognition that do not conceive agency this organismically-bound way.298
Rupert holds on to a type of embodied-embedded approach, where the human cognitive 
system does not extend beyond the organism, even if during cognitive processing humans may 
exploit  and  lean  on  environmental  and  cultural  scaffolding  structures.299 Specifically,  Rupert's 
hypothesis of embedded cognition (HEMC) maintains that:
296 I would like to thank Anne Salminen for drawing my attention to important issues concerning the notion of agency 
in the context of 4ED while we were doing a joint presentation on this issue in 2012 (Calonius & Salminen 2012). 
Needless to say the remaining mistakes in this chapter are all mine.
297 Note that the focus here is not in phenomenological accounts of agency, in who or what experiences agency or 
how agency might feel like. See Rowlands 2010: 160–161 for this sort of distinction.
298 This challenge may be found in Rupert (2004: 425–428; 2009a: 44–47; 2009b: 102–105; 2010a: 328–334; 2010b: 
346–352).
299 Rupert 2010b: 346
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Cognitive  processes  depend  very heavily,  in  hitherto  unexpected  ways,  on 
organismically  external  props  and  devices  and  on  the  structure  of  the  external  
environment in which cognition takes place.300
Rupert's argument is explicitly directed against the hypothesis of extended cognition (HEC) where 
human  cognitive  processing  literally  extends  into  the  environment 
surrounding the organism, and human cognitive states literally comprise–as 
wholes do to their parts–elements in that environment [...]301
Rupert's argument is quite similar to the motley crew argument and his difference argument (which 
was presented in section 4.2.1). He argues that there is a scientific cost that ensues from adhering 
to HEC because it loses touch with the core cognitive agent due to the proliferation of various 
(often  only  temporary)  cognitive systems.  Moreover,  if  HEMC can account  for  the  way  current 
cognitive science explains cognitive phenomena we should just stick with the more conservative 
HEMC over HEC.302 So, Rupert aims to deflate HEC.
Rupert maintains that it is the persisting human organism that houses the persisting and 
relevant  cognitive  capacities  that  explain diverse  cognitive  behaviour. He continues that  hybrid 
extended cognitive systems vary much in their constitution and are often only temporary, i.e. they 
do not persist beyond the integrated interaction between the internal and external.  Furthermore, 
Rupert notes how cognitive scientists are especially interested in persisting human organisms rather 
than the temporary hybrid extended cognitive systems. This is due to the explananda in cognitive 
science  being  mainly  regularities  in  the  organism's  behaviour  (such  as  patterns  of  intelligent  
behaviour),  that  are relatively independent of  the surrounding environment and the organism's 
interactions with it. Rupert maintains that abilities that are of interest to cognitive scientists, such as:  
remembering, reading, perceiving, language use, reasoning, social cognition, are all explained by 
the  persisting  abilities,  mechanisms,  and  capacities  etc.  of  persisting  systems,  not  by  fleeting  
temporary coupled systems.303
Now, if it is really so that what cognitive science is interested in is explained in terms of  
300 Rupert 2004: 393 original emphasis. 
301 Rupert 2004: 389. Note that where Rupert presents this argument the main focus and dialogue is with Clark's 
exposition of extended cognition. Yet, in his (2010b: 343n.1 and 2) he explicitly refers to some of the authors of 
enactivism, extended cognition and distributed cognition (as well as some that have here been presented as 
proponents of the embodied-embedded approach) as advocating HEC. Therefore, in this chapter I will keep in line 
with Rupert's way of conceiving matters and will take enactivism, extended cognition and distributed cognition in 
general as proponents of HEC.  
302 Rupert 2004: 425–428; 2009a: 44–47; 2009b: 102–105; 2010a: 328–334; 2010b: 346–352
303 Rupert 2010b: 346; 2010a: 330–334; 2009b: 103. I will not go through the specific empirical examples Rupert uses 
to support his argument. If one is interested in these see the references here. Note also that just this sort of view of 
cognitive behaviour is highly contested by distributed cognition for instance.
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persisting organism-bound properties and HEC does not make use of this type of organism-bound 
cognitive  architecture,  then  according  to  Rupert,  HEC  'loses  out  on  grounds  of  accuracy  and 
explanatory power.'304 Presumably this is where the scientific cost that Rupert is getting at ensues: if  
there is no core cognitive agent to refer to in explanations because the systems are so vastly varied 
and temporary, the required explanations for (given) cognitive phenomena would also be vastly  
numerous and diverse. Yet, Rupert continues:
Once, however, the HEC-theorist's model has been appropriately articulated–so that it 
includes the integrated internal architecture necessary to explain such organismically 
local  behavior  as reading [etc.]–both HEC- and HEMC-theorists  will  have embraced 
structurally similar explanations of interactive cognitive processing, that is, of the cases 
that motivate HEC.305
According to Rupert two unappealing consequences for HEC ensue from this. Either 1)  HEC loses  
on grounds of conservatism or 2) it loses on grounds of simplicity. 1) Rupert argues that HEC is an  
uninteresting  position  since  it  merely  adds  the  label  “cognitive”  to  the  external  resources  (in  
addition  to  positing  an  internal  (cognitive)  system  and  interactions  between  the  internal  and 
external).  This  is  in  contrast  to  HEMC which recognises  the same three structures/phenomena 
without the need of relabelling the external resources as cognitive. 2) Rupert notes that, on the  
other hand if HEC's contribution is to posit a single unified system over and above the distinct  
elements (that all the proponents in the debate recognise and with which HEMC so successfully  
accounts for the relevant cognitive phenomena) then HEC merely adds unnecessary and gratuitous  
complexity.306
7.2 Enactive Agency
The account  of  enactivism presented  in  section  3.2  may  be  understood  essentially  as  a  broad 
account  of  cognitive  agency.307 Hence,  in  what  follows  I  will  rehearse  the  relevant  aspects  of 
enactive cognition already presented in 3.2. with respect to agency and Rupert's challenge. Much of  
the application of enactivism's conception of agency to Rupert's challenge is my own extrapolation 
since  there  is  yet  to  be  found a  systematic  account  of  enactive  agency  that  discusses  Rupert's  
304 Rupert 2010b: 347. Recall here Pöyhönen's (2012) point about the lack of a systematic account of explanatory 
power by the opponents and proponents of HEC.
305 Rupert 2010b: 347
306 Rupert 2010b: 347
307 Note how Torrance (2005) has a similar reading of the general projects within enactive cognition: a broader 
account examining cognition and a more focused one examining the nature of perception.
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challenge and criticisms.
Recall that there were five essential notions in enactive cognition: autonomy, sense-making, 
emergence, embodiment, and experience. A key point of enactive cognition was to get rid of the 
cognitivists' sandwich model of cognition that divorced cognition, perception and agency. Instead,  
cognition,  perception  and  agency  should  be  thought  of  as  intertwined.  Embodied  biological  
organisms are autonomous through their self-generating and self-maintaining activity. In addition,  
these organisms are sensorimotorly coupled to the environment, thus allowing them to bring forth  
(or enact) relevant information for them. Thus, for enactivism cognitive agency is found in these  
sort of autonomous biological organisms.308
So, contrary to Rupert's conception of agency I take it that enactivism conceives cognitive  
agency as organism-centered, rather than organism-bound.309 As Thompson describes cognition as 
'a knot or tangle of recurrent and re-entrant processes centered on the organism […]'.310 Thus if 
one  were  to  extrapolate  a  response to  Rupert's  challenge from all  this,  one  could  argue  that  
enactivism does not lose touch with the core cognitive agent and become explanatory simple or 
gratuitous since agency remains centered on the organism. Moreover, one could argue that Rupert's 
way of conceiving agency as organism-bound is wrongheaded since it misses the point about the 
intertwined nature of cognition, agency and perception, and thus mistakenly divorces agency from 
cognition  and  perception.  It  is  Rupert's  account  that  misses  something  explanatorily  crucial. 
Furthermore,  enactivism need not make such a strict  three-fold division of distinct  phenomena 
involved in cognition as Rupert claims is needed in HEC (i.e. internal cognitive system, external  
cognitive resources and interaction between the internal  and external). Recall  from 3.2 that  for  
enactivism cognition is more holistic and emerges in the relational domain between the organism 
and the  environment.  This  is  opposed  to  the  internalist  or  individualistic  picture  of  cognition 
Rupert champions, whereby cognition is primarily within the organism (its brain/central nervous 
system  (CNS  hereafter))  that  may  then  be  influenced  by  external  resources  found  in  the 
environment. 
Therefore,  even  if  the  brain/CNS  plays  an  important  role  in  cognition  for  enactivism, 
because of the relational conception of cognition it is not simply reduced to the brain/CNS. I take it  
applies to the question of agency alike. It is through the autonomous sense-making activity of the  
organism  and  the  integration  with  the  environment  through  the  sensorimotor  couplings  that 
agency is centered on the organism (or perhaps more aptly in the relational domain of organism-
environment for that matter) without it being bounded within the organism and its nervous system. 
Agency is not a static property of closed organism, but results from the enactive  activity of the 
308 Thompson 2005: 417–418
309 Note that this should be distinguished from Clark's hypothesis of organism-centered cognition that will be shortly 
discussed below.
310 Thompson 2005: 408 referencing Hurley 1998.
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organism. Thus, Di Paolo's characterisation of enactive agency as the 'modulation of the coupling 
between the autonomous entity and its environment'311 applies well here and captures the essence 
of what is to be explained in scientifically relevant phenomena.
7.3 Extended Agency
I will now turn my attention to extended cognition's take on agency. I will start with first-wave 
extended  cognition,  namely  Clark's  account  of  agency,  and  then  continue  with  second-wave  
extended cognition. The second-wave account of agency is only a tentative analysis of how it might  
conceive  the  matter  since  there  is  no systematic  account  of  agency  found in  the  second-wave 
extended cognition literature. 
Clark explicitly responds to Rupert's criticism by arguing for the  hypothesis of organism-
centered cognition (HOC) over Rupert's organism-bound cognition.312 Clark says the following:
Human  cognitive  processing  (sometimes)  literally  extends  into  the  environment 
surrounding the organism. But the organism (and within the organism, the brain/CNS) 
remains the core and currently the most active element. Cognition is organism centered 
even when it is not organism bound.313
Clark's aim is to show that extended cognition, when properly understood, does not loose grip of 
the persisting core of cognitive agency that is present in softly assembled hybrid systems, and that it  
is in fact the conservative HEMC that threatens to obscure that what is important with regards to  
explaining cognitive phenomena.314 
First of all Clark maintains that cognitive agents are not individuated by first finding their  
cognitive mechanisms, but by identifying 'a reliable, easily identifiable physical nexus of perception 
and  action,  apparently  driven  by  a  persisting  and  modestly  integrated  body  of  goals  and 
knowledge.'315 It is only after this identification that the location and type of the relevant underlying 
mechanisms in/for a given cognitive task are identified. Secondly, Clark makes the “uncontroversial”  
assumption  that  the  brain is  at  least  currently  the essential  core  element  of  individual  human 
cognitive activity. Clark then asks whether the brain cares about 'the nature (biological or non-
biological) or the location (organism bound or organism external) of the processing and storage 
311 Di Paolo 2009: 15 fig.1
312 Note that this is independent of the enactive organism-centred agency.
313 Clark 2008a: 139
314 Clark 2008a: 111, 116
315 Clark 2008a: 118
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resources soft-assembled to tackle some cognitive task'.316 In responding no to this question Clark 
relies  on  Gray  et  al.'s317 studies  and  their  subsequent  time-cost-based  model  of  cognitive  task 
performance, to which was briefly alluded to in section 6.3.1. The key idea in Gray et al.'s model  
that arises from their experiments is that our brains are indifferent to the information source and  
what ultimately matters when recruiting internal or external resources when completing cognitive 
tasks is the cost-effectiveness of the (mix of ) elements. Hence, they argue for a “level playing field” 
with regards to the use of external and/or internal resources. Gray et al. took the time taken to 
complete a task as the prime cost function, but Clark maintains that Gray et al's conclusions are  
compatible with other cost functions as well  (that may be determined depending on the given  
context and goals) and hence Gray et  al.'s conclusions should be taken more generally. 318 This 
empirical evidence leads Clark to a  hypothesis of cognitive impartiality, that  resembles his 007-
principle and the principle of ecological assembly presented in section 2.2:
Our  problem-solving  performances  take  shape  according  to  some cost  function  or 
functions that, in the typical course of events, accord no special status or privilege to 
specific types of operations (motoric, perceptual, introspective) or modes of encoding 
(in the head or in the world).319
The relevance of the hypothesis of cognitive impartiality for HOC, the role of the brain/CNS and the  
interplay  of  the  elements  within  a  hybrid  system  becomes  clearer,  when  Clark  makes  two 
qualifications to the hypothesis of cognitive impartiality. Or rather Clark teases out two explanatory 
targets  in  play  so  as  to  prevent  HOC from  slipping  into  Rupert's  HEMC.  1)  The  role  of  the 
brain/CNS is to “recruit” the extended cognising; i.e. it combines the various elements into a softly-
assembled extended device. 2) Once this sort of device is in place cognitive processing, namely the 
flow and transformation of information, provide 'the machinery of ongoing thought and reason.'320 
So, Clark's point is that the brain/CNS plays an important role in building up and controlling the  
soft-assembled system through combining the influences of various different  elements;  whereas  
HEC brakes the boundaries of skin and skull and provides an account of the information flow and  
cognitive processing relevant for  a  given problem-solving (cognitive)  task once the  assembly  is 
complete. Clark argues that HEMC threatens to obscure this (scientifically important) distinction 
between the two explanatory projects by erecting strict boundaries. 321 I will finish Clark's account of 
agency with the following rather long quote.
316 Clark 2008a: 118
317 Gray & Fu 2004; Gray & Veksler 2005; Gray et al. 2006
318 Clark 2008a: 118–122
319 Clark 2008a: 121
320 Clark 2008a: 122
321 Clark 2008a: 122, 137. Note that Clark (2008a: 123–136) steers away from any possible picture of the brain with an 
inner homunculus that controls the building of the soft-assembled system.
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[…] in  rejecting  the  vision of  human cognitive processing  as  organism bound,  we 
should  not  feel  forced  to  deny  that  it  is  (in  most,  perhaps  all,  real-world  cases) 
organism centered. It is indeed primarily (though not solely) the biological organism 
that, courtesy especially of its potent neural apparatus, spins and maintains (or more 
minimally selects and exploits) the webs of additional structure that then form parts of  
the machinery that accomplishes its own cognizing. Just as it is the spider body that  
spins and maintains the web that then (following Dawkins 1982) constitutes part of its 
own extended phenotype, so it is the biological human organism that spins, selects, or  
maintains the webs of cognitive scaffolding that participate in the extended machinery 
of its own thought and reason. Individual cognizing, then, is organism centered even if  
it is not organism bound.322
Note the similarity to enactivism's insistence on the organism creating and maintaining its  own  
domain of meaningfulness, but recognise also the slightly distinct take on the notion of organism in  
use here. Whereas enactivism emphasised the relational nature of the organism and environment 
without  there  being  strict  boundaries  marking  cognition,  Clark  seems  to  be  conceiving  the 
organism as some pre-determined entity with boundaries that may be extended. 
Second-wave  extended  cognition  have  yet  to  provide  a  systematically  developed,  clear 
and/or unified account of cognitive agency. Hence I will extrapolate three accounts of agency from 
the  second-wave literature.  I  take  it  that  there  are  four  available  options  for  the  second-wave 
theorist to take. Cognitive agency could be conceived in line with enactivism, Clark's  organism-
centered  agency,  and/or  as  distributed  agency.  It  is  also  possible  for  second-wave  extended 
cognition to postulate its own distinct take on agency.
Menary takes the formation of cognitive agency to be a dynamic process that ties intimately 
with the surrounding environment through coupling rather than starting from a predetermined 
position. He makes the following claim about cognitive agency:
We  are  not  just  coupling  artifacts  to  pre-existing  cognitive  agents;  the  organism 
becomes a cognitive agent by being coupled to the external environment.323
Now,  Menary  does  not  develop  this  claim  further  in  his  writings  and  therefore  I  take  the 
interpretation of his account of agency to be up for grabs. I take the most viable reading of Menary's 
claim to be most inline with enactivism's account of agency. On the one hand, even tough Menary's 
use of the notion of organism could suggest an allusion to Clark's organism-centered view I deem  
322 Clark 2008a: 123 original emphasis.
323 Menary 2006a: 342
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this not to be a viable option since Menary clearly shies away from the idea of a predetermined (or  
“pre-existing”) organism to which agency is then centered on. Yet it seems that for Menary agency is  
still somehow centered on the organism. Note for instance how it is only after the coupling that the  
organism may be said to be an agent; as is clear in the claim: organism becoming a cognitive agent  
by being coupled to the external environment. This passage seems to allude to a similar reading of 
the  intimate  relationship  between  the  organism  and  the  environment  that  enactivism  holds.  
Moreover,  just before the quoted passage Menary  emphasises  that the proper unit  of cognitive 
analysis  is  the  integration of  internal  and  external  vehicles.324 I  take  it  that  this  again  echoes 
enactivism's point about the role of agency in modulating the interactions between the autonomous 
entity and the environment. On the other hand, Menary's focus on the notion of “organism” in the 
quoted passage does exclude him from a more distributed or decentralised view of agency, that is  
championed  by  Hutchins  for  instance.  Hutchins'  view,  which  will  shortly  be  discussed  more 
thoroughly, maintains that both the assembled cognitive systems and more importantly even the  
assembly, recruitment and control processes themselves (i.e. both of the explanatory projects that 
Clark distinguished) should be thought of as distributed. Thus I take it that Menary's account of 
agency is organism-centered, but not as Clark conceives it but as enactivism may hypothesise. 
Yet, this sort of view on agency might not be widely accepted in second-wave extended 
cognition in general,  or by  Sutton in  particular.  As was noted in section 5.3 Sutton alludes to  
distributed cognition as offering a  viable methodological  take on the study of cognition that  is 
compatible with extended cognition.325 So one could extrapolate that Sutton's view on cognitive 
agency could be more in line with Hutchins' than with Clark's organism-centered view or Menary's  
enactivist  perspective.  Moreover,  Kirchhoff,326 inspired by Sutton's  gesture  at  a  possible distinct 
third-wave extended cognition, has recently argued that extended cognition (in both of its waves)  
relies on a too individualistic notion of agency (e.g. Clark's HOC), and what is missing is a more 
decentralised account  of  cognitive  agency.  In providing this sort  of  an account  Kirchhoff  relies  
heavily on Hutchins' distributed account of agency. Essentially the point that Kirchhoff is making is 
the same that Hutchins327  makes in favour of his distributed view of agency to be discussed below.
Rowlands' account could also be a move towards a distributed view of agency. This I take to  
be manifested in the following quote:
324 Menary 2006a: 342
325 Sutton 2010; Sutton et al. 2010
326 Kirchhoff 2011
327 Hutchins 2011b
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For our purposes, the notion of a subject can, I think, be understood quite broadly. For 
example, I do not wish to rule out the possibility that the subject in question might be a 
group rather than an individual.328
Yet,  Rowlands does develop his  own distinct  and rather complicated account  of  agency that  is 
closely  tied  with  his  criteria for a  mark of  the  cognitive.  He mostly  analyses  the  ownership of 
cognitive states and processes along the lines of disclosing and revealing activity of the world to the 
subject. Without going much deeper into Rowlands' difficult account, I take it that Rowlands also  
(this is in addition to Hutchins) allows the assembly and recruitment processes themselves and not 
simply the assembled cognitive system to be extended/distributed.329 
[…] the vehicles of cognition are causal disclosers of the world. World disclosure, in 
general, is entirely neutral over the nature and location of its vehicles. Sometimes they 
are neural operations, sometimes they are processes taking place in the body, or even 
processes that extend into the world in the form of manipulation, exploitation, and 
transformation of environmental structures.330
7.4 Distributed Agency
As has been noted in chapter 5 distributed cognition conceives cognition from a systemic point of  
view as socially,  environmentally  and culturally  distributed.  However,  with regards to cognitive 
agency  there  is  disagreement  among  theorists  of  distributed  cognition.  In  what  follows  I  will 
present and examine Ronald Giere's and Hutchins' views of agency. I focus on these two since they 
explicitly take up the question of agency in the first place and because their analysis and treatment  
of cognitive agency feeds directly into the current debate of 4ED.
Giere331 advocates a distributed view of cognition that is much in line with that presented in  
chapter  5.  Yet,  it  is  Giere's  view  on  agency  that  especially  distinguishes  him  from  the  other  
distributed cognition theorists  presented in this  thesis,  Hutchins  in particular.  Giere alludes to  
Bruno Latour's notion of hybrid systems; i.e. systems that are composed of combinations of human 
and non-human parts.332 Giere conceives distributed cognitive systems essentially as hybrid systems 
thus accrediting external representations and the artifactual world to be encompassed in distributed 
cognitive systems.  Up to  this point  Giere is  in  agreement with Hutchins.  Yet,  he  departs  from 
328 Rowlands 2010: 135
329 Rowlands 2010: ch. 6–8
330 Rowlands 2010: 218
331 Giere 2004; 2007; 2011.
332 Giere 2007: 319; Latour 1993.
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Hutchins'  view  by  maintaining  a  threefold  division  of  distributed  cognitive  systems:  physical,  
computational  and human.  Specifically  Giere reserves  notions  such as  mind,  intentionality  and 
agency  only  to  the  human aspects  of  the distributed  cognitive  systems.  Hence he has  recently  
aligned himself with Clark's notion of organism-centered but not organism-bound cognition.333 The 
main justification for Giere's position, I take it, is similar to Rupert's and Clark's since it is framed in 
terms of  providing  a  theoretical  framework  that  various scientific  enterprises  from philosophy,  
anthropology,  history  to  psychology  are  able  to  share.  For  Giere  it  seems to  be  explanatorily  
superfluous and redundant to extend the notion of agency to parts of distributed cognitive systems  
other than humans.334
Now, Hutchins conceives cognitive agency as essentially distributed. First,  recall the way 
Hutchins argued for cultural practices as key elements in shaping cognition in section 5.2 and how 
one must be careful  when attributing relevant cognitive properties to individuals taking part in 
cultural practices that might in fact more aptly belong to a distributed system. Recall also that the 
roots of  Hutchins'  account of  agency lie  in his  reaction against  Clark's  organism-centered view. 
Hutchins  argues  that  Clark's  view is  too individualistic  and centered too heavily  on the  brain. 
Hutchins notes how Clark supports the idea that the assembled cognitive systems may be extended  
(Clark's second explanatory target) but fails to see 'that the assembly process itself is extended and 
orchestrated by the cultural practices that constitute the cognitive niche.'335 Hutchins thus takes 
away the assembly and recruitment processes, that Clark emphasised belonged solely to the brain 
(Clark's  first  explanatory  target),  and distributes  them to the surrounding dynamic culture,  i.e.  
cultural practices. 
Hutchins  argues  that  Clark  is  forced  to  take  up  his  hypothesis  of  organism-centered 
cognition due  to  a  misunderstanding  of  the  role  of  culture  in  cognition  (I  take  Hutchins'  
argumentation to apply to Rupert's HEMC and Giere's position alike). First, Clark misses the fact 
that  the cultural  world is  dynamic and not static  like Otto's  notebook.  It  for  instance includes  
dynamic activities of  other social people and thus allows the dynamic organising,  assembly and 
recruitment processes to include other possible sources besides the brain and/or the body. Second, 
culture is falsely reduced simply to internal mental representations and lifeless artefacts. Cultural  
practices do include internal representations but are not solely identified by them, as was noted in 
section 5.2.336 Hutchins maintains that by  getting rid of  these misunderstandings the organism-
centered (or for that matter organism-bound) thinking of cognitive agency could be removed. It is  
cultural practices that contribute to the organisation and assembly of distributed cognitive agency.  
Hence, Hutchins proposes his own hypothesis of enculturated cognition:
333 Giere 2011: 398
334 Giere 2004; 2007; 2011.
335 Hutchins 2011b: 442
336 Hutchins 2011b: 442–444
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The ecological assemblies of human cognition make pervasive use of cultural products.  
They are always initially, and often subsequently, assembled on the spot in ongoing  
cultural practices337
Now, Rupert has reacted against this sort of distributed agency since according to him it implies the  
presence of group cognition/minds.338 Group cognition refers to the idea that a group of people in 
itself may bear cognitive states over and above its constituent individuals. That is, group cognition  
supervenes on, is realised by, but is not simply reducible to the cognitive processes, actions and 
agency of the members of the group. Rupert focuses on group cognitive states as representational 
states that take the form of expressions in public language. Such as written court verdicts and press  
releases.  These  states  are  supposed  to  be  cognitive  states,  analogous  to  the  thoughts  and 
representations of an individual, even if they appear to be of linguistic form. Rupert focuses on 
representations  because  he takes  them  to  be  a  central  feature  of  cognition,  a  feature  which 
according to him groups lack. Moreover Rupert focuses group representations as expressions of 
public language because he takes most of the proponents of group cognition, such as Hutchins and  
Margaret Gilbert, to conceive them this way.339 Hence, I will refer to individual cognitive states as 
individual representations and group cognitive states as group representations.
Rupert’s  argument  has  two  parts:  he  first  offers  a  general  objection  to  the  causal  
explanatory power of group cognition and then applies these general concerns to particular cases  
of naturalistic accounts of mental representation. The general objection aims to show that nothing 
explanatory is gained from positing group cognition over and above what is gained from a more 
thorough  understanding  of  the  individuals  involved  in  the  group.  Note,  here  how  Giere's 
argumentation is remarkably similar. Giere is also weary of the notion of group/collective cognition 
and  maintains  that  what  ultimately  explains  the  final  cognitive  output  of  the  group  is  the 
interactions of the individuals of the group acting together.340 Rupert specifically maintains that it is 
explanatorily superfluous to equate the expressions of public language with autonomous cognitive 
states (group representations).341 Rupert gives two sufficient conditions for this and argues that:
337 Hutchins 2011b: 445
338 Rupert 2005. Note that one of the reasons for Giere to restrict cognitive agency to the human part of the 
distributed system was to avoid the explanatorily redundant postulation of this sort of group cognition, or what he 
dubbed collective cognition. (Giere 2007: 319)
339 Rupert 2005: 177–180. I accept Rupert’s way of conceiving group representations only because I want to put 
forward a counter-argument that meets Rupert at his own theoretical territory. In the end I will point to another 
dynamic reading of group representations that Rupert neglects. Note also that Rupert takes Gilbert as supporting 
the ontological claim of group minds, even though this is not necessarily Gilbert's position with regards to her 
plural subject account (Gilbert 2000: 21fn.23, 22).
340 Giere 2007: 319
341 Rupert 2005: 178–180
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After all, every step in the construction of such representations, as well as every step in  
the causal sequence alleged to involve the effects of those representations,  proceeds 
either [(1)] by brute physical causation (e.g., photons emitted from the surface of the 
page stimulate  the reader’s  retinal  cells)  or  [(2)] by  causal  processes  involving the  
mental states of individuals.342
But an initial worry arises straight out of these conditions. If group cognition is to be dismissed due 
to lack of explanatory power because they supervene on, or are realised by,  individual  mental  
states,  individual  cognition  should  also  be  dismissed  as  explanatorily  superfluous  since  it 
supervenes on physical  neurological processes.  Otherwise Rupert would be simply begging the 
question against group representations by a priori excluding representational systems that for their 
representations rely on subsystems capable of representation themselves.343
Rupert recognises this problem and counters it by maintaining that there is an important 
difference in understanding “inter-level relations”, which allows individual representations to retain 
their  causal-explanatory  power.  Rupert  argues  that  we  do  not  have  any  idea  how  to  reduce 
individual representations to their corresponding neurological realisers, i.e. psychological laws and 
regularities to physical laws and regularities.344 That is, to  eliminate the talk of mental states in 
favour of talk about brain states. But we do have an idea how to account for group representation,  
by making reference to the individual representations of the group. For instance, Rupert maintains  
that a legitimate court verdict is just a ‘majoritarian agglomeration of the opinions of the court’s  
members, set down on paper.’345 So, individual representations are explanatorily useful since they 
cannot  (yet)  be  explained  by  reducing  them  to  their  realisers,  but  group  representations  are 
explanatorily  superfluous  because  they  can  be  explained  by  making  reference  to  individual 
representations of the members of the group. Let’s call this further qualification of conditions (1) & 
(2) with the notion of understanding “inter-level relations”, problem (3).346
These general considerations lead Rupert  to a more particular objection. He views five 
naturalistic accounts of mental representation347 and argues that none of them plausibly applies to 
group representations. Rupert aims to show that group representations as expressions of public  
language cannot be made naturalistically represent something in the world. I am not going to view  
this objection in detail since I will object to Rupert’s general argument, and by rejecting the general  
account beg for its clarification before any particular objections may be drawn from it.348
Now,  Bryce  Huebner  notes  that  Rupert's  condition  (1)  applies  equally  to  individual 
342 Rupert 2005: 179 emphasis added.
343 Rupert 2005: 179–180; Huebner 2008: 99
344 Cf. Dretske’s (1993) emphasis on distinguishing structuring and triggering causes of behaviour.
345 Rupert 2005: 179
346 Rupert 2005: 179–180; Huebner 2008: 99
347 Those of indicator semantics (Dretske), pure-informational semantics (Fodor), teleological semantics (Millikan), 
causal-historical semantics (Prinz), and teleo-isomorphic semantics (Cummins). For more details on these and 
references to the original expositions see Rupert (2005: 180–182).
348 Rupert 2005: 180–184
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representations. All theories that aim to give a naturalistic account of mental  representations (i.e. 
including  just  those that  Rupert  relies on in  his  detailed objection)  necessary  require that  the 
production and use of representations proceed by some causal or physical process. But, if group 
representations are denied on the basis of being explanatorily superfluous because they involve  
brute  physical  causation  and  if  individual  representations  necessarily  involve  causal  or  other 
physical processes, then individual representations should also be denied on the same basis. Rupert 
cannot accept this conclusion, in so far as he relies on naturalised theories of representation in his  
other  objection.  Therefore,  (1)  fails  as  a  sufficient  condition  for  establishing  the  explanatory  
superfluity of group cognition. Hence, there needs to be some other unique problem with group 
representations.349
Problem (3) may be seen as this unique difficulty to group representations.  But first, I  
would  like  to  set  aside  an  initial  worry  that  arises  from  Rupert’s  insistence  on  the  proper  
understanding of “inter-level relations”, and then follow up on Huebner’s much more charitable  
reading of (3). Now, if it is so that individual representations are explanatorily useful only because  
they cannot be eliminated in favour of the talk of their realiser brain states, then this implies that  
the explanatory value of individual representations is simply up to the current scientific knowledge. 
That  is,  if  science  eventually  succeed  in  the  elimination,  then  individual  representations  will  
become as explanatorily superfluous as group representations, maybe it is just a matter of  time  
when this happens. As was noted above Rupert would not accept the (possible) elimination of  
individual representations.350
To resist this eliminativist outcome, (3) may be seen in another way, which directly feeds  
into condition (2) and Rupert’s detailed objection. Huebner emphasises this charitable reading of  
(3)  and  notes  that  the  unique  difficulty  for  group  cognition  may  lie  in  the  fact  that  group  
representations do not introduce anything new in kind as opposed to individual representations. 
That  is,  by  moving  from  physical  neurological  states  to  representational  states  individual 
representations  gain  semantic  content.  They  gain  it  by  having  the  appropriate  causal  relations 
(perceptual processes) between the perceiver and the world so that they may indicate and carry 
information about  the  world.  Group representations on the other  hand lack  these appropriate 
relations. It is specifically because already contentful individual representations realise them, they  
fail  to gain anything new. So,  because it  is  individual  representations that  explain semantically  
important  states  and processes  in  the  world,  such as  intentional  states,  they  cannot  be  made 
explanatorily superfluous by further scientific discovery. Also, since group representations bear only  
content  derived from  the  representational  states  of  the  individuals  that  produce  them,  group 
representations may be reduced to the aggregate of its individual representations.351 
349 Huebner 2008: 98–99
350 Huebner 2008: 99. Cf. Churchland’s (1981) point about eliminative materialism. 
351 Huebner 2008: 100; Rupert 2005: 180–184
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Huebner  argues  that  even  this  charitable  reading  fails  to  establish  Rupert’s  general 
argument because even individual representations derive their content from lover-level states that  
are already contentful. In order to illuminate this claim Huebner presents a pathological case of 
Capgras syndrome. Everything in a patient with a Capgras syndrome is functioning correctly with  
the exception that when she sees someone familiar to her, e.g. her mother, she has the unshakable 
belief that it is not her mother but an impostor. This phenomenon is thought to arise from a failure 
to  bind visual  representations  to  affective  representations  of  feelings  of  familiarity.  This  again 
suggests that in order to represent someone as one’s mother: a) the visual system needs to function 
properly in order to produce the correct representation, b) the affective response to this stimulus  
must be correct and produce representations of feelings of  familiarity, and c) the association of 
visual  and  affective  representations  must  follow  correct  rules.  Hence,  it  seems  that  individual 
representations  consist  of  subcomponents  that  produce  representations  themselves.  That  is, 
individual representations supervene on structures that are already contentful. Therefore, Rupert’s 
argument  against  group  representations  is  yet  again  in  danger  of  precluding  individual 
representations.  For  if  it  is  the  case  that  group  representations  are  explanatorily  superfluous 
because they supervene on already contentful representations, then individual representations are 
similarly superfluous since e.g. the representation of someone as one’s mother proceeds by causal  
processes involving semantically contentful subcomponents  of the visual  system and the rules of 
association.352
To conclude, recall  that  Hutchins argued for a dynamic conception of the cultural  and 
social  world.  I  think  this  idea  could  be  expanded  to  group  representations  as  well;  group 
representations should be conceived as dynamic representations that arise from and guide further 
behaviour, not as static public language structures. This aspect of representations is neglected by 
Rupert; as Huebner notes: 'taking […] public language structures to exhaust the representational 
states  of  collectivities  is  analogous  to  taking  an  individual’s  utterances  to  exhaust  her  mental  
representations’.353 Finally consider Hutchins' navigation example presented in chapter 5. In the 
task  of  marking the  ships  location a  great  deal  of  coordinated behaviour  and problem solving 
among different individuals and parts of the ship was required. But, even though this task involved 
numerous representational  subsystems (e.g. the particular individuals)  no single subsystem was  
solely responsible for the representation of the ship’s location. Rather, this representation came as a  
whole, and was best explained as being realised by the relevant individuals and their coordinated 
actions. Hence, one could make the claim that there is group cognition supervening on the crew of 
the ship and the representation is irreducible to any individual part of the group. Therefore, the 
representation of the ship’s location is best explained as a group representation.354 
352 Huebner 2008: 101–103
353 Huebner 2008: 105
354 Hutchins 1995: 117–119, 128–131; Tollefsen 2006: 148–149; Huebner 2008: 105–106
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7.5 Summary
In this chapter I examined the issue of cognitive agency and applied 4ED's take on it. This further  
highlighted the overlapping and distinguishing features the different 4ED approaches share with  
each other. I followed similar structure as was present in chapters 2–5 and started with Rupert's  
embodied-embedded take on cognitive agency and his proposed challenge to the other 4ED views. 
Rupert identified agency as organism-bound and argued from deflationary reasons that no-
other take on agency would suffice since they would loose touch with the core cognitive agent. He 
maintained  that  the  organismically-bound  conception  of  agency  accounts  for  all  the  relevant  
cognitive phenomena and nothing (other than confusion and gratuitous complexity) is gained from 
postulating agency any other way. Enactivism challenged the organism-bound view and maintained 
that rather than being bound to the organism, agency is merely centred on it. This way one does  
not loose touch with the core agency. The driving idea behind this was the commitment to the  
holistic intertwined nature of cognition, perception and agency that enactivism upholds. From an 
enactivist  perspective  Rupert's  view seems  misguided since  it  mistakenly  divorces  agency  from 
cognition and perception. 
Extended cognition had many takes on agency. Clark responded to Rupert and argued for 
an organism-centered view by distinguishing two explanatory projects. He interestingly still relied 
on the brain/CNS having the control and recruitment processes but allowed the information flow 
processes  to  be  softly-assembled  and  extended.  According  to  Clark  Rupert's  view  misses  this  
important distinction. Now, second-wave theorists' take on cognitive agency had allusions to both  
the  enactivist  organism-centred  view  (Menary)  and  Hutchins'  distributed  conception  (Sutton, 
Kirchhoff and Rowlands). 
I finally turned my attention to how distributed cognition conceived agency. I distinguished 
two takes on the matter. Giere argued along the lines of Clark and justified his organism-centered  
view similarly to Rupert and Clark by appealing to explanatory reasons. Hutchins reacted against 
especially  Clark's  organism-centered view and maintained that  it  relied  on a too individualistic  
notion of agency and static picture of culture. Hutchins argued that both of the explanatory projects  
Clark distinguished (the assembled system and importantly the assembly process itself ) should be 
regarded as distributed.  He accomplished this  through his  notion of cultural  practice.  Finally  I  
viewed how Hutchins'  view implied the existence of group cognition and how Rupert  failed to 
dismantle their existence as explanatorily superfluous.
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8 Conclusion
The title of this thesis alludes to the location of cognition and paraphrases Clark and Chalmers 355 
when suggesting that "It ain't all in the head". But if cognition ain't all in the head, then where is it?  
The subtitle gestures the possible route to an answer that I have taken in this thesis by “situating  
cognition to the body and the surrounding world”. After briefly describing the orthodox isolationist 
view of cognition I narrowed down my exploration in to this matter into four views on cognition  
that do not restrict cognition solely inside the cranium. These were embodied-embedded cognition,  
enactive cognition, extended cognition, and distributed cognition.
Four  research  questions  have  been  guiding  this  thesis:  I)  What  are  the  theoretical  
commitments the different accounts of cognition in 4ED hold on to and how do these relate to each 
other? II) (Why) should distributed cognition be added with the rest of the 4E accounts? III) What 
critique does 4ED face and how does providing a mark of the cognitive affect both the proponents 
as well as the opponents of 4ED? IV ) How does the notion of cognitive agency figure in the 4ED 
approach(es) to cognition?
With  regards  to  the  first  research  question  it  seems that  all  the  views  share  a  similar  
commitment to challenge the cognitivist sandwich model of cognition. There is also the tendency, 
with varying degrees, to credit more role to the body (sensorimotor activity) and the environment 
(including culture, artefacts and instruments) in cognitive processing. The differences in the views 
relate specifically  on how this  relationship  is  conceived and to  what  degree the body and the 
environment affect cognition. It is here that lies a very interesting issue. There seems to be an 
ostensible thematic gradation that, compared to the orthodox cognitivist position, moves from less 
to more radical with regards to how/where the boundary of cognition may be drawn. This thematic  
progression  also  mirrors  the  structure  of  the  thesis  in  chapters  2–5.  Now,  even  though  the 
approaches share similar theoretical commitments and rely on many notions and concepts from 
each other (note how for instance the notions of scaffolding, niches, ecology, and embodiment  
feature prominently in most, if not all of the views) there seems to be emerging a sort of continuum  
where a growing influence on matters outside the brain are said to take part in cognition when one 
moves  from  embodiment  and  embeddedness  to  enaction  and  extension  all  the  way  to  the 
distribution of cognition. To begin with, the body and the environment are said to have facilitating, 
constraining and coordinating influences on cognitive processing (embodied-embedded cognition). 
Then  cognition  is  moved  to  the  relational  domain  between  the  active  organism  and  the 
environment (enactive cognition). This is followed by allowing the literal extension of cognition in  
to  environmental  resources  on  functionalist,  parity-based  and/or  integrative  complementarity 
grounds (first-  and second-wave cognition).  Ending with a  change of  perspective that  does not 
355 Clark & Chalmers 1998: 8
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extend the cognitive boundaries of organisms but rather necessitates the incorporation of culture, 
history  and  artifacts  etc.  into  the  cognitive  ecology  of  problem solving  organisms  (distributed  
cognition). It is important to note that even if this thematic form seems apparent it should not be  
taken as a given and may very well simplify matters too much as there is a lot of variation within and 
between the approaches. 
This leads to another related and interesting point. It seems that the examination here has 
highlighted both the distinct  character (found in the research interests,  background and in the 
theoretical and conceptual positions of the different 4ED approaches) as well as the shared attitude  
towards the nature and study of cognition as a non-isolated phenomenon. Hence, this study speaks 
in favour of not compiling the different approaches into one wholesale position that in doing so 
looses the theoretical nuances and research tradition of each approach. Note how just these sort of 
considerations were also prominent in answering the second research question to do with the 
addition of distributed cognition with the rest of the 4Es in chapter 5. These sort of considerations 
again underline  the  question  whether  4ED constitutes  a  framework  or  a  general  approach for 
cognition or merely a group of similarly committed and inspired approaches to cognition. I am not 
ready to declare that a framework has emerged. Rather, I would like to paraphrase Kiverstein & 
Clark:356 even if 4ED does not (yet) form a unified church, the mere questioning of this and the 
further examination of these sort of approaches to cognitive phenomena will likely open up new 
vistas of discovery for the study of cognition and its place in the world.
Now, the third research question concerning the mark of the cognitive has its roots in the 
reactions of the opponents of 4ED type cognition. Chapter 6 ended on a note about how Adams 
and Aizawa's insistence on a proper mark of the cognitive retained its significance in the discussion 
even if their objections against 4ED that were based on it failed. Firstly the notion of a mark of the 
cognitive seems to push the orthodox cognitivists  to take  part  in  the debate about the proper 
boundaries of cognition and in doing so raise the viability of 4ED as an available position. Thus the  
ground between the orthodox and unorthodox positions seems to be levelling. Secondly a host of 
meta-level questions about the requirement for a mark of the cognitive arise. Does one need a mark 
of the cognitive in order to draw the boundaries of cognition or even study cognitive phenomena?  
Could one draw the boundaries  on some other  grounds  (e.g.  epistemic  or  explanatory  power 
considerations)? Or would it be best to just proceed with scientific research and let science discover  
the boundaries if ever they are to be discovered?
The fourth research question on agency narrows down the examination of 4ED into a more 
detailed issue. The discussion revolving around the notion of cognitive agency and 4ED's take on it 
draws out further overlap and differences between the different approaches. For these reasons it is  
a growingly relevant issue in the 4ED debate. It is also an independently interesting issue since it  
356 Kiverstein & Clark 2009: 6
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shakes our ordinary understanding of what cognitive agency means. The views on agency varied 
from  organism-bound  (cognitivism  and  embodied-embedded  cognition),  organism-centered 
(enactivism, extended and distributed cognition) to distributed agency (extended and distributed 
cognition). I find it interesting that the notion of agency neither lumps the 4ED together but rather  
for  instance  shows  some  common  ground  between  cognitivism  and  embodied-embedded 
cognition. Another surprising issue is to do with Clark's account of agency. Even though he puts 
forward a view of cognition that radically departs from the orthodox position, his reliance on the 
role of the brain and the central nervous system in agency puts him again closer to the more 
conservative positions. Whereas if you look at Hutchins' distributed account, both the notions of 
cognition and agency boldly depart from the more conservative positions. Distributed agency goes 
so far as to imply the possible viability of group agency.
I would like to conclude this thesis by raising some open questions and future applications 
of  the 4ED approach.  In addition to the  notion  of  cognitive  agency  one could  investigate  the  
normative issues that result from adopting a 4ED position. This is an interesting matter even more 
so because there is lacking a systematic take on this on the part  of the 4ED theorists. What is  
missing in the discussion of cognitive agency is for instance questions to do with responsibility: who 
or what elements can be said to carry responsibility of an action credited to a hybrid system, or  
where lies the responsibility of a group decision? It would be very interesting to see what kind of  
other issues would arise when the notions of organism-bound, organism-centred and distributed 
agency would be approached from the perspective of ethics. 
One could analyse further the significance of the notion of mark of the cognitive and the 
possible ways of demarcating the cognitive from the noncognitive. For instance one could bear 
down  on  the  requirement  of  such  a  mark  for  cognitive  practice  and  the  empirical  study  of 
cognition.  One could  also  investigate the  notion of  representation  that  is  used by  the  various 
authors here. Should we get rid of  representations all together, or only some forms of it? How 
should  representations  be  understood  in  the  first  place?  Could  they  possibly  be  for  instance 
understood as artefacts357 and how does this fit  with the 4ED view? How does an extended or 
distributed understanding of representations affect the notion of representation in the sciences? 
Still,  another area where the 4ED approach could bear fruit  is  the debate surrounding 
social cognition, i.e. how we come to understand the thoughts, feelings and intentions of others.  
For  instance  Gallagher  has  applied  his  embodied-embedded  approach  to  the 
mindreading/interpersonal  understanding  debate  and  re-interpreted  mirror  neuron  findings  in 
favour of his interaction theory of social cognition.358 Also, as was noted in chapter 5.2, it would be 
highly interesting to bring in the analysis of philosophy of action theorists, such as Gilbert, Bratman, 
357 See e.g. Knuuttila (2011).
358 See Gallagher (2001, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008b, 2009b) and De Jaegher (2009a, b).
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Tuomela, Velleman and Tollefsen to issues of cognitive and collective agency.  Or the other way 
around: bring the issues that have risen in the 4ED conceptions to the philosophy of action debate.  
Lastly, it seems that there is still an open question with regards to whether there emerges a unified 
framework for the study of cognition from 4ED or whether 4ED remains merely as collection of  
loosely tied approaches? Suffice it  to say that  even if 4ED remains (for now) as a collection of  
distinct approaches there is a kindling of an emerging paradigm. The take-home message I wish to 
suggest with this thesis is that even if the liberation of cognition from the confines of the head is a  
complex  issue,  being  open  to  this  kind  of  possibility  will  nevertheless  bring  forth  new  and  
interesting ways of understanding cognitive phenomena. 
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